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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with both mechanism design and political economy issues. The
first chapter examines the conditions under which information aggregation (through an
appropriately designed mechanism) can solve hidden-types (also commonly referred
as adverse selection) problems. The remaining two chapters adopt a contract theory
approach in order to explain prominent institutions of many contemporary political
regimes. Chapter two provides a theory on why laws, which restrict the freedom of
private parties to commit on certain transactions, may actually be beneficial for in-
creasing social surplus and promoting economic growth and how the evolution of these
laws interacts with the process of economic development. Finally, chapter three exam-
ines the issue on how the separation between the legislative and the executive branch
of a government can complement political competition in order to achieve an efficient
provision of public goods.
vi
Introduction
This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each one of which examines a different topic.
Chapter one is related to the mechanism design literature and examines the role of
information aggregation in relaxing incentive compatibility and implementing efficient
allocations. Chapters two and three examine the emergence of specific legislative and
judiciary institutions and their implications for social welfare.
More specifically, chapter one is concerned with a general economy, where agents have
private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially
interdependent. It is shown that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowl-
edge (the exact number of agents for each type), then a mechanism exists, which is
consistent with truthful revelation of private information and which implements first-
best allocations of resources as the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
The result requires weak restrictions on preferences (Local Non-Common Indiffer-
ence Property) and on the Pareto correspondence (Anonymity) and it is robust for
small enough noise around the interim distribution. This is useful in understanding the
power of information aggregation in alleviating incentive constraints and is particularly
pertinent to games with large populations, in which case the interim distribution of
types approaches the ex-ante distribution.
Chapter two relates the design of contract law to the process of development. In
this chapter, contract law defines which private agreements are enforceable (i.e. are
binding and enforced by courts) and which are not. Specifically, it considers an economy
where agents face a hold-up problem (moral hazard in teams). The resulting time-
inconsistency problem leads to inefficiently low levels of effort and trading among agents.
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The solution to this problem requires a social contract which meets two conditions: (i)
an economy-wide delegate (judge) responsible for the enforcement of the social contract
and (ii) a set of non-enforceable private contracts (regulation).
However, because this mechanism is costly, its effectiveness depends on the aggregate
production of the economy. To capture the interaction between contract enforcement
and development, a multi-period economy is introduced and it is shown that, in the
early stages of development, the mechanism is infeasible. The appearance of enforce-
ment institutions and regulation is delayed for the later stages. At this point of time,
the hold-up problem is solved and this spurs economic growth further. Finally, the
relationship between economic development and the evolution of contract law may be
non-monotonic, which may explain why empirical studies fail to find a robust relation-
ship between the two.
Finally, chapter three provides a political game where agents decide whether to become
legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining
politicians’ behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions
about the level of the public good.
The following results are derived: (i) Political competition is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the elimination of political rents. (ii) Agents utilize the separa-
tion of powers in order to endogenously select institutions which restrict the power of
politicians. (iii) In conjunction with political competition, these institutions implement
the Lindahl allocation in the economy as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the
political game. iv) As a consequence of the previous result, political rents are zero in
equilibrium, in the sense that the winning politician does not extract part of the social
surplus because of his power.
2
1 Chapter One: Information Aggregation and Ad-
verse Selection
1.1 Introduction
As first shown by the papers of Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973) and Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976), hidden-types (adverse selection) problems can have significant conse-
quences in terms of efficiency on economic outcomes1. More specifically, incentive com-
patibility constraints limit the set of feasible allocations that can be attained. How
are these restrictions relaxed as more information becomes common knowledge? And
what is the minimum additional information required for achieving first-best efficiency?
These are some of the questions that have emerged in the attempt to better under-
stand the effects of information aggregation on efficiency. Indeed, some early papers by
McAfee (1992), Armstrong (1999) and Casella (2002) already point out towards this
direction.
In this chapter, it is claimed that if the number of agents with the same type is
known for all types in a population (what we call the interim distribution of types),
then it is possible, under fairly general conditions, to implement first-best allocations.
More precisely, an economy with asymmetric information and finite agents is considered,
each one of whom has private information about his type. It is also assumed that (i)
the interim-distribution of types is common knowledge, (ii) preferences satisfy the Local
Non-Common Indifference Property and (iii) the social choice set satisfies Anonymity2.
1The title of this chapter may be slightly misleading. Adverse selection is, of course, the outcome
that may be generated in private information environments. The true source of the problem is the
hidden information. Despite the fact that we examine a hidden-types economy, it is shown that in the
equilibrium of this mechanism, individuals reveal their information truthfully and they receive first-
best allocations based on that. Therefore, adverse selection problems never arise as an equilibrium of
this game. So, the main claim is that information aggregation, under certain conditions, can eliminate
the possibility of adverse selection outcomes.
2Since we are considering an economy of incomplete information, different realizations of types,
which are consistent with the same interim-distribution, result in different desirable allocations. There-
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Given these general conditions, it is shown that it is possible to construct a mechanism
which has a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium, where all agents reveal their type truthfully
and they receive a first-best allocation.
This result has two interpretations. On one hand, one may consider economic
applications with a finite number of agents, where, in addition to the private information
that each individual has, there is knowledge about how many agents have each type.
This additional information could come from a positive or negative information shock.
For example, a retail store has received pre-paid orders from its customers, has already
the goods in stock and is ready to make the deliveries. However, the records on the
orders get destroyed due to an accident and the store’s manager does not know who
made each order. What is he to do? Can he induce the customers to reveal the orders
they have made truthfully without them making unreasonable claims or receiving orders
that were meant for other customers? It turns out that this is possible, as long as the
manager posts a list with all the orders made and gives to each customer a basket of
goods, which depends on how many other agents have claimed to have ordered it.
On the other hand, one can interpret this result as an application of the law of
large numbers. If the ex-ante probability distribution is known, then, for sufficiently
large populations, one can obtain a quite accurate estimate of the aggregate number of
agents who have a specific type and, based on this information, he can address adverse
selection problems. An example of this case would be insurance companies, which have
data on million of cases, collected over decades, and know with very high accuracy
the probability of certain accidents taking place and how personal characteristics affect
these probabilities. While the main result is originally stated for the case where the
interim distribution is known with perfect precision, subsequently it is proved that it
fore, the term Social Choice Set instead of the term Social Choice Rule or Correspondence is used,
which usually refers to complete information environments. See also Jackson (1991) and Palfrey and
Srivastava (1989).
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holds for the case where it is known with a small noise.
This formulation is general enough to accommodate both interpretations and the
intuition behind the result is common. If the interim-distribution is known, then one can
aggregate the messages that all agents are sending out and uncover any misreport(s),
even if the identity of the liar is not known. As a consequence, appropriately designed
punishments for lying can induce agents to reveal their information truthfully.
We talk about appropriately designed punishments, because one of the features of
this mechanism is that punishments must not be too extreme. If the punishment from
detecting a lie is too severe, then some agents may deliberately lie about their type in
order to force other agents to also do so. The lies cancel out in terms of the aggregate
information and the former agents “steal” the allocations of the latter, who are forced
to lie under the fear of the extreme punishments. This can lead to coordination failures
and multiplicity of equilibria. Therefore, uniqueness of the equilibrium requires a careful
construction of the allocations when lies are detected. It is shown that such punishments
exist when the indifference curves of different types are not locally identical, meaning
that in the neighborhood of any allocation one can find other allocations such that each
type prefers one of these over the rest.
It should also be pointed out that this result is derived for a general hidden-types
environment. Types can be multi-dimensional, valuations can be independent or inter-
dependent and the joint probability distribution over type-profiles allows for correlation
across types or dependencies on the identity of the agents (different agents may face
different probability distributions over types). The only restriction imposed on the no-
tion of (Pareto) efficiency is Anonymity. Anonymity requires that the allocation, which
an agent receives, depends only on his type (and possibly on the interim-distribution)
but not on his identity. It is a reasonable assumption which is satisfied by the majority
of social choice sets. For instance, in many mechanism design papers, a mechanism is
5
efficient if it implements the utilitarian social choice set, which satisfies our definition
of Anonymity3.
The Walrasian correspondence is another example of a well-known social choice set
which satisfies Anonymity. The issues of the existence of equilibrium and its welfare
properties in economies with adverse selection have been analyzed by many papers in
the context of the Walrasian mechanism4. It has been shown that the equilibrium, if it
exists, is inefficient. Since the usual justification for competitive behavior is the large
number of agents in both sides of markets (indeed, most of these papers assume a con-
tinuum of agents), one can apply the mechanism in this chapter in order to implement
the full-information competitive equilibrium allocations in the examined economies.
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the assumption of the interim distribution
of types being common knowledge is needed because we consider general social choice
sets. If one focuses on the implementation of specific allocations on the Pareto frontier
so that allocations depend only on ones type, one can implement the first-best as a
unique equilibrium even if agents have heterogeneous beliefs or no information at all
about the interim distribution5. The mechanism of this chapter can still implement
the desirable allocations truthfully, given that the social planner knows the interim
distribution. This is because, as becomes clear in section 1.4, players’ best-response
correspondences depend on their beliefs about how many misreports will be detected
by the mechanism and not on their ability to detect other agents’ lies. For instance,
this formulation fits the example of the store manager provided earlier. The manager
does not have to post the list of orders. It is sufficient that agents know that he knows
them.
3See for example the papers by Mezzetti (2004), Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007).
4Examples include Prescott and Townsend (1984), Gale (1992 and 1996), Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2002), Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005), Bisin and Gottardi (2006), Rustichini and Siconolfi
(2008).
5E.g. the Walrasian correspondence in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model.
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We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for full implementation when
the interim-distribution is common knowledge and examples of well known economies
with adverse selection, where the mechanism can be implemented. Finally, the issue of
robustness to small perturbations regarding the knowledge of the interim-distribution
and the issue of participation constraints are examined.
1.2 Related Literature
This chapter is most closely related to papers that use information aggregation to
implement first-best allocations in economies with asymmetric information. Thus, in
terms of spirit and research questions, Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) is the paper
closest to this research. They consider a specific set of agents, who play multiple copies
of the same game at the same time and their types are independently distributed across
games. They allow for mechanisms, which “budget” the number of times that an agent
claims to be of a certain type. If the number of parallel games becomes very large, then
all the Bayes-Nash equilibria of these mechanisms converge to first-best allocations.
This model differs from that of Jackson and Sonnenschein in four dimensions: (i)
It does not require multiple games to be played at the same time but a stronger as-
sumption on what is common knowledge is imposed (or, in certain cases, what is known
by the central planner). (ii) It allows for interdependent values, while they consider
an independent values setting. (iii) It allows for a more general joint probability over
type profiles, since types can be independently or interdependently distributed in this
formulation, and apart from preferences, types may concern other individual character-
istics as well (productivity parameters, proneness to accidents, etc.). iv) It also allows
for a more general social choice set. In terms of results, if values are interdependent
(but still independently distributed), the Jackson-Sonnenschein mechanism may have
multiple equilibria in the limit, while we prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium under
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small perturbations.
McLean and Postlewaite (2002, 2004) also consider efficient mechanisms in economies
with interdependent values. The state of the world is unknown to all agents, but each
individual receives a noisy private signal about the state. They show that when signals
are sufficiently correlated with the state of the world and each agent has small informa-
tional size (in the sense that his signal does not contain additional information about
the state of the world when the signals of all the other agents are taken into account),
then their mechanism implements allocations arbitrarily close to first-best allocations.
There are two main differences between their setting and the one in this chapter.
First, in the model of McLean and Postlewaite when private signals are perfectly cor-
related with the state of the world all agents learn not only their own type but also the
type of all other agents. That is, in the limit, the framework of McLean and Postlewaite
is one of complete information. In contrast, in the setting of this chapter agents can,
at most, know the interim distribution of types (when the signal is perfect)6. Second,
McLean and Postlewaite implement allocations arbitrarily close to first-best while the
mechanism in this chapter achieves the implementation of the exact first-best alloca-
tions even when agents face a slight uncertainty about the interim-distribution, i.e.
when private signals are slightly noisy.
The chapter is also related to the auctions literature with interdependent types. In
this context, Cre´mer and McLean (1985) and Perry and Reny (2002, 2005), show the
existence of efficient auctions when types are interdependent. Cre´mer and McLean,
however, require large transfers which may violate ex-post feasibility. Also, Perry and
Reny require the single crossing property on preferences which is a stronger restriction
than ours. The general framework presented here can encompass auction design prob-
6In a sense, in this model agents receive private signals as well, but one can think of them as perfect
signals about the interim distribution. As it has already been mentioned, a small noise about the
precision of these signals does not alter the results.
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lems as well. Furthermore, the main focus is the uniqueness of the equilibrium, an issue
which is not studied in these papers.
It is also noteworthy that in the framework of auction design the papers by Maskin
(1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show, in increas-
ing generality, that efficiency and incentive compatibility can not be simultaneously
satisfied if the single crossing condition is violated or if signals are multidimensional.
In that respect, the additional information allows us to overcome this impossibility and
implement efficient outcomes, even if conditions, which are necessary in the standard
mechanism design literature for implementation, are violated.
Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994) show that the inefficiency of trade
between buyers and sellers of a good, who are privately informed about their preferences,
rapidly decreases with the number of agents involved in the two sides of the market and
in the limit it reaches zero. Effectively, the paper examines the issue of convergence to
the competitive equilibrium as the number of agents increases. However, their model
is limited to private values problems and hence it can be seen as a special case of our
formulation.
More recently, the papers by Mezzetti (2004) and Ausubel (2004),(2006) examine the
issues of efficient implementation under interdependent valuations and independently
distributed types. However, they also assume that agents’ preferences are quasi-linear
with respect to the transfers they receive, whereas in the model below utility may not
be transferable. Moreover, the mechanisms proposed in these papers may generate
multiple equilibria (in most of which truth-telling is violated), while we are interested
in a mechanism which has a unique truth-telling equilibrium.
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1.3 The Economy
The economy consists of a finite set I of agents, with I standing for the aggregate number
of agents as well. Θ is the set of potential types (so ϑi is the type of a single agent i).
The vector θ contains I elements and is a type-profile, a realization of a type for each
agent. Each agent has private information about his own type, but does not know the
types of the other agents. Φ is the ex-ante cumulative distribution function over the set
of all possible type-profiles Θ, with Φ(θ) the ex-ante probability that the type-profile
θ is realized.
S is the set of all states. Each state s is a complete description of the world, in-
cluding the economic characteristics of each agent. This means that the state describes
agents’ features, such as preferences, productivity, individual endowments or any other
economically pertinent information. The probability distribution over states Π is a
function of the type-profile θ. Therefore, pi(s|θ) is the probability of state s arising,
conditional on the type-profile θ.
β is an unordered collection of I realizations of types (potentially the same types for
some realizations). One interpretation is that β is the distribution of types that have
been realized. Given a β, the exact number of agents who have a specific type is known
for all types. We slightly abuse terminology by calling β the interim distribution of
types7. Θ(β) is the set of all type-profiles consistent with the interim distribution β,
while Θ(β) is the set of types consistent with β. In other words, Θ(β) is the set of all
vectors which match each agent to a type and which result from β, while Θ(β) is the
set of types which are realized in β.
The above elements characterize the economy: E = {I,Θ,Φ, S,Π, β}. It is assumed
7A more accurate definition of the interim distribution is the percentage of realizations of each
type over the entire population, namely the collection of numbers I(ϑ) = λβ(ϑ)/I, where λβ(ϑ) is the
number of agents who have type ϑ given the collection β. However, since the collection β already
contains this information and for notational simplification, the misnomer of interim-distribution for β
is retained.
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that E is common knowledge. Given E, let A(E) (or simply A) be the set of all feasible
allocations, with elements a ∈ A ⊆ RI×S×L+ , with L × S > 2. L can be interpreted
as the number of commodities in the economy. Each a is an S-tuple of feasible state-
dependent allocations. In other words, the collection of feasible allocations may depend
on the state of the world. Furthermore, it is assumed that preferences are represented
by expected utility functions:
Ui(a) =
∑
θ−i
[∑
s∈S
ui(a, s) pi (s|ϑi,θ−i)
]
φ(θ−i|ϑi, β) , θ−i ∈ Θ−i(β|ϑi)
Ui(a) is the expected utility to agent i when he receives allocation a, with ui(a, s) the
decision-outcome payoff in state s (preferences may be state-dependent) and θ−i is a
type-profile for all agents, excluding i, which is consistent with the interim-distribution
of types β8.
The formulation of the economy allows for modeling a wide variety of economic
situations. Types may or may not be independently distributed, and the character-
istics of agents may or may not depend on the types of other agents. Hence, both
adverse-selection problems with independent or inter-dependent valuations can be seen
as special cases of this formulation.
1.4 Implementation of First Best Allocations
1.4.1 Implementation
In this subsection it is shown that the conditions specified in section 1.3 are sufficient
for the implementation of truthful strategies. Full implementation (i.e. the unique-
ness of the truthful equilibrium) requires additional conditions, which are specified in
8Therefore, the standard six axioms for expected utility representation are implicitly required:
Completeness, Transitivity, Local Non-Satiation, Convexity, Continuity and Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives.
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subsections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3. The main idea is simple. The knowledge of the interim
distribution of types allows the construction of a direct mechanism, which provides allo-
cations conditional on the message profile being consistent with the interim distribution
or not. If the message profile is different from the interim distribution, this is consid-
ered as an indication of lying by some agent, in which case the mechanism provides a
“punishment” allocation. As a result, an agent reveals his information truthfully, if all
other agents reveal their information truthfully as well.
Let a∗ = (a∗1, a
∗
2, ..., a
∗
i , ..., a
∗
I) be a Pareto efficient allocation of the economy. ai
represents an individual allocation, namely it is a vector a state-contigent allocations
for agent i. Let am be an individual allocation such that amls = min{a∗ils} for every
i ∈ I and for each state-contingent commodity ls. By construction, I × am is feasible.
Consider the direct mechanism M0(g, a) , g : M → A, in which agents state their type.
λβ(ϑ) is the number of agents with type ϑ according to the interim distribution β and
λm(ϑ) is the number of agents who report type ϑ. Agents receive allocations according
to the following message profiles:
• If λβ(ϑ) = λm(ϑ) , ∀ ϑ ∈ Θ(β), then ai = a∗i .
• If λβ(ϑ) 6= λm(ϑ) for at least one ϑ ∈ Θ(β), then ai = am.
Claim 1: M0 has a truthful equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose I − 1 agents report truthfully. By Local Non-Satiation, Ui(a∗i ) >
Ui(a
m). Therefore, it is a best-response for agent i to report truthfully as well.
This demonstrates that the interim-distribution is sufficient for truthful implementation
under the standard conditions on preferences in general economic environments. In fact,
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implementation of the truthful equilibrium is possible even when there is a single state
contingent commodity. Hence, the implementation of first-best allocations is possible
in the most well-known models of adverse selection (Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973),
Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)) if one makes the additional assumption that the interim-
distribution is known.
Even though this is a strong assumption, in subsection 1.4.6, it is shown that as
the number of agents increases, the interim-distribution converges to the ex-ante dis-
tribution of types. Hence, the standard assumptions of the literature are sufficient for
implementation of first-best allocations when the number of agents is sufficiently large.
1.4.2 Full Implementation
In this section we provide sufficient conditions for full implementation. Three assump-
tions additional to section 1.3 are made. A series of Lemmata, which are used in the
proof of the main Proposition, are presented and we provide the main claim of the
chapter: if the interim-distribution of types is common knowledge, preferences satisfy
the Local Non-Common Indifference Property (LNCIP) and the social choice set sat-
isfies Pareto efficiency and Anonymity, then a mechanism exists that fully implements
it. The additional assumptions required for this result are the following.
Assumption 1: The Social Choice Sets satisfy Anonymity.
Definition 1: A Social Choice Set satisfies Anonymity if, for every social choice func-
tion in the set, each agent’s assigned allocation depends only on his type and the
interim-distribution of types: a∗i = a(ϑi, β).
Under Anonymity, agents who have identical types receive identical allocations. There-
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fore, an agent’s identity per-se has no impact on the agent’s final allocation. As a
result, for any interim-distribution of types there is a unique collection of allocations
to be assigned to agents. The order of the allocations does depend on the type-profile
θ, but the collection of individual allocations is the same for all type-profiles consistent
with the same interim-distribution.
It is also noteworthy that Anonymity is a desirable property for a social choice rule.
In most cases of interest, economists are concerned with the economic characteristics
of agents and not with their identity. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if the
distribution of these characteristics remains unchanged, so does the distribution of the
economically desirable outcomes. It is also a property satisfied by many commonly used
social choice rules, like the Walrasian correspondence and the utilitarian social welfare
function.
Assumption 2: Preferences satisfy the Local Non-Common Indifference Property
(LNCIP).
This is a requirement that the intersection of the indifference planes around any in-
dividual allocation of any two agents with different types is of at least one dimension
lower than the dimensions of the indifference planes themselves. In other words, if the
indifference planes are n-dimensional (e.g. three-dimensional surfaces), the intersection
around any allocation ai is (n-1)-dimensional (e.g. curves). Formally:
Definition 2: Let Ci(a) = {c ∈ A : Ui(c|ϑi,θ−i) = Ui(a|ϑi,θ−i), ‖c− a‖ < }.
The Local Non-Common Indifference Property is satisfied if ∀i ∈ I, ∀a ∈ A and
∀j ∈ I, ϑj 6= ϑi, there exists ij > 0 : dim (Ci(a) ∩ Cj(a)) 6 L× S − 1 , ∀  < ij.
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Figure 1: Indifference Curves satisfying LNCIP
LNCIP is a weaker restriction than the Single-Crossing Property (SCP) which is usually
used in the literature. For example, any pair of indifference curves that has finitely
many intersections satisfies the LNCIP but it violates the SCP. Also, LNCIP allows for
tangent indifference planes (as long as the tangent parts “miss” at least one dimension
compared to the indifference planes), while the SCP does not. On the other hand, if
SCP is satisfied then LNCIP is also satisfied9. Figure 1 provides two diagrams, which
illustrate the LNCIP and distinguish it from the SCP.
Finally, we denote by A(ai) the set of individual allocations strictly less than ai:
A(ai) = {ci ∈ A : cils 6 ails,∀ ls}. Li(ai) is the lower contour-set for an agent i given
some individual allocation ai.
Assumption 3: If for ϑ, ϑ′ holds that a∗ϑ ϑ′ a∗ϑ′ and a∗ϑ′ ϑ c , ∀c ∈ A(a∗ϑ)∩Lϑ′(a∗ϑ′),
then λβ(ϑ
′) > λβ(ϑ), where ϑ and ϑ′ are different types.
9Note that we could alternatively characterize this restriction on preferences in terms of the ax-
iomatic approach. Apart from the standard axioms (Completeness, Transitivity, Local Non-Satiation,
Convexity, Continuity and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives), the Axiom of Local Non-Common
Indifference would be required. In this case, the only difference from the definition provided above is
the definition of Ci(a): Ci(a) = {c ∈ A : c ∼i a, ‖c− a‖ < }.
15
Assumption 3 ensures feasibility off-the-equilibrium-path and is discussed in more detail
after the presentation of Lemma 4. Below, we provide three results which hold for any
Pareto efficient allocation. The combination of these results shows that every allocation
on the Pareto frontier of an economy generates a “social ranking” among the agents of
the economy, such that agents of “lower ranks” envy the allocations of “higher ranks”.
By exploiting the common knowledge of this ranking, due to the common knowledge of
the interim-distribution and the efficiency of the allocation, a mechanism is constructed,
which has a unique equilibrium and in which agents reveal their private information
truthfully.
Lemma 1: Let PF(E) be the Pareto Frontier of economy E. Then, for every allocation
a on the Pareto Frontier, there exists at least one agent i ∈ I, who does not envy the
allocation of any other agent: Ui(ai) > Ui(aj),∀j ∈ I.
Proof: See Appendix A
Lemma 2: For every allocation a on the Pareto Frontier, there exists at least one agent
i ∈ I, whose allocation is not envied by any other agent: Uj(aj) > Uj(ai),∀j ∈ I.
Proof: See Appendix A
Corollary 1: If a ∈ PF (E), then Lemma 1 and 2 hold for any subset of I. Namely, let
Iˇ ⊆ I and let Aˇ = {ai : i ∈ Iˇ}. Then, if a ∈ PF (E), Lemma 1 and 2 hold for Iˇ with
regard to Aˇ as well.
Proof: See Appendix A
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Lemma 1 and 2 provide two necessary conditions for Pareto efficiency. If these condi-
tions are violated, then an allocation can not be Pareto efficient. However, they are not
sufficient. One can easily find examples, where these conditions hold but the allocation
is not on the Pareto frontier of the economy. Most importantly for our purposes, they
imply that any Pareto efficient allocation exhibits a social ranking between groups of
agents who envy and groups who are envied.
Let Rank(K) = {i ∈ I : Ui(ai) > Ui(aj),∀j ∈ I}, be the set of agents who do not
envy the allocation of any other agent. By Lemma 1, we know that this set is non-
empty. Then, by removing this set of agents from the set I and applying Corollary 1,
one can define Rank(K-1) = {i ∈ I−Rank(K) : Ui(ai) > Ui(aj),∀j ∈ I−Rank(K)}.
By iteration, we define K groups, 1 6 K 6 I, such that the agents in each one of them
do not envy any of the agents in their own group or groups with lower rank, but they
envy the allocation of some agent(s) in groups with higher rank10. We will also refer
to group Rank(K) as the group with the highest rank and group Rank(1) as the
group with the lowest rank. Some additional results required for the proof come from
the LNCIP and are provided in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
Lemma 3: If the LNCIP holds, then around the neighborhood of any individual
allocation ai, there exists a set of allocations such that each agent of a certain type
prefers a particular allocation over the rest.
Proof: See Appendix A
10One extreme case is when an allocation exhibits no-envy, in which case Rank(K) contains the
whole set of agents and Lemma 1 and 2 apply for all (egalitarian allocations). The other extreme case
is when each rank-group contains a single agent, in which case the agents form a complete hierarchy,
from the one who is envied by all the other agents to the one who is not envied by anyone else.
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In effect, Lemma 3 states that it is possible to find incentive compatible allocations
for any type in the neighborhood of any allocation, which implies that it is possible to
satisfy no-envy, at least in a local sense.
Lemma 4: Suppose a∗ ∈ PF (E) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. ∀ϑ, ϑ′ ∈ Θ(β) there
exist some feasible individual allocations {a1(ϑ, ϑ′), a2(ϑ, ϑ′)}, such that, if Rank(ϑ) >
Rank(ϑ′), then a1(ϑ, ϑ′) ϑ a∗ϑ′ %θ a2(ϑ, ϑ′) , a∗ϑ′ %ϑ′ a2(ϑ, ϑ′) ϑ′ a1(ϑ, ϑ′).
Proof: Because a Pareto efficient allocation is feasible by definition, any allocation
c ∈ A(a∗ϑ) ∪ A(a∗ϑ′) is feasible. Also, due to the Pareto efficiency of a∗ and the fact
that ϑ′ envies the first-best allocation of ϑ, Lϑ′(a∗ϑ′) ∩ A(a∗ϑ) 6= ∅. Take an individual
allocation c inside this intersection and arbitrarily close to (and below) the indifference
plane of ϑ′ that passes through A(a∗ϑ′). Therefore, a
∗
ϑ′ ϑ′ c. There are two possible
sub-cases to consider (the case of indifference is being ignored because it always possible
to move c slightly so that it falls under the following two cases).
Case a): c ϑ a∗ϑ′ . In this case, let a1(ϑ, ϑ′) = c and a2(ϑ, ϑ′) = a∗ϑ′ and this
completes the proof. λβ(ϑ) allocations c and λβ(ϑ
′) allocations a∗ϑ′ are feasible on
aggregate.
Case b): a∗ϑ′ ϑ c. In this case, by LNCIP, it is possible to find an allocation d very
close to a∗ϑ′ such that: d ϑ a∗ϑ′ and c ϑ′ d. Because c is in the interior of A(a∗ϑ), it
is always possible to find such points (one can define distance  and make sure that
B(c) ∩ Uϑ′(a∗ϑ′) 6= ∅, while B(d) ∩ Uϑ′(a∗ϑ′) = ∅, where B(c) is the open ball with
radius  around c). Therefore, let a1(ϑ, ϑ
′) = d and a2(ϑ, ϑ′) = c. λβ(ϑ) allocations d
and λβ(ϑ
′) allocations c are feasible on aggregate. 
Lemma 4, provides pairs of feasible and incentive compatible allocations for any pair
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of types ϑ, ϑ′ which are of different rank. However, feasibility is ensured under the
implicit assumption that the number of agents is equal across types. If this is not the
case, then additional restrictions on the interim distribution are required. This is the
role of Assumption 3. Specifically, the set {a1(ϑ, ϑ′), a2(ϑ, ϑ′)} in Lemma 4 is feasible
by construction whenever λβ(ϑ) = λβ(ϑ
′). In case a) c ϑ a∗ϑ′ , it is always possible
to find the desired allocations for any number of agents of the two types, since the
allocation which ensures incentive compatibility c is in the interior of A(a∗ϑ).
Case b) a∗ϑ′ ϑ c, however, is problematic if λβ(ϑ) > λβ(ϑ′). In this case it
is feasible to provide λβ(ϑ) allocations of type c and λβ(ϑ
′) allocations of type d. If
the ϑ-type agents are much more than the ϑ′-type agents, then there may be too few
allocations d in order to ensure that a(ϑ, ϑ′) ϑ a∗ϑ′11. Assumption 3 rules out those
cases by imposing restrictions on the number of agents who are envied. This is a joint
restriction on preferences and the interim-distribution.
Lemmas 3 and 4, along with the knowledge of the “social ranking” of the allocations,
allows us to construct a mechanism which makes it a dominant strategy for agents of
higher rank to report their type truthfully. The main idea is that, if the number of
agents, who report a specific type is higher than the number who have this type, ac-
cording to the interim distribution, then they all receive an allocation, which the “true”
types prefer to the first-best allocations of the misreporting types, but the other types
do not prefer. This acts as an effective punishment for lies by those who envy allocations
of other types. Hence, one can use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to prove
the uniqueness of the proposed equilibrium. The proof of Proposition 1 constructs this
argument formally.
Proposition 1: Assume that the economy E, described in section 1.3, satisfies As-
11The last condition is required for ensuring incentive compatibility. See also 4.3 for the necessity
of this condition for full implementation.
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sumptions 2 and 3. Then, for every allocation a∗ ∈ PF (E), which satisfies Assumption
1, there exists a mechanism, for which a∗ is the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium alloca-
tion and agents report their private information truthfully.
Proof: The proof is done by construction. Let a∗ ∈ PF (E), which satisfies Anonymity,
and let a∗(θ) be the first-best allocation which is to be implemented for each type-profile,
with individual allocations ai = a
∗
i (ϑi, β), ∀i ∈ I. Also, let aˆϑ(a, ) denote an individual
allocation in the -neighborhood of allocation a which is incentive compatible for type
ϑ, in the sense of Lemma 3, and let a1(ϑ, ϑ
′), a2(ϑ, ϑ′) be individual allocations as
constructed by Lemma 4. Recall that λβ(ϑ) and λm(ϑ) is the number of agents of type
ϑ according to the interim distribution β and the received messages m, respectively,
and am is the minimum allocation, as defined in 4.1.
Each agent reports his type mi and a final allocation is received according to the
following mechanism M1(g, a):
(i) If m ∈ Θ(β), then ai(mi,m−i) = a∗(mi, β), ∀i ∈ I.
(ii) If m is such that for two types, (ϑ, ϑ′), the number of reported agents is different
from number of agents in the interim-distribution by one, specifically λm(ϑ) =
λβ(ϑ) + 1, λm(ϑ
′) = λβ(ϑ′)− 1, then:
• If Rank(ϑ) = Rank(ϑ′), agents who reported types ϑ, ϑ′ choose an allocation
from the set {a∗(ϑ, β) − , a∗(ϑ′, β) − }.  is strictly positive for all state-
contingent commodities and it is sufficiently small so that a∗(ϑ, β) −  ϑ
a∗(ϑ′, β) and a∗(ϑ′, β)−  ϑ′ a∗(ϑ, β).
• If Rank(ϑ) > Rank(ϑ′), agents who reported types ϑ, ϑ′ choose an allocation
from the set {a1(ϑ, ϑ′), a2(ϑ, ϑ′)}.
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• If Rank(ϑ) < Rank(ϑ′), agents who report type ϑ′ receive allocation a∗ϑ′ and
agents who report type ϑ receive allocation
λβ(ϑ)
λm(ϑ)
a∗ϑ.
• For all mk 6= {ϑ, ϑ′}, ak(mk,m−i) = a∗(mk, β).
(iii) For any other case, ai(ϑ,m−i) = aˆϑ(am, ), ∀ϑ ∈ Θ(β).
Under the mechanism above, it is a strictly dominant strategy for all agents with
types of rank(K) to report their type truthfully. To see this consider the different
beliefs of an agent of rank(K) (say i) about the messages that other agents will send. If
i believes that all other agents will report their type truthfully, then the best-response
for him is to report truthfully. This is because a∗(ϑi, β) i a∗(ϑi, β) − , in the case
he reports another type of the same rank, and a∗(ϑi, β) i λβ(ϑ
′)
λm(ϑ′)
a∗(ϑ′, β), in case he
reports a type of lower rank.
If i believes that only one other agent will misreport, then i still prefers to report
his type truthfully, irrespectively of the rank of the other agent. Say that i believes
that j is of the same rank as him but of different type and that j will misrepresent
her preferences as being of type ϑi. If i reports that he is of type ϑj, then the two
lies will cover each other and i will receive a∗(ϑj, β). But if he chooses to report ϑi,
then λm(ϑj) = λβ(ϑj) − 1 and λm(ϑi) = λβ(ϑi) + 1. In the latter case, i chooses
one allocation from {a∗(ϑ, β)− , a∗(ϑ′, β)− }. Since a∗(ϑ, β)−  is constructed to be
strictly preferred by i to a∗(ϑj, β), i strictly prefers to report truthfully.
The same argument holds if i believes that j is of type ϑj, which is of lower
rank than K, and that j will report ϑi. Note that, by the construction of the set
{a1(ϑi, ϑj), a2(ϑi, ϑj)} (see also Lemma 4), there are λβ(ϑi) + λβ(ϑj) individual alloca-
tions that are feasible. If one of the two allocations is requested more times than it is
feasible, then, in the game induced by i’s report: assign first the allocations in excess
supply to the agents who request them and then assign the rest of the agents randomly
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to the remaining allocations. This ensures that there are no coordination failures and
all agents choose their most preferred allocation. Also, note that in both cases where i
believes that j misreports, i strictly prefers to report truthfully than to send any other
message ϑ 6= {ϑi, ϑj}, because, in the latter case, i receives aˆϑ(am, ), which makes him
strictly worse-off.
In the case where i believes that multiple misrepresentations will take place, either
in types of rank(K), or in other ranks, then, irrespectively of his message, m 6= Θ(β) (if
all representations but one cancel out then we go back to the analysis of the previous
cases). This means that his message, alone, can not hide the fact that some agent(s)
misrepresents(misrepresent) her(their) type(s). His best response remains to report
truthfully: Ui(aˆϑi(am, )) > Ui(aˆϑ′(am, )), ∀ϑ′ 6= ϑi, by construction (recall that I×am
is feasible). We conclude that, under all possible beliefs, i strictly prefers to report
truthfully.
Given this, it is a best response for an agent of rank(K-1) to report his type truthfully
as well. Say that agent i, who is of rank(K-1), envies the allocation of some type ϑj
of rank(K). Of course, if i believes that some agent of type ϑj will report as being of
type ϑi, then the best response for i is mi = ϑj, but, as we showed, this cannot be an
equilibrium12. Hence, if i believes that all agents will report truthfully, he prefers to
report truthfully as well. If he believes that only one agent of the same or lower rank
will misreport their types as his own, he will still prefer to reveal his type truthfully, for
the same type of reasoning as in the case of an agent of rank(K). Finally, if he believes
that many agents will misreport their types, he still prefers to receive an incentive
compatible allocation (by construction) than misrepresenting his own type. Therefore,
given that rank(K) agents report truthfully, agents of rank(K-1) also report truthfully.
By induction, we conclude that for an agent of Rank(κ), if all agents of higher rank
12This argument also makes clear that the mechanism is not one of dominant strategy implementa-
tion, as only rank(K) individuals have dominant strategies.
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are expected to report truthfully their types, his best-response is to report truthfully,
irrespectively of the actions of agents of the same or lower rank. Since it is a dominant
strategy for rank(K) agents to report truthfully, then, by iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies, the only possible equilibrium is when all agents report truthfully.
Therefore, the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the mechanism is for all agents to
reveal their type and to receive the allocation a∗i (ϑi, β),∀i ∈ I. 
The result depends crucially on the fact that the rank of types is known. This is due
to the interim-distribution being common knowledge. On the other hand, Anonymity
ensures that agents do not gain any strategic benefit from their personal identity. For
instance, even if β is common knowledge, if different type-profiles result in different
ranks between types, then it may not be a dominant strategy for any agent to reveal
his type truthfully. As one’s rank, in this case, also depends on the realized types of the
other agents, there may be situations where an agent misreports his type in order to
force someone to misreport as well. This may cause multiplicity of equilibria. In other
words, if Anonymity fails, implementation is still possible, but full implementation may
fail.
The LNCIP is also required for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, as it allows for
agents to strictly improve their payoff if they report truthfully. Once again, if LNCIP
is violated, then one can still construct mechanisms which implement the first-best al-
locations, but the uniqueness of the equilibrium may not be possible. Therefore, the
common knowledge of the interim-distribution, Anonymity and LNCIP (along with
Assumption 3) are jointly sufficient conditions for full implementation of first-best al-
locations, but they are not necessary.
We would also like to comment on the advantages of this mechanism in comparison
to the existing literature (see for example, Maskin, 1999, Jackson, 1991). First, the
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mechanism holds even with two agents (or even in the degenerate case of one agent).
Second, the required message space is minimal, since agents send messages only about
their own type. Third, it does not require any ad-hoc game, which has no equilibrium in
pure strategies (like an integer game), in order to rule out undesirable equilibria. This
is achieved by “enticing” some of the misreporting agents to report truthfully, whenever
there are multiple misrepresentations. Fourth, full implementation is also achieved if the
equilibrium concept is changed to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies,
which is, in fact, the solution concept used in the proof of Proposition 1. Therefore,
the mechanism is not limited only to Bayesian implementation.
Finally, Assumptions 1,2 and 3 are relatively weak and there are many cases of
interest that comply with them. To demonstrate this, in 4.4, some well-known examples
of economies with hidden types (and the solutions that this framework provides) are
provided. But first, let us characterize the problem by providing necessary and sufficient
conditions for full implementation when the interim-distribution is common knowledge.
1.4.3 Full Implementation: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
Condition 1: Suppose a∗ ∈ PF (E). ∀ϑ, ϑ′ ∈ Θ(β) such that a∗ϑ ϑ′ a∗ϑ′ , ∃ a(ϑ, ϑ′) ∈
A such that: (i) aϑ(ϑ, ϑ
′) ϑ a∗ϑ′ , and (ii) a∗ϑ′ ϑ′ aϑ(ϑ, θ′).
Proposition 2: Condition 1 is necessary for full implementation.
Proof: Full implementation of a∗ requires that g(m) = a∗ if mi = ϑi, ∀i ∈ I and that
the strategy profile mi = ϑi, ∀i ∈ I is the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Consider
any direct mechanism M(g, a), which specifies some allocation a(m) 6= a∗, whenever m
is such that λm(ϑ
′′) 6= λβ(ϑ′′) for some ϑ′′ ∈ Θ(β) (whenever this is the case, then, by
common knowledge of the interim-distribution, it follows that mi 6= ϑi for some i ∈ I).
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Suppose that, apart from i (of type ϑ) and j (of type ϑ′), incentive compatibility is
satisfied for all other agents and that they report truthfully (this is done in order to
check the necessity of the condition).
Because Condition 1 is violated, then either part (i) or part (ii) of the condition
is violated (or both). This means that at least one of the following will hold: (i)
a(mi = ϑ,mj = ϑ,m−i,j) j a∗ϑ′ , (ii) a∗ϑ′ i a(mi = ϑ,mj = ϑ,m−i,j). In case
(i), truthful reporting is not equilibrium, because, if everyone else reports truthfully,
j’s best-response is mj = ϑ (incentive compatibility is violated for j). In case (ii),
there may be multiple equilibria because, if the truthful equilibrium exists, then so
does another equilibrium, where i reports type ϑ′ and j reports type ϑ. To see this,
notice that if i believes that j is of type ϑ′ and that mj = ϑ, then his best-response
is mi = ϑ
′, in which case it is also a best-response for j to report mj = ϑ. Finally, in
the case where both parts of Condition 1 are violated, then there can be no truthful
equilibrium (as j strictly prefers to report ϑ, if everyone else reports truthfully), while
an untruthful equilibrium may exist, where i reports j’s type and vice versa. In all
cases, full implementation is impossible. 
Condition 1 is similar in spirit to Bayesian Monotonicity, which is necessary for full
implementation in economies with incomplete information (Jackson, 1991). In our
case, full implementation is possible, if there is a feasible allocation through which
some agent (i) “signals” cases of misreport. As a result, not all efficient allocations
are fully implementable when the interim-distribution is common knowledge. However,
Condition 1 holds whenever the number of agents of lower-rank are less or equal to the
number of agents of higher ranks. Assumption 3 in section 1.4.2 made this restriction
clear. On the other hand, Condition 1 is weaker than Assumption 3, and may hold in
cases where this assumption is violated.
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Note that Condition 1 is also sufficient for full implementation if one allows for
mechanisms with games that do not have an equilibrium in pure strategies (for example
integer games, as in Maskin (1999) or modulo games, as in Jackson (1991))13. This is
because one can rule out undesirable equilibria with multiple misrepresentations of
types (sub-case (iii) in the mechanism of Proposition 1) by making agents to play such
a game, whenever the message-profile differs from the interim-distribution by more than
one message. However, if one restricts attention to mechanisms where agents send only
messages about their types, the following condition is also required.
Condition 2: Suppose a∗ ∈ PF (E). There exists allocation a ∈ A, such that a∗ϑ ϑ aϑ
and aϑ ϑ aϑ′ ∀ ϑ, ϑ′ ∈ Θ(β).
Condition 2 ensures that whenever there are more than one misrepresentations of types,
it is a best-response for one of the “liars” to deviate and report truthfully, while it is
not a best-response to deviate from truth-telling. It becomes apparent that Assump-
tion 3 and the LNCIP (Lemma 4) satisfy Condition 1, while LNCIP (Lemma 3) also
satisfies Condition 2. Jointly, Condition 1 and 2 are necessary and sufficient for full
implementation for this restricted set of mechanisms when the interim-distribution is
common knowledge14.
1.4.4 Examples
Spence (1973)
The Spence economy consists of two types. Group I has low productivity a and is a
proportion q1 of the population. Group II has high productivity a and is a proportion
13See Appendix A for the proof. It is omitted here, since it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
14See Appendix A for the proof
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1− q1 of the population. Acquiring y units of education costs y/a for Group I and y/a
for Group II. Productivity parameters are private information and firms hire workers
according to a wage schedule, based on verifiable educational attainment. The payoff
for an individual is the value of his wage minus the educational cost and for a firm the
productivity parameter minus the wage.
Spence argues that agents will acquire education (which does not increase produc-
tivity in his model) in order to signal their productivity to firms. In equilibrium, the
wage schedules are such that high productivity workers acquire some educational and
credibly signal their type, while low productivity workers acquire no education, and
firms correctly infer that they are low productivity. The education acquired by Group
II is a deadweight loss, necessary for signaling their abilities.
Assume that the total population N is common knowledge. Then Nq1 is the total
number of agents of Group I and N(1− q1) is the total number of agents of Group II.
Based on this, the following mechanism can separate types without any agent incurring
educational costs in equilibrium:
Let all workers report their type. If the number of agents who report Group I and
II is Nq1 and N(1 − q1), respectively, then agents who report Group I receive wage
wGI = a and those who report Group II, receive wage wGII = a. Otherwise, those who
report Group I receive wGI = a and those who report Group II, are asked to undertake
one additional time-period of education and receive wGII = a+
1
a
+ , with a−a
aa
>  > 0.
The above mechanism fully implements the first-best allocations in this economy.
First, consider the strategies of an a-type, who has already acquired education y. It is
clear that, irrespectively of the reports of the other agents, it is a dominant strategy
for her to report a, since a > a and a +  > a. Then, it is a best-response for an
a-type to report truthfully as well. This is because a > a+ + 1
a
− 1
a
. Hence, all agents
report truthfully in equilibrium. Anticipating the outcome of the job-market, all agents
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acquire zero education before reporting their types. Figure 2 provides the graphical
representation.
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Figure 2: Spence, 1973
Rotschild-Stiglitz (1976)
Consider the following, slightly modified, version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz economy.
There is a finite number of N risk-averse agents and one risk-neutral entrepreneur.
There is one commodity. Agents have a stochastic endowment with two possible states
wH and wL, with wH > wL. The entrepreneur has an endowment wE, which is subject
to no risk. An agent’s utility function depends on her consumption on both individual
states: U(cL, cH). There are two types of agents. K of them are of type 1 and face a high
probability of suffering from the low endowment state: pH . The remaining L = N −K
are of type 2 and have a low probability of wL: pL < pH . Types are private information,
but the rest characteristics of the economy are common knowledge. Finally, assume that
wE is large enough so that, even if all other agents suffer from the low-endowment state,
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they can still be fully insured by the entrepreneur’s wealth.
Assuming that the other side has full bargaining power and hence the entrepreneur
makes no profits from her services, the following mechanism can be utilized in order to
implement first-best allocations (see also Figure 3). All agents report their type. If the
message-profile matches the interim-distribution then each agents receives the insur-
ance contract that corresponds to her message (CFB1 and C
FB
2 are the state-contingent
allocations resulting from the first-best insurance contracts for 1 and 2 respectively).
Otherwise, agents who report type 1, receive an insurance contract which results to
allocation A1, while agents who report type 2, receive A2.
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Figure 3: Rothschild-Stiglitz, 1976
Notice that, by construction, A2 2 CFB1 2 A1 and CFB1 1 A1 1 A2. Also,
providing any combination of these individual allocations to the agents of the economy is
feasible, since they all lie in the interior of A(CFB2 ). Therefore, Condition 1, is satisfied.
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It is easy to check that it is a dominant strategy for type 2 to report truthfully. Given
this, it is a best-response for any agent of type 1 to report truthfully, as well. Therefore,
the proposed mechanism has a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium, which is truthful.
1.4.5 Robustness to Small Perturbations
So far it has been assumed that the interim-distribution of types is commonly known
with perfect precision. This is a very strong assumption, and hence one would like to
make sure that small relaxations of it would not change the results dramatically. As it
turns out, if there is a sufficiently small noise about β, then the main claim still holds.
Let Γ be the set of all possible interim-distributions that can be generated by Θ.
By definition,
⋃
γ∈Γ Θ(β) = Θ. Suppose, now, that there is a small noise about the
probability of the interim-distribution. Agents have a probability distribution over the
set of interim-distributions. With probability 1−∑
γ∈Γ
γ, the interim-distribution β will
be realized, while γ is the probability that some other interim-distribution γ will be
realized, with γ > 0,∀γ ∈ Γ.
We maintain the assumption that each agent knows his own type with certainty but
has no information about the other agents’ type. The expected utility of agent i has to
be modified in order to include the uncertainty over the interim distribution:
Ui(a) = (1−
∑
γ∈Γ
γ)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i(β|ϑi)
[∑
s∈S
ui(a, s) pi (s|ϑi,θ−i)
]
φ(θ−i|ϑi, β)
+
∑
γ∈Γ
γ
[ ∑
θ−i∈Θ−i(γ|ϑi)
[∑
s∈S
ui(a, s) pi (s|ϑi,θ−i)
]
φ(θ−i|ϑi, γ)
]
It is also assumed that for each γ ∈ Γ and for every ϑi corresponds an individual
allocation a∗i (ϑi, γ) such that any I-collection of individual allocations is consistent with
γ, Pareto optimal and satisfies Anonymity. In other words, for every γ there is a set
of Pareto-optimal allocations to be implemented, each one corresponding to a specific
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realization of a type-profile θ consistent with γ and Anonymity.
In the case of uncertainty about the interim distribution, the rank of each agent
is also uncertain, as different γ may correspond to different sets of realized types and
different ranks. The problem then would be one similar to the problem when the
Anonymity property is violated. However, if this uncertainty is sufficiently small, the
equilibrium strategies of agents will not change. To see this, consider an agent i who
has the highest rank under β (and potentially other ranks for other γ’s). If he knows
that β is the interim distribution with certainty, then under the mechanism presented
in 4.2, he would strictly prefer to report his type truthfully than report any other type:
Ui(ϑi,m−i|β) > Ui(ϑ′,m−i|β), ∀ϑ′ 6= ϑi ∈ Θ, ∀m−i ∈M
Adding a small uncertainty about the interim distribution means that his expected
utility by reporting his type truthfully becomes:
Ui(θi,m−i) = (1−
∑
γ∈Γ
γ)Ui(ϑi,m−i|β) +
∑
γ∈Γ
γUi(ϑi,m−i|γ)
It is evident that, if γ is sufficiently small for every γ, the expected utility of i ap-
proaches the expected utility under β and hence it remains a strictly dominant strategy
to report his type truthfully. The argument can be repeated for any other agent j of
different rank according to β. Given a sufficiently small vector of probabilities , j
expects all higher-rank agents to report truthfully and his best-response is to report
truthfully as well, irrespectively of the messages send by agents of the same or lower
ranks. Hence, there exists some vector , with strictly positive elements, such that the
equilibrium strategies under certainty over β remain the unique equilibrium strategies
under uncertainty over β.
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Corollary 2: If the interim distribution of types is uncertain but there is a sufficiently
high probability that some distribution β will be realized, then the mechanism of Propo-
sition 1 fully implements the first-best allocations for every interim-distribution.
Proof: It follows from the analysis above.
It is noteworthy that, due to the fact that truthful revelation of one’s type is the only
equilibrium action for all agents, the desirable individual allocations will be imple-
mented for any interim distribution γ. In other words, the almost certainty about β
makes agents to report their type truthfully irrespectively of the interim distribution
that is eventually realized. As a consequence, agents receive first-best allocations for all
realized interim-distributions. This confirms that the result is robust to small perturba-
tions of the information structure and it is not just a construction of perfect knowledge
of the interim distribution.
1.4.6 Convergence to Ex-Ante Distributions
So far we have shown the main result and that it is robust to small uncertainty about
the interim distribution. We also want to show that if the number of agents becomes
very large then the interim-distribution converges to the ex-ante distribution of types, in
which case the informational assumptions made in this chapter converge to the standard
assumptions in the adverse selection literature, i.e. agents know the ex-ante probability
of each type occurring. This allows us to relate this formulation and results to large
economies with adverse selection problems, and make the claim that in these economies,
because the interim-distribution is effectively common knowledge, one can implement
first-best allocations.
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Of course, this requires some restrictions on the joint probability function Φ. The
easiest way is to assume that types are independently and identically distributed. This
means that the probability of acquiring type ϑ, τ(ϑ), is the same across all agents and
the draws of types from the ex-ante distribution are uncorrelated. Then, by directly
applying the Weak Law of Large Numbers we get:
lim
I→∞
(
λβI (ϑ)
I
)
= τ(ϑ)
This is exactly the information provided by the interim-distribution: the number of
agents, for whom type ϑ has realized. Hence, at the limit, the relative frequency of
types in the population (interim-distribution) coincides with the ex-ante probability,
if types are independently and identically distributed, and the interim distribution of
types coincides with the ex-ante distribution at the limit15. Hence, the mechanism of
this chapter can be applied to economies with large populations without requiring any
additional information than the literature on asymmetric information. This comes at
the cost of additional restrictions on the joint probability function, which, however, are
common with many other papers in mechanism design.
1.4.7 Participation Constraints
A final note is required regarding the issue of participation constraints. In many impor-
tant applications of adverse selection problems, agents are given the opportunity not
to participate in a contract or in a mechanism if the expected utility they anticipate by
entering is less than some exogenously given threshold. In this model, however, we have
completely ignored any participation constraint restrictions. Fortunately, this omission
does not result in loss of generality. If participation constraints are to be taken into
15Notice, however, that other formulations of the Law of Large Numbers do not require independence
or identically distributed types. Therefore, the results also hold for these cases.
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consideration, then this only restricts the points of the Pareto frontier that satisfy these
constraints and does not alter the rest of the analysis16.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we consider a general hidden-type economy and, under relatively weak
conditions, we show that it is possible to construct a mechanism which has a unique
Bayes-Nash equilibrium, where all agents reveal their type truthfully and they receive
a first-best allocation. Our result relies on information aggregation and appropriately
chosen punishments. If the interim distribution is known (perfectly or imperfectly),
then one can aggregate the messages that all agents are sending out and uncover any
misreport(s), even if the identity of the liar is not known.
Truth-telling, however, requires appropriately designed punishments for lying. If
the punishment from detecting a lie is too severe, then some agents may deliberately
lie about their type in order to force other agents to also do so. The lies cancel out
in terms of the aggregate information and the former agents “steal” the allocations of
the latter, who are forced to lie under the fear of the extreme punishments. This can
lead to coordination failures and multiplicity of equilibria. Therefore, uniqueness of the
equilibrium requires a careful construction of the allocations when lies are detected. It
has been shown that such punishments exist when the indifference curves of different
types are not locally identical, meaning that in the neighborhood of any allocation one
can find other allocations such that each type prefers one of these over the rest.
It should also be pointed out that the assumption on the interim distribution of
16Of course, in all interesting problems, the intersection of all participation constraints with the
Pareto-frontier is non-empty. Notice that, in off-the-equilibrium-path situations, the resulting allo-
cations may violate certain participation constraints. But as long as agents decide and commit on
their participation before the mechanism is played (based on the expectation of an outcome, which
results from some equilibrium of the sub-game), then the uniqueness and efficiency of the equilibrium
guarantees the participation of all agents.
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types being common knowledge is needed because we consider general social choice
sets. If we focus on the implementation of specific allocations on the Pareto frontier
so that allocations depend only on one’s type, one can implement the first-best as
a unique equilibrium even if agents have heterogeneous beliefs or no information at
all about the interim distribution. The mechanism can still implement the desirable
allocation truthfully, given that the social planner knows the interim distribution. This
is because players’ best-response correspondences depend on their beliefs about how
many misreports will be detected by the mechanism and not on their ability to detect
other agents’ lies. Finally, an interesting question is whether the implementation of first-
best allocations in this setting can be achieved through a decentralized mechanism. We
plan to address this question in the near future.
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2 Chapter Two: Contract Law and Development
2.1 Introduction
The main body of the economic literature on contract theory assumes that private agree-
ments are enforceable by an external authority so that private contracts are binding for
the contracting members17. It is also assumed that the enforcement of all agreements,
which private parties are willing to commit to, increases social welfare. Because the
role of enforcement institutions is obvious in this context, the related papers do not
attempt to explicitly model the enforcement authority and how it achieves its goals.
On the other hand, the literature on economic growth and development has placed
emphasis on the importance of property rights and their enforcement, but contract law
has received disproportionately less attention.
This chapter relates the emergence and evolution of contract law to the process of
development. We show that the relationship between the two is reciprocal. As the
process of development unfolds, contract law evolves accordingly and at the same time
it generates new opportunities for economic growth and development. Furthermore,
the relationship between the two may be non-monotonic and hence it is difficult to be
captured by empirical studies. Through the analysis, we also rationalize two stylized
facts of enforcement institutions: (i) the existence of institutional agents (such as judges
or bureaucrats) who act on behalf of these institutions and are rewarded for their
function, and (ii) the fact that not all types of private agreements are permitted in a
society (regulation).
By contract law we mean the types of private agreements which are enforced by judi-
cial institutions as binding contracts. If a type of private transaction is non-enforceable
this means that judges will not impose the terms of the contract on the transacting
17See for example page 3 in the introduction of “Contract Theory” by Bolton and Dewatripont.
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members, even if one of them breaches the initial agreement. Since most agreements
made into contracts are time-inconsistent (i.e. party members do not wish to carry out
their part of the initial promise when the execution time comes), non-enforceability of
certain transactions effectively prohibits them from taking place.
In order to make the points described above, a simple economy is presented, which
consists of multiple pairs of agents. Each pair is comprised by a producer and a con-
sumer of a specialized good, who face a bilateral hold-up problem. The cost of the
specialized good is uncertain and trade is valuable to both parts only if the low-cost
state materializes, in which case the surplus generated by trade is divided between them
according to their bargaining power. The probability of this event depends on the effort
levels of both the consumer and the producer. The effort levels, the state of nature and
the utilities of agents are non-verifiable. Because both agents bear the full marginal
cost of effort exertion but receive only part of the marginal benefit, they generally exert
sub-optimal effort levels. The problem could be solved by a mechanism of transfers
contingent on trade, if agents could commit not to make any other private agreement
for transfers of resources. However, this solution is not time-consistent and, as a result,
mechanisms with exogenous full enforcement can not implement the first-best outcome.
In the first part of the chapter, a mechanism is proposed which solves this time-
inconsistency problem. In this mechanism, the agents themselves decide which contracts
are enforceable and which are not. That is, contract enforcement is endogenous. It
turns out that the implementation of the first-best requires that some contracts be
non-enforceable. Specifically, the mechanism involves a social contract between an
institutional agent, who has the enforcement power in the economy, and the rest of the
agents. The social contract specifies what types of private agreements are enforceable
or not at each point in time and the rewards and punishments for the institutional
agent, if she acts according to its clauses or not. Thus the optimal social contract
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specifies ex-post transfers from the trading members to the institutional agent or from
the institutional agent to the trading parties, conditional on the occurrence of trade.
We show that this mechanism can induce agents to exert optimal effort levels and is
renegotiation-proof if: (i) at least one agent plays the role of the institutional agent so
that she has a stake to the outcomes generated by the enforcement process and (ii) some
forms of private agreements are not enforceable and hence non-credible. However, the
implementation of the institutional design also requires a minimum amount of resources
and so it is inevitably related to the level of economic development.
Note that this is a model of perfect enforcement. That is, there are no exogenous
frictions on enforcement. It is costless for the judge to obtain information on verifiable
variables and there are no costs for punishing an agent who did not execute her part
of the contract. Furthermore, we do not impose any exogenous restrictions on the
contract space, apart from the condition that contracts should be written on verifiable
variables (the natural one). However, in equilibrium, agents will choose to render some
(otherwise fully enforceable) contracts as non-enforceable, in order to credibly commit
themselves to exert high-effort. In other words, we abstract away from any possible
enforcement friction in order to show that the contractual space is optimally chosen to
be incomplete.
In the second part of the chapter a multi-period economy is introduced and the
hold-up problem (and its solution) is connected to the process of economic growth and
development. The agents in the economy have access to the production technology of a
non-specialized or autarchic good, which exhibits no uncertainty, and to the production
technology of a specialized good in pairs of buyer and seller, exactly as in the previous
section. The economy starts with no initial institutions, but at the beginning of the
first period agents can propose and generate institutions of government and enforcement
through a social contract. Institutional agents play the dual role of the governor and
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judge and they are responsible for imposing taxation to agents, spend public revenues
to investments (which increase the productivity of agents), enforce private agreements
and provide reductions in taxation conditional on the trade of the specialized good.
The reductions in taxation work as subsidies which induce agents to exert higher effort
and thus increase the value of trade.
In this economic set-up, the initial level and the rate of increase of productivity in
the production of the autarchic good are the main parameters which drive the evolu-
tion of institutions and growth. The most interesting case is when productivity growth
is fast enough so that the economy passes from multiple stages of development. We
identify the necessary conditions for this case to arise and the following results are de-
rived: (i) The economy starts from low levels of productivity, where the trade of the
specialized good is not feasible, but as productivity increases the feasibility constraints
are relaxed. At a specific point in time trade becomes feasible and enforcement insti-
tutions are created. (ii) Restrictions on the set of enforceable private agreements arise
endogenously, inducing trading parties to exert high effort and to increase the value
of trade and this spurs further economic growth. Therefore, the causal relationship
between enforcement institutions and growth goes in both directions. (iii) The change
of restrictions on the set of enforceable agreements is non-monotonic to the process of
economic growth.
These results are interesting because they emphasize the reciprocal relationship
between contract law and growth. More importantly, the relationship between the two
may be non-monotonic. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) test whether property rights
institutions or contract enforcement institutions have a positive impact on growth.
While they find that property rights seem indeed to affect growth positively, contract
institutions do not present a statistically significant impact. Their main hypothesis is
that the lower the cost of contract enforcement, the more easily private parties can
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contract and hence the greater the impact of economic growth. They test for this effect
by using as a proxy for enforcement costs the legal origin of contract law (whether it is
common law or civil law).
While, this model can not distinguish between the two types of law origins, if one
is willing to assume that enforcement costs are positively correlated with the number
of transactions which are enforceable (which is justified in subsection 2.4.6, in the part
where the empirical implications of the model are discussed), then one can offer an
explanation to the findings of the empirical literature. With a non-monotonic relation-
ship between the set of enforceable agreements and the level of growth, the impact of
contract law on the latter can not be captured by linear specifications.
These results also show that regulation may be optimal for social welfare. Thus,
limiting agents’ economic freedom may have beneficial results if hold-up problems are
prevalent in economic exchanges, a point which goes against the classic economic intu-
ition that more economic freedom implies greater welfare. Apart from the example of
trade of specialized goods, which we provide in this chapter, there are many other cases
of economic interest, where a trade-off between ex-ante incentives and ex-post efficiency
may arise. This framework can be applied in these cases to explain why certain types
of regulation are imposed or why certain types of contracts are forbidden from being
written.
For instance, the model could be used to explain the abolishment of slavery in the
19th century as banning certain property contracts in order to induce the accumulation
of unobservable human capital. It could also be used to rationalize certain laws, which
protect collective bargaining agreements between employees and employers as an effec-
tive banning of one-to-one contracts. This, in turn, increases labour wages and, apart
from redistributive effects, it increases the ex-ante incentives of workers to acquire hu-
man capital. On the other hand, forbidding prenuptial agreements, which may dissolve
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dysfunctional partnerships in an effective way ex-post, may be a way into incentivizing
parents in exerting high effort to their family affairs and children up-bringing.
We also believe that our model can be extended to generate a more complete theory
of the trade-off between economic freedom and incentives (ex-post efficiency versus ex-
ante incentives) and it can also provide a model of regulation cycles. Finally, we provide
a different rationale for the existence of institutional agents, such as bureaucrats and
judges. Besides being the executors of authority, they also guarantee the credibility
of the institutions they represent by having a stake in their functionality and by not
always agreeing to change them. Thus institutions acquire persistence, which again is
crucial for their credibility and the solution of hold-up problems.
2.2 Related Literature
There is an extensive literature dealing with the determinants of property rights, their
value for society and development. Examples include Umbeck (1981), Skaperdas (1982),
Grossman (2001) and Gonzalez (2007). On the contrary, there is little work on how
enforcement institutions and contract law can affect the development process. A notable
exception is Dhillon and Rigolini (2009), which relates the process of development to
enforcement institutions through the functioning of commodity markets. The current
framework differs from theirs in two ways. First, this chapter considers only formal
institutions while their model is concerned with the co-determination of both formal
and informal institutions of enforcement. Second, the process of development in their
paper is exogenous and related to the reliability of the production process to generate
high quality goods, while the chapter is concerned with the co-evolution of contract law
and development through the changes on regulation and productivity respectively.
A different strand of literature examines the impact of limited enforcement on eco-
nomic transactions. Telser (1980) is one of the first papers to model self-enforcing
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agreements, while Bull (1987) examines self-enforcing agreements in the context of the
US labor market and Ray (2002) examines their time-structure. However, these pa-
pers are concerned with cases where contract enforcement is impossible and this is an
economic restriction which agents can not overcome. Other papers, like Cooley, Ma-
rimon and Quadrini (2004) and Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2008), are concerned with
the impact of limited enforceability on financial contracting. Krasa and Villamil (2000)
consider the case where enforcement of the contractual agreement is a choice variable
of the contracting members but it is costly and show that the costly state verification
model can be seen as a reduced form of their enforcement problem. None of the above
papers, however, examines the issue of enforceability from the perspective of endogenous
limitations on the types of agreements that are enforced.
On the other hand, there is an extensive literature that is concerned with the issues of
institutional authority. Aghion and Tirole (1997), Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004),
Greif and Laitin (2004), Greif et al (2008), Laffont and Martimort (1998), Sanchez
and Straub (2006) are some of the papers concerned with the issues of authority in
organizations or the endogenous formation of institutions. The main difference is that
we focus on enforcement institutions and its relationship to the process of economic
development. On top of that, in the analysis to follow we combine both the questions
of how these institutions emerge and evolve and how authority is determined.
The chapter is also related to the literature regarding the hold-up problem. Since
the seminal contributions by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988,
1990), a long list of papers has been devoted to presenting the inefficiencies generated
by this problem or solving it18. The chapter does not attempt to solve the most general
type of hold-up. Instead, a simple example of a hold-up problem is used (which can
18See for example Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994), Che and Hausch (1999), Hart and Moore
(1999), Maskin and Moore (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999a), Maskin and Tirole (1999b), Guriev and
Kvassov (2005) and Evans (2008)
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not be solved by the mechanisms presented in the papers above) in order to show the
importance of enforcement institutions in solving time-inconsistency problems.
However, Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2009) adopt a very similar framework to ours. In
their paper they allow agents to contract with a third party and show that, with an
appropriately designed mechanism, agents can solve their time-inconsistency problem.
Furthermore, they show that side-contracting between the third party and one of the
agents does not alter their results. They apply their framework to the hold-up problem
and to the problem of moral-hazard in teams. Similar results are obtained in this
chapter through the institutional agent. The main differences are two. First, the third
party in this chapter has a specific type of authority in the economy (to enforce private
agreements or not), which the third party in their paper does not have. Second, and
most important, they assume that all private agreements are enforceable while here
enforceability is treated as an endogenous variable.
Finally, the chapter is related to the literature concerned with issues of delegation.
These papers examine the ability of an uninformed principal to extract information
from an informed agent, who is asked to perform a task. Some examples are the papers
by Holmstro¨m (1982), Fershtman, Judd and Kalai (1991), Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and
Martimort (2003), Szalay (2005) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008). While in these
papers delegates act on behalf of a principal, in the model of this chapter institutional
agents are economy-wide delegates who act on behalf of the society. We also eschew
away from issues of information extraction as it is assumed that the actions of institu-
tional agents are fully observable by the rest of the agents.
2.3 A simple model with two agents
In this section we examine the solution to a static hold-up problem and derive the main
results and intuition which are required for the analysis of the dynamic model.
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A plough-maker (say agent j, who is also sometimes referred as the producer) and a
farmer (agent i) face a simple hold-up problem with bilateral externalities. The plough-
maker has the ability to produce one unit of plough g, which is custom-made to satisfy
the farmer’s requirements. This good has valuation equal to v for the farmer in terms
of some numeraire commodity (think of it as the additional quantity of wheat, which
the farmer can produce due to its use).
However, the cost of the plough, which is again reflected in terms of the numeraire
commodity, is uncertain and depends on the state of nature. There are two states of
nature, one with a high cost (θ1 : k1 = kH) and one with a low cost (θ2 : k2 = kL).
The probability of the low-cost state depends on the effort level of both the producer
and the farmer. The intuition for this assumption is that effort is exerted for acquiring
skills relevant to their occupation. The more skilled the farmer is in cultivating the
land, the higher the chances that he requires a crude, but inexpensive plough to do his
job. Similarly, the more skilled the plough-maker is, the higher the chances that he can
produced the required plough with minimal use of resources19.
If ei and ej are the effort levels exerted by them, then f(ei, ej) is the joint probability
function of the low cost state arising. There are two effort levels for each agent: {e, e} :
e > e. The corresponding cost of effort, which is homogeneous across agents, is given
by: ci(e) = cj(e) = c > ci(e) = cj(e) = c and f(e, e) > f(e, e) = f(e, e) > f(e, e).
The probability function f exhibits decreasing returns to scale: f(e, e) − f(e, e) >
f(e, e)− f(e, e). Also, let 0 < kL < v < kH .
The agents are endowed with a sufficiently large amount of the numeraire commod-
19Alternatively, the model can be formulated so that uncertainty is added on the consumption side
of the economy. For instance, the valuation for the plough could be high or low and its probability
can depend on the effort level of the farmer. In this case, there would be four states of nature, but
the main results of the chapter would be the same if the trade generates social surplus in only one of
the four states. The economic interpretation would be similar as well, especially if one thinks of goods
which require some effort from the farmer’s part in order to learn how to use them efficiently.
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ity w (think of it as wheat or bread)20. Moreover, agents are risk neutral. The utility
of the plough-maker depends only on the amount of the numeraire commodity that she
consumes, but the utility of the farmer also depends on good g. In terms of notation,
uj = x
a
j − cj and ui = xai + Igv − ci, where xaj and xai are the consumption levels of
the numeraire commodity by the producer and the farmer respectively and Ig is an
indicator function that takes the value one if g is traded and zero otherwise. If agents
decide to trade after the state of nature is realized, they divide the gains from trade
according to some exogenous bargaining power21. Let βi (βj) be the bargaining power
of agent i (j), with 0 < βi < 1 and βi+βj = 1. Furthermore, assume that the following
inequalities hold:
[f(e, eζ)− f(e, eζ)]βξ(v − kL)− (c− c) < 0,∀eζ ∈ {e, e} (1)
[f(e, eζ)− f(e, eζ)](v − kL)− (c− c) > 0,∀eζ ∈ {e, e} (2)
kl − kH + 2 c− c
f(e, e)− f(e, e) > 0 (3)
In the inequalities above, ξ denotes one of the two parts of the transaction (either i or
j) and ζ denotes the other part (if ξ = i, then ζ = j and vice versa). The timing of
events is: first, agents choose effort levels, then the state of nature is determined and
then agents decide whether to trade or not. Committing to trade before uncertainty
is resolved is sub-optimal as it entails welfare losses in the state where the cost of g is
20for the purposes of this section it is sufficient that w > v − kL
21This can be interpreted as the probability of one side to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
other side.
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higher than v.
Inequalities (1) and (2) reflect the conditions under which the hold-up problem
arises. Inequality (1) states that, independent of the effort level of the other agent, the
marginal benefit of increasing the effort level for type ξ is lower than the marginal cost of
doing so, while (2) states that, under the same conditions, the marginal social benefit
exceeds the marginal social cost, which is equal to the private cost. In conjunction,
inequalities (1) and (2) imply that it is a dominant strategy for both types of agents to
exert low effort, but this is socially sub-optimal.
In fact, adding inequality (2) for different effort levels and types, one can show that
[f(e, e)−f(e, e)](v−kL)−2(c−c) > 0, which means that if both agents choose to exert
high effort the aggregate social benefit is positive. In other words, the two conditions
form a simple model of a hold-up problem: both agents would benefit from exerting
high effort but because they receive only a part of the social surplus they generate, they
do not have an incentive to do so.
Inequality (3), on the other hand, is a technical condition, which is required for
making the incentive compatibility problem meaningful. As is shown in the proof of
Proposition 1, when this condition holds, subsidizing trade in order to induce high
effort, without any restrictions on enforceable agreements, is ineffective, because agents
prefer to trade in the high cost in order to receive the subsidies and redistribute them
among themselves.
Effort levels, effort costs, the state of nature and the level of utility of each agent
are observable but non-verifiable. In addition, the effort levels of the agents are non-
transferable, so that property rights can not solve the problem. This is a plausible
assumption since in many cases of economic interest the economic surplus may depend
on the actions of some individuals which can not be easily replicated by others. In
our example, the plough-maker has a specific set of skills which are needed for the
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production of the good, which the farmer does not have and can not acquire.
If effort choices were transferable, an easy solution to this problem would be the
allocation and trade of property rights on the effort decisions (see also Grossman and
Hart, 1986). Also, if any of the non-verifiable variables, could be verified, even at some
cost, then the agents could design mechanisms of subsidy provision or punishments
in order to induce the first-best effort levels. For example, if the state of nature were
costlessly verifiable, then the following mechanism would implement the first-best effort
levels: the farmer and the plough-maker give out τi = f(e, e)(1 − βi)(v − kL) and
τj = f(e, e)βi(v − kL) units of the numeraire commodity to a risk-neutral agent, who
has the obligation to return to them si = (1 − βi)(v − kL) and sj = βi(v − kL) units
respectively, if the low-cost state arises. In such a case, agents receive a subsidy in the
low-cost case which aligns the marginal costs and benefits of effort exertion to the social
costs and benefits and therefore achieves first-best outcomes.
Of course, as the relevant literature points out (see for example Hart and Moore
(1988) or Maskin and Tirole (1999b)), the problem with such a mechanism is that truth-
telling about the state of nature is not incentive compatible when the states of nature
are non-verifiable. If the high-cost state arises, agents have incentive to lie in order
to receive and redistribute the subsidies between them. Such redistributions require
binding agreements on net transfers of resources. Ex-ante, agents prefer to ban such
transfers, so that the mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility and generates optimal
incentives for effort provision, but ex-post agents prefer to renegotiate the mechanism
and allow for the transfers to take place. Therefore, this mechanism fails to provide
incentives for efficient effort exertion, because it is not renegotiation-proof and, hence,
credible.
This section shows how this problem can be circumvented by the introduction of
an institutional agent, a type of delegate, who enforces the mechanism and whose
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final payoff depends on the outcome of the mechanism. In this case, because the in-
stitutional agent has an incentive to block any renegotiation that reduces his expected
payoff, an endogenous commitment not-to-renegotiate the mechanism arises ex-post.
Furthermore, the enforceability of ex-post transfers and the incentives of the insti-
tutional agent arise endogenously, through the ex-ante social contract between the
agents and their delegate.
For the rest of this section the timing of events as represented by Figure 4 is assumed,
which is similar to the one adopted by Watson (2007). Before proceeding to the main
result of the section, we provide the necessary definitions.
Time
0: Players establish social contract
1: Consumer and producer exert effort
2: Possible renegotiation of social contract
3: State of nature is determined
4: Possible renegotiation of social contract
5: Private contract between producer and consumer 
6: Institutional agent gives subsidies conditional on trade
7: Enforcement of social and private contract
Figure 4: Timing of Events
Definition 1: An institutional agent (Σ = 1) is a third party whose actions and
rewards are determined by the agents through a social contract. The action set of the
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institutional agent is the payment of subsidies to the agents and the enforcement or not
of private contracts.
Definition 2: A private contract pi(q, p(g), Ig) is any agreement between the farmer
and the plough-maker. This formulation includes agreements for selling good g at a
price p(g), agreements which promise a net transfer of resources q conditional on the
trade and the price of good g (side contracts) and agreements for an unconditional
transfer of resources q (irrespectively of trade). Q is the set of all possible contracts.
Whether a subset of Q is enforceable or not depends on the social contract.
Definition 3: A social contract S(Σ,Φ(Q), τ) is a contract between the farmer,
the plough-maker and potentially (but not necessarily) an institutional agent, which
defines ex-post transfers τ conditional on the verifiable trade of the good g and on its
price p(g)22, the inclusion of the institutional agent or not (Σ = 1 or Σ = 0, respectively)
and the set of enforceable private agreements Φ(Q).
It is assumed that even if an institutional agent is not included in the social contract, the
farmer and the plough-maker can still utilize the enforcement authority of the economy
(which is treated as an automaton or a machine in that case). This is done so that we
can contrast these results with the existing literature, which assumes that enforcement
authorities exist but they are not explicitly modeled. In particular, we want to show
why the incompleteness of the contractual space and the structure of incentives for the
institutional agent as well, are so important for solving the hold-up problem.
However, in the analysis that follows it is implicitly assumed that the judge is
punished if he violates his part of the agreement with the other two agents, and hence
22Ex-post transfers can be either positive (subsidization) or negative (taxation).
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he is bound to execute the social contract, unless they all agree to renegotiate it23.
Also notice that the cases of exogenous enforcement with complete or incomplete set of
enforceable agreements are special cases of social contracts in our framework. In section
2.4, we make the more realistic assumption that the economy starts of from a point of
no institutions and we derive their emergence, evolution and structure endogenously.
Propositions 1 and 2 below show the role of contract law for solving the hold-up
problem. The main intuition is that, in order to induce agents to exert high effort, sub-
sidization of trade is required. However, once the high-cost state materializes, agents
may have an incentive to conduct trade, even if it is suboptimal, in order to receive the
subsidies. Stopping them from doing so requires limitations to the maximum amount of
net transfers that the farmer can provide to the producer. However, these limitations,
though optimal from an ex-ante point of view, are not credible ex-post. Without an
institutional agent, who bears the cost of subsidies and the benefits of taxation, the
agents would simply undo the regulation they set in place after the state of nature
realizes. Therefore, a credible solution to this time-inconsistency problem requires a
judge, who enforces regulation and who has a stake on the function of the enforcement
institutions. In other words, the solution to the hold-up problem is not imposed ex-
ogenously, but arises as the equilibrium outcome of an institutional process (the social
contract).
Proposition 1: Let p = kH + βj(v − kL) − c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) . Consider the social contract
S∗, which defines:
(i) if trade of good g takes place, agent ξ receives subsidy (negative taxation)
23Of course, the important question of what ensures the compliance of the institutional agent with
the social contract is omitted from the analysis. However, one way to deal with this issue is to assume
an infinitely lived judge and construct a reward structure for him and trigger-strategies for the rest of
the agents, such that the compliance with the social contract is self-enforced. We leave this interesting
direction for future work.
50
τξ1 = (1− f(e, e))
(
βξ(v − kL)− c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
< 0.
(ii) if trade of good g does not takes place, agent ξ pays out taxation
τξ0 = f(e, e)
(
−βξ(v − kL) + c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
> 0.
(iii) any private contract pi(0, pˆ, Ig) or pi(qˆ, p, Ig), with pˆ > p or qˆ > p − p is non-
enforceable.
Then S∗ implements the first best effort levels and it is renegotiation-proof.
Proposition 2: The existence of the institutional agent and the non-enforcement of
private contracts contingent on trade are necessary conditions for the implementation
of first-best effort levels.
The proofs of the propositions are provided in Appendix B. Given these results, one
can also see the implications of this mechanism for development. Social contracts can
solve the hold-up problem as long as there is sufficient production to be taxed and
provided as subsidies. At the early stages of development, production is relatively low
and the mechanism is infeasible. As a result, there is low effort exertion and low prob-
ability of trade. Once productivity increases sufficiently, then the mechanism becomes
feasible and this implies the emergence of regulation, which is necessary to support
high effort levels. In turn, the probability and the marginal value of trade increase,
which encourages more investments to the know-how of the specialized good and pro-
motes productivity growth further. Therefore, a feedback mechanism emerges between
economic growth and enforcement institutions. The following section formalizes these
arguments and shows why the relationship between the two may be non-monotonic.
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2.4 Enforcement Institutions and Development
This section links the process of economic development with contract law. Formally,
the model follows closely the notation and assumptions of the previous section. The
economy lasts for T periods and consists of two groups of agents, each one of which is
represented by a continuum of measure one. The group i are buyers (farmers) of the
specialized good and group j are sellers (plough-makers). Each seller j can produce a
specific variety of an intermediary good g, which a specific buyer i can use to generate
additional production of the numeraire commodity (good a). In each period, a random
matching process matches one agent from group i with one from group j and together
they form an exclusive partnership24. Apart from their specialization in a specific
variety of g, the partnerships are identical and thus we use i and j as the notation for
the representative buyer-seller party.
The structure of the production for the specialized good is the same as in section
2.3, but the gains from trade are allowed to vary over time by a scaling factor Γt
25. Γt
is a positive coefficient, common for the whole economy, which can be interpreted as
the productivity on agents’ effort levels for good g. Agents can save resources (in terms
of the numeraire commodity) and invest in an aggregate, non-depreciable amount of
capital Zg which increases the value of trade Γt. It is assumed that Γt is a concave
function of Zg.
In addition to the specialized good g, both agents have access to the production
24This means that the buyer has the know-how of using only a specific variety of the good g, which
is produced by only a specific seller and the appropriate variety changes randomly every year.
25So, good g yields Γtv units of good a to the appropriate buyer, its cost takes values ΓtkH or ΓtkL
and the cost of effort by an agent ξ for g in period t is Γtcξgt. Also, conditions (1) and (2) hold.
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technology of the numeraire commodity a, which can be thought of as a non-specialized
or “autarchic” good (both terms are used interchangeably). The output of this good
in each period is a linear non-stochastic function of the economy-wide productivity
variable At and of the effort level an agent exerts for its production: yξt = Ateξat, where
yξt is the production of good a in period t by an agent of type ξ and eξat is the effort
level exerted by her26. Unlike the effort levels for the production of good g, we assume
that the effort level for the production of good a is continuous and the cost of effort
cξat is a convex function of eξat with
∂cξat
∂eξat
> 0,
∂2cξat
(∂eξat)2
> 0. The total cost of effort for
an agent is the summation of the two efforts: cξt = cξat + cξgt.
The productivity variables At and Γt are common for all agents. Furthermore,
their values depend on two types of cumulative, non-depreciable capital, Za and Zg
respectively. These capital levels can be interpreted as the technological know-how
of the economy for the production of the non-specialized and the specialized good
respectively27. Agents can choose to save amounts of the non-specialized good and
invest into the two forms of capital. However, due to the infinitesimal size each agent
and the fact that productivities are common for all, private savings are zero. Hence,
private savings are ignored in the analysis and consider public taxation and investment,
conducted by a governor.
Let zat, zgt be the aggregate investment to the production process a and g respec-
tively in period t. It is also assumed that At(Za) and Γt(Zg) are concave functions
of the respective capital stocks, satisfying the following conditions: A(0) > 0, Γ(0) >
0, Inada condition: A′(0) = Γ′(0) = ∞. Assuming that the economy starts with zero
capital stocks (Za0 = Zg0 = 0), the first two conditions guarantee that some production
is attainable even with zero capital stocks while the last two conditions guarantee that
26i has an increased production of good a if she buys the appropriate variety of the specialized good.
This is additional to yiat.
27Alternatively, one could allow the capital levels to also depend on effort and think of the relative
cost in terms of foregone production, but the mathematical formulation of the two problems is identical.
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at least some investment in productivity is socially beneficial.
Agents are risk-neutral. The state-dependent utility is the summation of production
of a, gains from trade, taxation and cost of effort:
uiθt = yit + Ig(Γtv − p)− τigt − (ciat + cigt)
ujθt = yjt + Ig(p− kθ)− τjgt − (cjat + cjgt)
Uξ =
T∑
t=0
δt
(∑
θ
fθ(eξgt, eζgt)uξθt
)
In terms of the timing of events, every period is split into sub-periods which roughly
follow the order of events of section 2.3. In the beginning of period zero the agents of
the economy propose and vote social contracts, which establish the main institutions
of government and enforcement in the economy. Thereafter, in every period t, agents
decide how much effort to exert on autarchic and specialized production, the state
of nature is determined, and agents decide whether to trade or not and sign private
contracts. Once production (and potentially trade) has taken place, the institutional
agent imposes taxation (conditional on trade) and decides whether to enforce certain
private agreements. Finally, consumption takes place. Figure 5 presents the sub-stages
of the game and the timing of events for every period after period zero.
The social contract S is similar to section 2.3, with three main differences: (i) Given
that it is proposed in period 0, it is an exhaustive plan of all future dates. (ii) It includes
investment plans za, zg for increasing respective productivities A and Γ, so S takes now
the form: S(Σ,Φ(Q), τ, za, zg). (iii) Σ can contain multiple agents. In this context, an
institutional agent can be thought of as a governor and a judge at the same time (there
is no separation of powers).
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Time
Effort exertion
Production costs are determined
Private contracts are signed 
1
2
3
Trade takes place. Government executes taxation and investment plans 
in productivity growth
Enforcement of private contracts
Consumption takes place
4
5
6
Figure 5: Timing of Events
As mentioned above, in the beginning of the game any agent of the economy can
propose a social contract. A proposal becomes a valid social contract if all agents vote
for it (unanimity requirement), even if there is only one proposal made28. If no proposal
achieves the unanimity requirement, then there is no government and enforcement insti-
tutions in the economy, and agents can utilize only the autarchic production technology.
In this case, the game proceeds with effort exertion, production and consumption under
autarchy in each period29.
Also notice that the unanimity requirement for the selection of the social contract
acts as a participation constraint. If the enforcement of a proposed social contract gives
28This means that agents have the option of not voting at all.
29The state of nature is inconsequential for autarchic production and therefore it is omitted from
the analysis of these sub-games
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lower utility to an agent than the utility of autarchy, then the agent can block the social
contract by not voting for it. Therefore, there can be no equilibrium of the game where
the final expected utility for a subset of agents is below their autarchic continuation
utility. For the rest of the section, when we refer to participation constraints, we imply
the autarchic utility level that each agent receives in each period.
On the other hand, any proposal that generates a Pareto undominated allocation
and satisfies the participation constraints of all agents can be an equilibrium of the
game. This is again a result of the unanimity requirement, since it gives veto power to
players30. In the analysis of the following sub-sections only one of the equilibria of the
game is analyzed, the equilibrium where the proposed social contract is designed so as
to maximize the summation of the utilities of all non-institutional agents, given that it
satisfies the participation constraint of the institutional agents31.
If a certain social contract is voted in the beginning period zero, the selected institu-
tional agents do not exert effort in the production process. In other words, it is assumed
that the activities of the institutional agent and production are mutually exclusive32.
The rest of the agents decide on how much effort to exert in producing the generic good
or investing effort for the specialized good and whether to trade or not.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the problem, it is worth mentioning that in-
stitutional agents play a dual role in this model. They are both governors and judges
at the same time. They are governors because they collect taxes from the rest of the
30The analysis of this result is available from the author upon request.
31We effectively compute the social contract which arises from a Nash-bargaining procedure which
allocates an equal bargaining coefficient on both types. The general set of equilibria, with unrestricted
coefficients can also be derived, however, we simplify the analysis by examining only the limiting case
of equal bargaining power.
32One consequence of this assumption is that occupation in institutions generates a cost in terms
of foregone production and hence a trade-off between the functionality of institutions and productive
capacity. It also implies a simple solution to this trade-off: the minimization of the set of institutional
agents. Relaxing this assumption can generate a more interesting trade-off and richer model predictions
for institutions but it would lead us astray from the main topic of the analysis. We leave this aspect
of the problem for future work.
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agents and allocate them to public spending, i.e. investments to the two types of pro-
ductivities. They are also judges because the enforce private agreements. This dual
role seems to better fit the role of monarchs in pre-industrial economies. The potential
reasons behind the separation of powers in post-industrial economies are not examined.
The main focus are the questions of when do restrictions on enforcement arise and how
they affect the development path of the economy.
2.4.1 Agents’ Maximization Problem and Best-Response Functions
An agent of type ξ, who is occupied with production activities, chooses effort levels
eξgt and eξat in each period t in order to maximize his utility, given an accepted social
contract S (and the implied values of τξgt, At, Γt). Each pair (i, j) also exchange g on
the “fair” price p∗ = Γt((1 − βi)v + βikL), if its cost is low or if the contract law does
not allow (side-)payments which violate incentive compatibility. Otherwise, they ex-
change good g for the price: p+q. Assume the former case33. In this case agent ξ solves:
max
{eξat,eξgt}
A(Zat−1)eξat+f(eigt, ejgt) (Γ(Zgt−1)βξ(v − kL)− τξ1t)+(1− f(eigt, ejgt) (−τξ0t)
−Γ(Zgt−1)cigt − ciat (4)
The solution to problem (4) is given by:
eξat : A(Zat−1) =
∂cξat
∂eξat
(5)
33We will shortly show a similar condition to condition (iii) of Proposition 1, which ensures incentive
compatibility and the “fair” price.
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 eξgt = e if τξ0t − τξ1t > −
Γ(Zgt−1)[(f(e,eζ)−f(e,eζ))βξ(v−kL)−(c−c)]
f(e,eζ)−f(e,eζ)
eξgt = e otherwise
(6)
Since the value of of eξgt also depends on the choice of effort of the trade-partner ζ,
equations (5) and (6) give the best-response function of agent ξ.
As far as institutional agents are concerned, they do not directly engage in pro-
ductive activities. Their utility is a function of the total taxes they collect minus the
resources they invest in Za, Zg. Though it is not explicitly modeled in the social con-
tract, one can ensure the compliance of institutional agents by including certain rewards
and punishments, conditional on its execution or not.
Denote by r+σ the reward of an institutional agent for executing the social contract
and by r−σ her punishment if she deviates. Her reward is equal to the aggregate taxes
she collects minus the aggregate investments in physical capitals:
r+σ = f(ei, ej)(miτσi1t +mjτσj1t) + (1− f(ei, ej)) (miτσi0t +mjτσj0t)− zσat − zσgt
In the expression above, mi, mj is the total mass of agents of type i and j respec-
tively, who are occupied in productive activities (non-institutional agents) and σ is
the institutional agent, who is asked to execute the taxation plan τσ and investment
plans zσa, zσg. On the other hand, if the institutional agent executes different plans
in period t, say {τ ′σξθt, z′σat, z′σgt}, for ξ ∈ {i, j}, for θ ∈ {0, 1}, then her utility is
the aggregate units of the autarchic goods she accumulates according to her plan minus
her punishment. By adding and subtracting r+σ and by using the equation above, we get:
f(ei, ej)
(
mi(τ
′
σi1t − τσi1t) +mj(τ ′σj1t − τσj1t)
)
+ (1− f(ei, ej)) (mi(τ ′σi0t − τσi0t)
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+mj(τ
′
σj0t − τσj0t)
)− (z′σat − zσat)− (z′σgt − zσgt) + r+σ − r−σ .
This states that the utility of the institutional agent is the utility she would receive by
executing the policy plans of the social contract, plus the extra resources of the new
taxation, minus the additional expenses by the new investment plans minus the penalty
defined by the social contract for deviating from the original agreement. It is clear that
as long as the punishment for deviation is lower than the net additional resources, the
institutional agent will choose to deviate.
In fact, the optimal choice of the institutional agent is to tax all production of
the non-specialized good so as to maximize the net resources from deviation. Such a
behavior can be prevented, of course, by setting the penalty of deviation sufficiently
high. Lemma 2 in Appendix B provides the necessary rewards and punishments for an
institutional agent, so that her participation constraint is satisfied, while maintaining
her incentives for executing the social contract. For the rest of the analysis we suppress
this problem from the analysis.
2.4.2 The Optimal Design of Contract Law
Lemma 1 characterizes the optimal set of institutional agents. Proposition 3 charac-
terizes the optimal design of contract law and follows from Proposition 1. Both proofs
are provided in Appendix B.
Lemma 1: The optimal social contract S∗ determines that the set Σ is of measure
zero. That is, the total number of institutional agents is infinitesimal compared to the
aggregate population.
The intuition of Lemma 1 is simple. Since productive and government activities are
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mutually exclusive and there is no limit to the span of control in governance, having
a strictly positive measure of institutional agents is a social waste of resources: it re-
duces the productive capacity of the economy without generating any additional benefit.
Therefore, the minimization of Σ is the optimal option. In other words, the optimal
social contract defines that the number of institutional agents is finite, so that some
institutional agents exist. However, the exact number is indeterminate, as they do not
impact the aggregate economy due to the continuum-of-agents assumption. Without
loss of generality, henceforth it is assumed that there is only one institutional agent in
equilibrium.
Proposition 3: Let p = Γ(Zgt−1)
(
kH + βj(v − kL)− c−cf(ei,e)−f(ei,e)
)
. Incentive com-
patibility requires that any private contract pi(0, pˆ, Ig) or pi(qˆ, p, Ig), with pˆ > p or
qˆ > p− p is non-enforceable.
Proof: See Appendix B
Proposition 3 gives the necessary regulation required to support an incentive com-
patible subsidization scheme, which parallels that of Proposition 1. Notice that p,
which stands for the maximum transfer allowed between the two agents when trade
takes place, depends on the values of Γt, the productivity of the specialized good, and
the induced effort level ei. These are endogenous variables which change over time
and, therefore, regulation is dynamic. While the impact of Γt has a positive effect on
p (meaning that it relaxes the incentive compatibility condition), the evolution of ei
has a negative impact on p, and the two effects generate a non-monotonic relationship
between the optimal contract law and development. This effect is analyzed in more
detail in subsections 2.4.4 and 2.4.5.
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2.4.3 Unconstrained optimal taxation and investment plans
A consequence of the result stated in the Lemma 1 is that the utility of the institutional
agent is infinitesimally small compared to the utility of the agents employed in produc-
tive activities and hence it can be ignored in the determination of the optimal social
contract. Provided the optimal values for Σ and Φ(Q) (by Lemma 1 and Proposition 3),
the rest of the variables included in the social contract are given as the solution to the
problem which maximizes the expected utility of both types of agents with respect to
taxation and investment plans and subject to the incentive compatibility, government
budget and feasibility constraints:
max
∫ ( T∑
t=0
δt
(∑
θ
fθ(eξgt, eζgt)uit
))
di+
∫ ( T∑
t=0
δt
(∑
θ
fθ(eξgt, eζgt)ujt
))
dj ⇔
max
1
2
T∑
t=0
[
δt [A(Zat−1)e∗iat + f(eigt, ejgt) (Γ(Zgt−1)βi(v − kL)− τi1t) + (1− f(eigt, ejgt)) (−τi0t)− ciat − cigt]
]
+
1
2
T∑
t=0
[
δt
[
A(Zat−1)e∗jat + f(eigt, ejgt) (Γ(Zgt−1)βj(v − kL)− τj1t) + (1− f(eigt, ejgt)) (−τj0t)− cjat − cjgt
]]
(7)
With respect to: {τ, za, zg}, and subject to:
Best Response Function of type i (8)
Best Response Function of type j (9)
τj0t − τj1t 6 Γ(Zgt−1)kH − (p+ q) Incentive Compatibility Constraint for type j (10)
61
zat + zgt 6 f(eigt, ejgt)(τi1t + τj1t) + (1− f(eigt, ejgt)) (τi0t + τj0t)
Government Budget Constraint (11)
f(eigt, ejgt) (τi1t + τj1t)+(1− f(eigt, ejgt)) (τi0t+τj0t) 6 A(Zat−1)(eiat+ejat)−f(eigt, ejgt)kL
Feasibility Constraint (12)
Due to the risk neutrality of the utility functions of agents, the concavity of pro-
ductivity functions A(Za), Γ(Zg) and the Inada condition, the optimal taxation and
investment plans take the form of a stopping-time problem: at the beginning of the
economy, when the marginal productivity of investment is higher than the marginal
value of consumption, the institutional agent taxes all income from the other agents
to fund investments in productivity. At some threshold value of productivity, taxa-
tion drops and no further investments are made. Non-taxable production is consumed
thereafter.
However, trade between agents and inducing high effort levels for one of the types
(or both) require specific threshold level of production of the non-specialized good,
which are endogenously determined by investment plan za. Specifically, trade can take
place between i and j only if the non-specialized production of agent i is sufficient to
cover the cost of production in the low-cost state:
A(Zat−1)eiat > kL (13)
Inducing high effort for one type of agent requires that the aggregate production of the
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non-specialized good minus the expected production costs of the specialized good are
greater than the expected reduction in taxation:
A(Zat−1) (eiat + ejat)− f(e, eζ)Γ(Zgt−1)kL > f(e, eζ)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1)
[
βmin (f(e, e)− f(e, e) (v − kL)− (c− c)
]
f(e, e)− f(e, e)
)
(14)
Similarly, incentivizing both agents to exert high effort level requires:
A(Zat−1) (eiat + ejat)− f(e, e)Γ(Zgt−1)kL > f(e, e)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1) [β
max (f(e, e)− f(e, e)) (v − kL)− (c− c)]
f(e, e)− f(e, e)
)
+ f(e, e)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1)
[
βmin (f(e, e)− f(e, e)) (v − kL)− (c− c)
]
f(e, e)− f(e, e)
)
(15)
In inequalities (14),(15), βmin = min{βi, βj} and βmax = max{βi, βj}. It is easy to
solve the problem when these constraints are not binding, which is the case when the
initial value of productivity for the non-specialized good is sufficiently high. In this
case the optimal social plan induces both agents to exert high effort level by reducing
taxation in the low-cost state and increasing it in the high-cost state (which are truth-
fully revealed through trade). It also increases capital stocks in period zero up to the
point where the future marginal increase in production is equal to the marginal cost of
production for both goods. Formally, this solution is defined by the equations below:
τξ0t − τξ1t = −Γ(Zgt−1) [βξ (f(e, eζ)− f(e, eζ)) (v − kL)− (c− c)]
f(e, eζ)− f(e, eζ) for ξ ∈ {i, j}
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za0 such that:
T∑
t=1
δt
∂A(Za0)
∂Za
(e∗ia(Za0) + e
∗
ia(Za0)) = 1 , where Za0 = za0
zg0 such that:
T∑
t=1
δt
∂Γ(Zg0)
∂Zg
(f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c) = 1 , where Zg0 = zg0
The above equations characterize the problem only for very high values of A(0). If A(0)
is such that any of the feasibility constraints (13)-(15) is not satisfied at time t = 0,
then the optimal investment plan za depends on the marginal benefits and costs of
prolonging investment in future periods. The benefits come from the increased future
production of the autarchic good and satisfying the minimum production level required
for trade to take place or for providing subsidies34. The costs come from the value of
foregone consumption in the period of investment.
Due to the fact that equations (13) to (15) define threshold values, which are de-
termined endogenously by past investment and taxation, there are multiple different
cases to consider regarding optimal investment and taxation plans. Figures 11 to 13 in
Appendix B provide all possible cases, but in the following subsection we examine only
the most interesting of these cases. Before doing so, we define some useful threshold
values, which will be used in the analysis thereafter. The following threshold values
K(Zgt−1) and K(Zgt−1) represent the aggregate production of the autarchic good re-
quired for the subsidization of one or two types of agents respectively form equations
(14) and (15).
34Which generate extra value by increasing the volume of trade of the specialized good.
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Let K(Zgt−1) = f(e, e)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1)[β
min(f(e,e)−f(e,e))(v−kL)−(c−c)]
f(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
+ f(e, e)kL
Let K(Zgt−1) = f(e, e)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1)[β
min(f(e,e)−f(e,e))(v−kL)−(c−c)]
f(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
+ f(e, e)
(
−Γ(Zgt−1)[βmax(f(e,e)−f(e,e))(v−kL)−(c−c)]
f(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
+ f(e, e)kL
As before, βmin = min{βi, βj} , βmax = max{βi, βj}. Define by Z˜a, Za, Za the
minimum require physical capital of type a, such that the inequalities (13) to (15) hold
respectively at time zero. Formally:
Z˜a : A(Z˜a)e
∗
ia(Z˜a) = kL
Za : A(Za)
(
e∗ia(Za) + e
∗
ja(Za)
)
= K(0)
Za : A(Za)
(
e∗ia(Za) + e
∗
ja(Za)
)
= K(0)
If the solutions to the above equations do not exist (and since effort exertion is an
increasing function of productivity), there are two possible cases to consider for each
equation. Either the required value of Za is so low that it violates the non-negativity
constraint for the capital stock or the limit lim
Za→∞
A(Za)(eiat + ejat) is lower than the
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required threshold.
The first case is the case where A(0) is sufficiently high so that feasibility constraints
for trade and effort exertion are not binding and, therefore, the analysis is the same
as of the unconstrained problem provided above. In the second case, the respective
feasibility constraint is always binding, which implies that either trade will never take
place, irrespectively of the capital stock of the economy, or inducing high effort for at
least one or both agents is not attainable. However, the second class of results can also
arise in the case where the required capital stock for trade (or inducing high effort) is
attainable, but the cost of foregone consumption is too high and such an investment
plan is not optimal. Therefore, in terms of economic consequences, nothing is lost by
restricting attention to the cases where the critical values Z˜a, Za and Za exist and are
non-negative.
The importance of these thresholds is that one can examine the optimal investment
and taxation plans when one of these constraints is more difficult to satisfy than the
others. Notice that because K(Zgt) is always greater than K(Zgt), then Za > Za,
which means that feasibility constraint (15) is always more difficult to satisfy than
(14). Furthermore, for each one of these critical values and given some plan za, which
utilizes all non-specialized production in each period for investments in productivity
and subsidizing effort levels, there exists a point t in time such that the accumulated
capital stock Za reaches the respective critical value. Define t˜, t and t as the respective
points in time and assume that each one of them is less than T. Under these assumption
and results the following case of interest is examined.
2.4.4 An Economy with non-Monotonic Regulation
We now analyze the case where the three feasibility constraints (13)-(15) are binding at
time zero. We derive the required conditions on parameter values so that the economy
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passes through the different stages of economic development (no-trade, trade with low
effort levels, trade with high effort levels). We also find the conditions for regulation to
change non-monotonically over these stages. Enforcement institutions are required at
the point where productivity in good a is high enough to support trade, but contract
law becomes relevant only when subsidization of trade for at least one type is feasible.
In turn, the increase in the trade of good g, generated by regulation, spurs further
economic growth by increasing its marginal value and this leads to further investments
in the productivity of this good. Therefore, we claim that the interaction between
markets and institutions goes in both directions35.
As before, there are different combinations of assumptions that can give similar
qualitative results in our model36. We examine the conditions that present the most
detailed interpretation of economic development and enforcement institutions evolution.
The main requirement is that the continuation value of investment in productivity of
goods a and g is greater than the cost of foregone consumption in all three threshold
points (t˜, t, t). This generates optimal investment paths for five different stages of
development: [0, t˜], [t˜, t], [t, t], [t, t∗] and [t∗, T ]. These are described below:
Stage 1: [0, t˜]
Assume that Z˜a < Za < Za. This implies that the most difficult to satisfy constraint
is the subsidization of both types of agents. Define t˜ as the time period which satisfies
the following condition and growth path:
t˜∑
t=0
zat = Z˜, zat = A(Zt−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1) and assume
that ∂A(Z˜a)
∂Z˜a
[e∗ia(Z˜a) + e
∗
ja(Z˜a)]
(
T∑
t=t˜
δt−t˜
)
> 1. The last assumption means that the net marginal
benefit of investment za at the critical value Z˜a is positive, so that investment in the
productivity of good a must continue beyond this threshold. Therefore, zat follows the
35The paper by Dhillon and Rigolini is also important in that respect, as the determination of prices
and the use of formal and informal channels of enforcement arise endogenously. The main focus is on
the impact of the design of contract law.
36See Appendix B.
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state-independent growth path zat = A(Zt−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1) up to time t˜. Call this
investment plan IP ∗
t˜
. During stage 1, productivity for good a is low and the autarchic
production of type i is not sufficient for covering the cost of production of good g in
any state. Trade does not take place, but production of a is taxed away and invested
in increasing Za.
Stage 2: [t˜, t]
Define t such that: Z˜a +
t∑
t=t˜+1
zat = Za
zat, zgt are defined by the following investment paths:
zgt = A(Zat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)− Γ(Zgt)f(e, e)kL , Zgt = Zgt−1 + zgt and zat = 0
if ∂A(Zat−1)∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
<
∂Γ(Zgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
otherwise, zat > 0 and zat , zgt are such the marginal returns are equalized:
∂A(Zat−1)
∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
=
∂Γ(Zgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
,
zat + zgt = A(Zat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)− Γ(Zgt−1)f(e, e)kL
Call the optimal investment path above IP ∗t . At time t˜ there is enough production of
good a by agents of type i, so that trade arises in the economy, but, since Za > Z˜a, there
is not enough production for subsidizing effort exertion. This constraint holds until the
physical capital reaches the critical value Za, which happens in period t. Also at the
same time (t˜) enforcement institutions emerge but no restrictions on enforceability are
required.
On the other hand, after t˜, due to the Inada conditions, investment takes place
in productivity Γ and the optimal investment plan must divide available production
between za and zb. The optimal rule is to invest production to the productivity of
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good g only, until the marginal returns of production are equalized between goods a
and g. Thereafter, investment is divided between the two goods so as to maintain the
equality of marginal returns. This is represented by the first (the “if”) and second (the
“otherwise”) part respectively of IP ∗t .
Stage 3: [t, t]
The main logic and intuition proceeds in the same way as in stage 2. Define t such
that: Za +
t∑
t=t+1
zat = Za. Furthermore assume that:
∂A(Za)
∂Za
[
e∗ia(Za) + e
∗
ja(Za)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
> 1
∂Γ(Zgt)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
> 1
T∑
t=t
δt
[
A(Zat−1)
(
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
)
+ Γ(Zgt−1) (f(e, e)v − c− c)
]
>
T∑
t=t
δt
[
A(Zˆat−1)
(
eˆ∗ia(Zˆat−1) + eˆ
∗
ja(Zˆat−1)
)
+ Γ(Zˆgt−1) (f(e, e)v − 2c)
]
The first two conditions ensure that it is optimal to invest both in the productivity of
good a and g beyond time period t, at which point there is enough production of good
a so that one of the two agents can be subsidized to exert high effort. Notice that the
marginal benefit of one of the agents exerting high effort is the same irrespectively of
who is subsidized, due to the symmetry of the probability function in terms of effort
levels. However, the subsidy required for inducing high effort is lower for the agent with
the lower bargaining power. This is the reason why we have defined Za to depend on
βmin. Let us assume that type ξ is the one with the low bargaining power.
At time t, it is optimal for type ξ to receive subsidy conditional on trade, if the
overall social surplus from the increased probability of trade and the slower increase in
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productivity is greater than the social surplus under the lower probability of trade but
the faster increase in productivity. This trade-off between the probability of trade and
productivity growth comes from the fact that both must be funded from the taxation
imposed on agents and they both face ultimately the same feasibility constraint. The
third condition ensures that paying out subsidies to one type of agents Pareto domi-
nates not paying subsidies at all. The investment path with partial subsidies {za, zg}
and without any subsidies {zˆa, zˆg}, are given below:
zgt = A(Zat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)−K(Zgt) , Zgt = Zgt−1 + zgt, zat = 0 ,
if ∂A(Zat−1)∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
<
∂Γ(Zgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
otherwise, zat > 0 and zat , zgt are such the marginal returns are equalized:
∂A(Zat−1)
∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
=
∂Γ(Zgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− c− c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
,
zat + zgt = A(Zat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)−K(Zgt−1)
zˆgt = A(Zˆat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)− Γ(Zˆgt)f(e, e)kL , Zˆgt = Zˆgt−1 + zˆgt, zˆat = 0
if ∂A(Zˆat−1)∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zˆat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zˆat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
<
∂Γ(Zˆgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
otherwise, zˆat > 0 and zˆat , zˆgt are such the marginal returns are equalized:
∂A(Zˆat−1)
∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zˆat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zˆat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
=
∂Γ(Zˆgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
zˆat + zˆgt = A(Zˆat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)− Γ(Zˆgt−1)f(e, e)kL
Therefore, the optimal investment plan for [t, t] (call it IP ∗
t
) is characterized by the
three inequalities and the investment plan {za, zg} above37.
37See also Appendix B for the possible cases when some of the above inequalities are violated.
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Stage 4: [t, t∗]
Similarly to stage 3, define t∗ such that:
∂A(Za)
∂Za
[
e∗iat(Za) + e
∗
jat(Za)
]( T∑
s=t∗
δs−t∗
)
=
∂Γ(Zgt∗ )
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t∗
δs−t∗
)
= 1
Also assume that:
∂A(Za)
∂Za
[
e∗ia(Za) + e
∗
ja(Za)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
> 1
∂Γ(Zgt)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− c− c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
> 1
T∑
t=t
δt
[
A(Zˇat−1)
(
e∗ia(Zˇat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zˇat−1)
)
+ Γ(Zˇgt−1) (f(e, e)v − 2c)
]
>
T∑
t=t
δt
[
A(Zat−1)
(
e∗ia(Zat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zat−1)
)
+ Γ(Zgt−1) (f(e, e)v − c− c)
]
These conditions are equivalent to the conditions specified for periods [t, t]. The first
two ensure that investment in productivity of good a and g are optimal after t = t. At
this point of time, there is adequate production of the autarchic good so that subsidizing
the effort levels of both types is feasible. As before, subsidizing both agents is optimal
if it generates greater overall utility than subsidizing only one agent, which, given the
conditions specified thus far, is better than no subsidization for any type. The required
assumption for this result is the third condition. Call the optimal investment plan until
t∗ as IP ∗t∗ . IP
∗
t∗ incorporates all the previous optimal investment plans up to t plus the
investment plan {zˇat, zˇgt} thereafter. This is given below:
zˇgt = A(Zˇat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)−K(Zˇgt), Zˇgt = Zˇgt−1 + zˇgt, zˇat = 0
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if ∂A(Zˇat−1)∂Za
[
e∗ia(Zˇat−1) + e
∗
ja(Zˇat−1)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
<
∂Γ(Zˇgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
otherwise, zˇat > 0 and zˇat , zˇgt are such marginal returns are equalized:
∂A(Zˇat−1)
∂Za
[
e∗iat(Zˇat−1) + e
∗
jat(Zˇat)
]( T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
=
∂Γ(Zˇgt−1)
∂Zg
[f(e, e)(v − kL)− 2c]
(
T∑
s=t
δs−t
)
,
zˇat + zˇgt = A(Zˇat−1)(e∗iat−1 + e
∗
jat−1)−K(Zˇgt−1)
The plan {zat, zgt} follows the same growth path and is subject to the same feasibility
constraints as the optimal plan for the periods [t, t]. Of course, by the third inequality
above, it is suboptimal to {zˇat, zˇgt}, and is not part of the equilibrium path (See also
Appendix B for the cases where the inequalities above do not hold).
Stage 5: [t∗, T ]
After t∗ investment falls to zero, since the marginal utility increase by additional in-
vestment in either types of physical capital is lower than the marginal cost of fore-
gone consumption. In this case, agents receive subsidies whenever they trade, pay
taxes whenever they do not trade and consume the remainder of the production.
The evolution of regulation depends on the investment path for Zg and the opti-
mally induced effort levels. Recall that the maximum permitted transfers are given
by p = Γ(Zgt)
(
kH + βj(v − kL)− c−cf(ei,e)−f(ei,e)
)
.
Figures 6 and 7 give the graphical representation of the economy according to the
conditions above. A first note is that they are drawn as if time is continuous. While
the model is one of discrete time, the figures can be closely approximated if T takes
sufficiently high values. Figure 6 depicts the equilibrium path of capital stocks Za
and Zg and Figure 7 depicts the equilibrium path of contract law, as represented by
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Figure 6: Capital-Accumulation Paths
the maximum enforceable transfer p. These graphs also present the different stages of
economic development.
To recapitulate, during [0, t˜] productivity Za is very low and trade is infeasible.
There is no need for enforcement institutions or regulation and taxation is used in
increasing Za. This stage reflects a rather primitive stage of economic organization.
In stage [t˜+1, t] trade becomes feasible and enforcement institutions are required to
support it by making private agreements enforceable. However, providing tax-breaks
to agents in order to incentivize high effort remains infeasible and hence regulation is
still not required. Any agreement on exchanging specialized goods is enforceable. On
the other hand, public spending can be used for increasing both types of capital stock,
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but, since the marginal increase in productivity of g is much higher than the marginal
productivity of good a, taxation flows only to the former. This continues until effective
marginal returns are equalized, which depends on parameter values.
In periods [t + 1, t], Za exceeds the threshold value Za and partial (one-type) sub-
sidization of trade takes place. At this point of development, limitations on the set
of enforceable transfers are set in order to make tax-breaks effective in inducing high
effort. Thus the probability of trade increases for each group. On average, trade and its
marginal value increase as well, which induces greater investment in Zg. This is shown
in the diagram by the kink in the slope of Zg at period t. Higher investment in Zg
also means that the optimal stopping time for investment t∗ is delayed. Moreover, as Γt
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increases, p also increases, which means that regulation is initially severe but it is subse-
quently relaxed. This is an important stage of the development process, where one can
see the interaction between contract law, specialization and productivity growth and
could be loosely interpreted as a stage akin to merchantilism before industrialization38.
The next stage, [t+1, t∗], is the stage where the economy develops fully its productive
capacity. Investments in Za and Zg reach their peak in t
∗ and tax-breaks are given
to both types. The feedback effect between contract law and productivity is repeated.
Furthermore, as Figure 7 depicts, if f(e, e)−f(e, e) > f(e, e)−f(e, e), then contract law
tightens again (p decreases). This gives rise to a non-monotonic pattern of regulation
over time, which may explain why it is difficult in empirical studies to find a robust
effect between contractual institutions and growth.
Finally, the remaining periods of the economy, [t∗+1, T ], represent a fully developed
economy. Capital stocks and trade have reached their optimum level and taxation is
used solely for inducing high effort levels. The remainder of production is used for
consumption purposes.
2.4.5 The non-monotonicity between enforcement costs and development
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the purposes of the chapter is to show that
enforcement costs may not be monotonically related to economic growth and, therefore,
the empirical specification by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) may not be the appropriate
one for testing the relationship between contract law and development. As was shown in
the previous subsection, it is possible that the evolution of regulation is non-monotonic
over the process of economic development. That is, there may be periods where reg-
ulation is relaxed and the contractual space expands, while other periods where the
38It is also noteworthy to mention that Landes (1998) provides evidence that, despite common beliefs,
the medieval period experienced a rapid increase in the productivity of the agricultural sector. This
is in line with the argument made here that the initial growth in productivity of the non-specialized
sector precedes specialization and the period of severe regulation.
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contractual space shrinks (as shown in Figure 7).
If this is the case, and if one makes the additional (and plausible) assumption, that
contract enforcement costs are positively correlated with the set of enforceable agree-
ments, then it follows that contract enforcement costs may not be positively correlated
with growth. Of course, in this model, for theoretical reasons, it was implicitly assumed
that contract enforcement costs are zero. This helped to contrast the results of this
chapter, where the limits on contractual space arise endogenously, with the results of the
previous literature, where, due to exogenous enforcement costs, the contractual space
is incomplete. But one can modify the model to include strictly positive enforcement
costs.
Consider the following modification of the model. Assume that in the economy
there are two categories of ploughs. Those which are described by our model and
which suffer from a hold-up problem in their production, and another category, which
is unaffected by any hold-up considerations. However, the second variety of ploughs
(call them the class-two ploughs), varies in terms of its value for the farmer, while it has
a constant cost k2. Say that, for class-two, v is distributed uniformly between [0 , v],
with v > max{pt}. Furthermore, a plough of class-two may turn out to be defective
after its sale, in which case the farmer can ask for a refund, if he proves his case in the
court. This is necessary, if his output in terms of wheat can be verified by the court
but not the seller (as is usually the case).
In this economy, as long as the class-two category is not too large a fraction of trade
(so that the ex-post inefficiencies generated by banning some of these exchanges are not
too large), it is still optimal to not allow some contracts from being written in equi-
librium (for optimal incentives in the production of class-one ploughs). Moreover, the
dynamic evolution of contract law is still represented by Figure 7 (under the relevant
conditions) and the aggregate transactions for ploughs of class-two are positively corre-
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lated with pt. As a consequence, the number of cases brought to courts and aggregate
enforcement costs are positively correlated with the design of contract law (pt) as well.
Of course, the plausibility of the result depends on the credibility of the assumptions.
But still the assumption (the positive correlation between contract-enforcement
costs and the set of enforceable agreements) can be justified in terms of intuition.
This is because one expects that the greater the aggregate number of transactions in an
economy, the greater the number of cases that end up in courts and hence the higher the
aggregate enforcement costs (and the costs per case, due to the dis-economies of scale
exhibited by bureaucracies). And the aggregate number of transactions is expected to
be positively correlated with the size of the set of permissible transactions. Of course,
these hypotheses, though plausible, remain to be tested empirically as well.
2.4.6 Discussion
As mentioned before, the institutional agent stands for a governor or a monarch, who
is bound by the agreement she has made with the rest of the citizens in period zero.
She agent plays a double role in this economy. The standard economic role implied by
most models of public economics is the role of the government, which collects taxes and
allocates public expenditures in economic activities where the market mechanism fails
to provide efficient outcomes. In this model, investment in the production technology
is a public good, due to the assumption of the continuum of agents and the assumption
that productivity parameters are economy-wide.
The second role of the institutional agent is her role as an enforcement authority for
private agreements. As was have shown, in this setup, it may not always be optimal
for the enforcement authority to guarantee the conduct of trade, unlike the previous
literature. Because agents are perfectly rational, they will never honor their part of
agreement when they know that it will not be enforced on them. Hence making some
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private agreements non-enforceable is equivalent to effectively forbidding them. So one
can interpret the endogenously determined set of non-enforceable private agreements
as laws of banning some types of transactions and this can have a positive effect on
social welfare.
Overall, the analysis of this subsection presents an economy which moves through
all the stages of development. It starts from a point where production is limited to
activities who do not suffer from hold-up problems, it moves to a period where trade
begins and enforcement authorities are necessary and finally it ends up in a stage with
limitations on enforceable agreements (regulation). Furthermore, the resources spent for
incentivizing agents to exert high effort is proportional to the productivity parameter
Γt and hence as the value of trade grows so do the optimal subsidies. This can be
interpreted as an endogenous growth of enforcement institutions, at least in terms of
the resources devoted to their cause. Moreover, the exertion of high effort increases the
marginal value of trade and, as a consequence, it increases the threshold value for the
capital stock Zg. This implies that the overall investments made in the productivity
of trade are higher and this generates a positive feedback loop from economic growth
to contract law and back to economic growth. In other words, the model provides a
formalization of the argument that growth and law are inexorably entangled and the
development of one has consequences for the other.
2.5 Conclusion
The main purpose of the chapter is to relate the process of economic development with
the emergence and evolution of enforcement institutions and contract law. We demon-
strate the importance of restrictions on enforceable agreements for increasing social
welfare and growth. In equilibrium, the relationship between economic growth and the
intensity of regulation may be non-monotonic and this may explain why empirical stud-
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ies do not find a positive correlation between enforcement institutions and development.
Finally, the model derives the design of enforcement institutions and the centralization
of authority as equilibria phenomena.
The model of this chapter can be extended in various directions in order to explain
different phenomena related to the process of economic development, institutional de-
sign and regulation. Notice that in the models of section 2.3 and 2.4, there is no
loss of efficiency. Despite the fact that regulation is necessary, all socially valuable
transactions take place in equilibrium. So regulation does not impose any cost from
an efficiency point view, which goes against standard economic theory and intuition.
However, one can extend the model to incorporate multiple sources of trade among
agents. In this case, regulation generates social value by underpinning the mechanism,
which induces optimal incentives, but destroys social value by forbidding some wel-
fare enhancing transactions. The trade-off between incentives and economic freedom is
even more clear in the extended model. We believe that one can use this more elab-
orate model of the design of optimal regulation in order to explain the differences in
regulatory regimes that we observe between economies.
Furthermore, the model can be modified in order to generate a theory of regu-
lation cycles. In the current form of the model, the set of enforceable agreements
changes whenever the number of agents, who need to be incentivized to exert high
effort, changes. But in a model with a stream of new traded good being introduced at
different stages of economic development, the introduction of a new good is associated
with a tightening of regulatory restrictions, which are subsequently relaxed. This cycle
is then repeated every time a new good is introduced. Thus, we can have a model
of regulation cycles which are related to the process of innovation and technological
advance.
Similarly, the model can be used to relate the role of enforcement institutions with
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the degree of specialization in the economy and the organizational complexity by assum-
ing that new production processes require the cooperation of a larger set of individuals
who face a multi-agent version of the hold-up problem. This model is able to generate
regulation cycles and relate the degree of specialization to the existence of appropriate
institutional restrictions at the same time.
Another assumption that can be relaxed is the assumption of the mutual exclusivity
between productive and governmental activities. By allowing institutional agents to
have a certain span of control, which they have to allocate between their institutional
and their economic role, one can provide a more rigorous analysis of how and under
what conditions centralization of power emerges. This can provide us with a more
complete theory of institutional size and how it may vary along the development path
of an economy.
For all the above reasons, we believe that this model is an interesting contribution
to the literature, which highlights the importance of enforcement institutions to the
process of development.
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3 Chapter Three: Separation of Powers, Political
Competition and Efficient Provision of Public Goods
3.1 Introduction
Voting games on public goods usually have two undesirable features: (i) non-existence of
equilibrium when policy platforms are multi-dimensional, (ii) inefficiently low provision
of public goods when the equilibrium exists (Jackson and Moselle, 2002). Citizen-
candidate models (Osborne-Slivinski, 1996, Besley-Coate, 1997) solve the problems of
existence and efficiency of Nash equilibria in voting games, but generate a different
concern. The elected politician is free to choose any allocation of resources he prefers
and hence, in any equilibrium of these games, the social position of an individual (citizen
or executive) matters for his payoff. Therefore, in a sense, the equilibria of these games
generate excessive “rents” for the elected politician, which can be captured by the
difference between their payoffs as citizens and as elected politicians.
The purpose of this chapter is to show that this negative side-effect of the citizen-
candidate models can be solved by the use of appropriately designed institutional re-
strictions in economies with public goods and complete information (which is the nat-
ural setting for these voting games). We show how agents may reach agreement on the
type of political institutions selected and how these institutions lead to efficient social
choices with zero political rents in equilibrium.
The institutions that arise endogenously from this political game is the utilization
of the separation of powers by agents (some of them choose to become politicians, while
others choose to become legislators to set the constitution) and the constitution (a set of
restrictions on the voting behavior of citizens and politicians). Therefore, institutional
arrangements on collective decisions become a necessary prerequisite for efficiency in
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this case.
More specifically, we present an economy with one private and one public good and
we use a five-stage game, where all agents start as citizens. At stage one each citizen
decides on whether to become a politician or a legislator (but not both) or to remain
as a citizen. At stage two, legislators set the constitution of the economy, which defines
restrictions on political competition, and at stage three politician propose platforms.
At stage four, agents vote and at stage five the elected politician imposes taxation
and produces the level of the public good according to his proposal and constitutional
restrictions.
It is shown that the pure-strategy sub-game perfect equilibria of this political game
implement the Lindahl allocation of the economy, which implies that none of the agents
has sufficient power to achieve his most preferred outcome (and essentially becoming
a social dictator). Thus, political rents are zero, in the sense that, in equilibrium,
the utility of an agent is not dependent on whether he is a politician or not. To the
best of our knowledge, no paper in the voting literature so far has implemented efficient
allocations implying zero political rents as Nash equilibria. In this chapter, this outcome
is due to political competition in conjunction with appropriate political institutions, and
hence this highlights the importance of these two factors in eliminating political rents
and achieving efficiency.
The following assumptions are crucial for the results: (i) An agent can become
either a politician or a legislator, but not both (Separation of Powers), (ii) the rules set
by legislators apply equally for all agents, conditional on their characteristics, namely
preferences and endowments (No-discrimination Principle).
In section 3.3, we start with a very simple model. We show why both political
competition and political institutions are necessary conditions for the implementation of
Lindahl allocations when political parties (or politicians) are exogenous. The economy
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consists of 2 agents and 2 goods, one private and one public. Political parties are selfish
entities which make proposals over the allocation of resources in order to extract as
much of the social surplus as possible. Agents vote for their most preferred proposal
and the party which wins the election becomes the government and implements its
policy.
The actions of the parties and agents may be restricted by the Constitution, which
in this section is an exogenously imposed set of restrictions. The constitution deter-
mines the dimension of commitment to political proposals and the maximum amount
of taxation, which a government can levy on citizens. A particular form of the consti-
tution is considered, which specifies that political proposals are committing only to the
level of the public good but not taxation levels and the maximum taxation on a citizen
must be such that his marginal willingness-to-pay for the proposed level of the public
good is not violated39.
Using the above constitutional rule, three different cases are examined. The first case
assumes that the constitution limits taxation, but there is a single candidate politician.
In this case, it is shown that the party acts as a social dictator and reaps as much
political rents as possible, given the limitation it faces. In the second case, we allow
for free entry of political parties, but the maximum taxation restriction is removed
from the constitution. In this case, it is shown that, despite the presence of political
competition, parties still earn political rents. In fact, because the taxation restriction
is removed, parties face weaker restrictions than the social dictator of the previous case
and they may earn strictly higher rents than him.
In the third case, we allow for both political competition and the maximum taxation
restriction to apply in the economy. It is shown that under these conditions the equi-
39We explain this definition of the maximum-taxation constraint more thoroughly in section 3.3. It
essentially implies that the taxation imposed by the government on an agent can not reduce his utility
below the utility he would have received if he were on his offer curve for the specific level of the public
good implemented.
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libria of the game are the Lindahl allocation of the economy and prove that political
rents to parties are zero. We, thus, establish the necessity of both types of checks and
balances over the power of government for efficiency.
In section 3.4 we move one step further and show how political institutions emerge
endogenously, by extending the political game to the five-stage game described earlier.
More specifically, at the first stage of the game agents decide what type of political power
they want to hold from the two types available: legislative and executive power. Given
theses choices, agents are distinguished into three classes, namely legislators, politicians
and citizens. Therefore, we introduce separation of powers as a potential institutional
control on the power of politicians, and agents in the economy choose whether to utilize
it or not. Legislators determine the constitution of the economy, which is the set of
political institutions that restrict voting behavior and political actions. Specifically,
legislators are allowed to determine how committing political proposals will be and
what is the constraint on maximum taxation. The rest of the political game, then
follows the game in section 3.3.
The extended game has multiple sub-game perfect Nash equilibria, all of which im-
plement the Lindahl allocation of the economy. Under any preference profile, legislators
decide that politicians will be committed to the level of the public good they announce
but not to the taxation level. Instead they set an upper bound to the level of taxation
politicians can impose, namely the maximum-taxation constraint of section 3.3. With
these restrictions in place, and because of the free entry of candidates in the political
arena, politicians can not extract social surplus by simply being in power. In other
words, political rents are zero40.
Therefore, the contribution of this chapter is threefold: First, it contributes to the
40There are also other equilibria of the game, which hold only for specific preference profiles, but
the equilibrium allocation remains the same. The only difference is in terms of the constitutional
restrictions that arise in these equilibria.
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citizen-candidate models by showing how institutional restrictions and the separation
of powers can facilitate political competition in achieving zero-political rents. Second,
it shows that this requires that political proposals be only partially committing (com-
mitting only to the level of the public good but not taxation). Third, it shows how the
required institutions can emerge endogenously by the actions of the agents themselves.
As most voting models, we assume that information is perfect and so agents’ pref-
erences and endowments are common knowledge. Hence, taxation can be conditioned
on these observable characteristics (preferences and endowments). We understand that
the assumption of full information may be restrictive and gives rise to taxation rules
that are not empirically observed. However, this assumption serves two purposes: (i)
It allows us to build a benchmark model which shows how political competition along
with certain institutional restrictions (arising from the separation of powers) leads to
efficient equilibria with zero political rents. (ii) It facilitates the comparison of the
results with those of other related voting models. We intend to consider the case where
preferences and endowments are private information in the near future.
3.2 Related Literature
The model closest to this chapter is the citizen-candidate model, pioneered by Osborne
and Slivinski (1996). In their paper, each agent (citizen) in the economy decides whether
to become a candidate politician or not and then citizens vote for electing one of the
politicians under different electoral rules. The winner of the election chooses his most
preferred policy. The authors show that the number of candidates at the second stage
depends on the cost of running the campaign and the potential benefits of winning.
They also show that the plurality rule generates more candidates than an electoral rule
based on runoffs.
Besley and Coate (1997) introduce the citizen-candidate framework into a multi-
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dimensional policy setting and examine the implications of the model for the efficiency
of the final allocations. They also present an application of their model in economies
with public goods. They show that an equilibrium of the game always exists, even
though the policy space is multi-dimensional, and that the resulting allocations are
Pareto efficient.
Despite the similar structure of political competition between the above papers and
the one presented here, there are some major differences as well. In both models (Os-
borne and Slivinski, Besley and Coate), the (lack of) commitment to political proposals
is exogenously imposed, while in our case it emerges endogenously. In other words, the
case they consider, namely that politicians implement their most preferred policy when
they are in power, corresponds to the case in our model where legislators decide that
political proposals are not committing to any dimension. Moreover, it is shown that if
commitment is endogenous this case will never be chosen (that is, in our model, this
case is off the equilibrium path.). It is also implicitly assumed that political entry is
costless, while the assumption in these papers is that each citizen must pay some cost
to become a candidate.
As a result, the properties of the equilibrium allocations in the two types of games
differ substantially. The main difference is that in case examined here, politicians do
not implement their most preferred policy. In fact, the equilibrium allocation does not
depend on the identity of the politician and as a result, as long as there are at least
two candidates, there are no incentives for strategic entry. A second implication of this
is that, in this model, political rents are zero in equilibrium, in the sense that, given a
specific equilibrium allocation, the utility of an agent is not dependent on whether he
is a politician or not. In other words, in equilibrium, becoming a politician does not
provide additional benefit to a citizen. Obviously, in the political game of Osborne-
Slivinski or Besley-Coate this does not apply, as the equilibrium utility level of an agent
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depends critically on his social identity (citizen or politician).
There is an extensive literature on voting games with simultaneous proposals and
multi-dimensional policy space. The main finding of these papers is that, if the propos-
ing members are free to make any type of offer, then the corresponding voting games
have generally no equilibrium. The theoretical literature has tried to overcome this
problem by examining restrictions on preferences that would make them compatible
with a notion of political equilibrium. It is not in our intentions to provide a compre-
hensive list of these articles. Some of the most noteworthy contributions are related
with the work of Sen (1964, 1966) and Inada (1964), but they restrict their analysis to
triplets of preferences. Kramer (1973) provides a general characterization of necessary
conditions in order for social welfare functions to be consistent with Arrow’s assump-
tions and shows how restrictive these requirements can be. Plott (1967) provides a
different notion of political equilibrium and demonstrates how general preferences vi-
olate the conditions required to satisfy it under a simple majority rule. Subsequently,
Slutsky (1979) generalizes this result for any type of majority rules, including unanimity.
The chapter is also related to the model adopted by Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
They adopt a sequential bargaining approach for the sharing of a private good, which
is essentially a generalization of the sequential bargaining game by Rubinstein (1982).
Each agent in their model has a positive probability of being a proposer and if his
allocation is objected by a majority of the agents, the bargaining process moves to the
next round. The authors show that when the time discount factor is less than one there
is a sub-game perfect equilibrium, where the first individual to propose makes an offer
which the majority accepts. It is a general feature of their model that the first proposer
has superior bargaining position compared to the rest so that some bargaining rents
will accrue to him. On the contrary, in this chapter it is shown that political rents are
zero in equilibrium.
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Nevertheless, many authors, following their seminal work, have demonstrated how
social choices can be implemented through the mechanism of a sequential bargaining
game41. Jackson and Moselle (2002) extend Baron and Ferejohn’s model to the case
where the economy contains public goods (alternatively, an ideological dimension).
They show that, if there is a sufficiently high cost of delay, then the offer of the first
proposing legislator will be approved and will contain a decision in both dimensions.
The offer will trade part of the potential private good distribution gains for a com-
promise in the public good dimension and under this procedure there is a wide set
of potential equilibrium proposals. The main difference between our model and Jack-
son and Moselle is that the sequential approach generates allocations where the final
quantity of the public good does not fully reflect the associated externalities and there-
fore it is under-produced. In contrast, the equilibrium outcome of our model implies
the elimination of political rents and the efficiency of proposals, irrespectively of party
identities.
More recently, Da´vila, Eeckhout and Martinelli (2006) have proposed a similar se-
quential bargaining mechanism for the distribution of a private and a public good
between two individuals. They find that as the cost of delay vanishes the equilibria
of the game converge to the Lindahl allocations and so the inefficiency generated by
sequential bargaining disappears. In our game, though, the efficiency result of the pro-
posals remains even if one were to assume strictly positive costs of delay. Also, it is not
clear whether their result holds for more than two agents, whereas our result holds for
any number of players greater or equal to three. Furthermore, the equilibrium outcome
of our game is exactly the Lindahl allocation.
Finally, the chapter is related to the literature of political competition as a driving
force for eliminating political rents. Stigler (1972) was among the first to point out
41See for example Merlo and Wilson, 1995 and Banks and Duggan, 2000
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the similarities that exist between political and market competition. In a similar way
that competition among producers reduces their ability to earn abnormal returns, com-
petition among candidates or political parties reduces the magnitude of opportunistic
behavior and the adoption of socially undesirable policies. Wittman (1989) pushes
the argument one step further, by presenting many features of the modern representa-
tive democracies as institutional designs of monitoring and control over the actions of
politicians. Despite the existence of informational constraints on their actions or the
bargaining power nested in their authorities, institutions, like political parties, elections
or the structure of the legislative bodies, create a variety of reputation and competi-
tion considerations that prevent politicians from extensive abuse of their positions.
Wittman’s conclusion is that one should not expect the inefficiencies of the political
system in democracies to be greater than the failures of competitive markets.
Though the analysis does not consider such a general set of institutional designs it
is in line with the political efficiency argument. The main difference is that this chapter
is explicitly concerned with the issue of the provision of the public good and the role of
political competition in solving it, while the aforementioned research agenda is centered
around the elimination of political rents, whatever form they may take.
3.3 Description of the economic environment and the mecha-
nism
Consider an economy with 2 agents and 2 goods. Good 1 is a private good while good
2 is a public good. Let e1 and e2 be the endowments of the private good for agents 1
and 2 respectively. The public good is produced through a linear production function
F (z) = mz, where z stands for the aggregate quantity of the private good used as an
input and m is a scaling coefficient (technological constant).
Agent i = {1, 2} has a well defined ordering of preferences which can be represented
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by a continuous, non-decreasing, strictly quasi-concave utility function ui(xi, y), where
xi represents the consumption of private good for agent i and y represents the quantity of
the public good produced. We assume that ui → 0, as xi → 0 or y → 0. Furthermore,
for every agent, the demand for the public good is strictly increasing as its relative
price decreases. This means that the offer curve of each individual is strictly increasing
(see also Figure 8), which is the case when the income effect is not strong (negative)
enough to overcome the (positive) substitution effect. Besides simplifying the analysis,
this assumption is made in order to restrict the attention to economies with a unique
Lindahl allocation42.
As a benchmark case we define the allocation outcome generated by competitive
markets. Each agent places an order for a certain quantity of the public good to firms
so as to maximize his utility given his endowment and the order of the other agent.
Firms, facing conditions of free entry, buy inputs from agents and try to maximize their
profits. Assume that k is the number of firms operating in the economy, where k is
a large number. Assume, without loss of generality, that the equilibrium allocation of
resources under free markets is unique and is given by: afm = {xfm1 , xfm2 , yfm} . The
resulting utility level for agent 1 and 2 is vfm1 = u1(x
fm
1 , y
fm) and vfm2 = u2(x
fm
2 , y
fm)
respectively: vfm = {vfm1 , vfm2 }43.
Because of the nature of good 2, afm is not Pareto efficient. There exists a feasible
re-allocation of resources that can make at least one of the agents better-off without
42The uniqueness of the Lindahl allocation, in turn, is required in order to ensure the existence of
equilibrium in our game, as we also note later on.
43Formally, agents maximize their utility with respect to the quantity of the public good they
privately demand (yi): max
yi
ui(e1− pyi,
∑
i yi), and firms maximize their profit: max
yf
(p− 1m )yf , where
p is the price of the public good in terms of the private. One can also formulate the problem in
game-theoretic terms by assuming that each agent has access to the production technology of the
public good and chooses how much to produce as a best-response to the choice of the other agent:
max
yi
ui(e1 − yim ,
∑
i yi). It is easy to verify that the two formulations give the same final allocations.
See also Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) for the definition and the characterization of the Nash
equilibrium of the above game. They also establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium under very weak
assumptions.
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making the other worse-off. This can be achieved through a centralized decision making
process, which takes into account the consumption externalities. However, at the same
time, we allow each agent to veto any centralization process, in which case it is assumed
that it is effectively blocked and agents resort to competitive markets for allocating
resources. Therefore, under the assumption of veto power, vfm is an effective outside
option, which determines the individual participation constraints on any centralized
allocation scheme. Even though the ability to veto centralized processes does not change
the results (political rents are defined in terms of the competitive equilibrium utility
levels instead of the no-private consumption outcome that would be produced under
absolute dictatorship), we include it for checking their robustness to the existence of
participation constraints or not.
First, we highlight the importance of political competition for the efficient provi-
sion of the public good. In order to make the source of political rents as transparent
as possible, we initially take the institutional constraints and political parties as ex-
ogenous (we will relax these assumptions in the subsequent subsection). Consider the
following centralized decision making mechanism manifested into a voting game dic-
tated by the rules of a Constitution. The players of the mechanism are political parties
(or alternatively politicians) and the 2 agents. A political party is an exogenous entity
which makes offers of prospective quantities of the public good to agents and tries to
be elected as government. Parties exhibit risk neutrality and their utility is the prob-
ability to win the election in the voting game times the rents they receive from their
offers: V p = pwinr
p 44. Agents play the double role of being the consumers of the final
allocations produced in the economy and voters, who decide which party will become
the government.
The Constitution is a exogenous political institution which puts restrictions on the
44None of the results is affected by the degree of risk aversion of political parties.
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action set of parties and voters. More specifically, it specifies the types of political
proposals that parties can make, the way agents vote and how a government is elected
to implement its proposed allocation. Agents vote for the party whose proposal provides
the greatest level of utility for them (sincere voters). If agents are indifferent between
two proposals, then it is assumed that they vote arbitrarily for one of them, say the
proposal of the party with the lowest index45. The party which receives the majority
of votes, wins the election. Ties are again solved arbitrarily, say for the party with the
lowest index46.
Party proposals consist of only one element: the quantity of the public good to be
produced (yp). Let PRp = {yp} denote the political proposal of party p. If a party
is elected into power, then it will be called to implement the level of the public good
it proposed before the election. Note, however, that, while the party has committed
itself to the quantity of the public good, it has not committed itself to the taxation
levels that will be imposed on agents. The only constraint, which we assume that is
imposed on the government by the Constitution, is that the taxation each individual
will pay can not exceed the taxation that the same agent would have paid for the
proposed level of the public good if he were on his offer curve. This is equivalent to
saying that, given a specific proportion of aggregate taxation that an agent pays, the
maximum taxation possible is one that gives the agent the same utility level as the one
he would have obtained when the proposed level of the public good was an optimal
choice for the agent. For example, the maximum taxation possible for agent i for the
proposed level y in Figure 8 (page 96) is equal to ti. For the rest of the chapter,
this institutional restriction is called the maximum willingness-to-pay constraint or the
maximum-taxation constraint.
45Even though the assumption of sincere-voting is quite restrictive, it is without loss of generality.
We will come back to this point and explain it in more detail in the analysis that follows.
46Of course, any other assumption about who wins the election under a tie would work equally well.
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However, on its own, this restriction is not sufficient to eliminate political rents,
as is shown for the case of a single party. A party that faces only this constraint can
find levels of the public good for which the aggregate willingness-to-pay exceeds the
required expenditure. That is, the presence of political competition is also necessary
for the elimination of rents. On the other hand, if there are more than one parties, but
the Constitution does not impose the maximum willingness-to-pay constraint, then po-
litical parties can still earn political rents, despite the presence of political competition.
Therefore, some form of institutional restrictions are also necessary for the efficient
provision of public goods.
In order to show that political competition and institutional constraints are both
necessary requirements for the efficient provision of the public good in this economy,
we present the equilibrium of the game under 3 different conditions: (i) when the
Constitution restricts party proposals and imposes the maximum-taxation constraint,
but there is only one party in the economy, (ii) when there are two parties in the
economy, but the maximum-taxation constraint is not in place (the only constraint that
applies is the standard participation constraint) and finally (iii) when both conditions
(multiple parties and the maximum-taxation constraint) are satisfied.
Case I
Consider, first, the case when there is only one party, which has secured the control of
the government and acts as a dictator. This provides a base of comparison for political
competition. The party’s objective is to maximize its rents given the constitutional
constraint on policies, and hence it tries to find the level of the public good, for which
the summation of agents net valuation is the highest. More formally, the party’s max-
imization problem can be described as:
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max
y
rp(y) =
∑
i
ti(y)− y
m
subject to
ti(y) =
ysmi (y)
m
smi (y) =
{
si|
∂ui
∂y
∂ui
∂xi
=
si
m
}
,∀i ∈ {1, 2}
The party’s problem is straightforward. It needs to choose a level of the public good
such that both agents would like to contribute a share of their endowment as big as
possible, so that political rents are maximized. The rents come from the fact that,
at the proposed level of the public good, aggregate taxation will be higher than the
required resources for its production, so that the difference is received by the party.
Below we show that these rents are positive47.
Proposition 1: Under the assumptions made above on agents’ preferences, the maxi-
mization problem of the party has at least one solution with strictly positive rents.
Proof: The party’s maximization problem can be rewritten as:
47Note that the formulation above does not include agents’ participation constraints. It is easy
to show that the main result of Proposition 1 (namely that political rents are positive) holds when
participation constraints are included. The main intuition is that the allocation generated by compet-
itive markets is inefficient and, therefore, the political party can still find an allocation that generates
strictly positive political rents, even when some participation constraints are binding. The results are
available by the authors upon request.
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max
y
rp(y) =
(∑
i
(
ysmi (y)
m
)
− y
m
)
⇔
max
y
rp(y) =
y
m
(∑
i
smi (y)− 1
)
The First Order Condition for this problem is given by:
∂rp(y)
∂y
= 0⇔ ∂
∂y
[
y
m
(∑
i
smi (y)− 1
)]
= 0⇔
1
m
(∑
i
smi (y)− 1
)
+
y
m
(∑
i
∂smi (y)
∂y
)
= 0⇔
∑
i
smi (y) = 1− y
∑
i
∂smi (y)
∂y
(16)
The left-hand side of equation (16) is the marginal benefit to the party by an increase
in the level of the public good, while the right-hand side reflects the marginal cost.
Also, notice that smi (y) is a continuous, strictly decreasing function of y. Because of
the assumptions of non-satiation and strict quasi-concavity of the utility functions, for
every level of expenditure sharing si there exists a unique level of the public good y,
such that agent i maximizes his utility. Furthermore, by assumption, as si decreases the
demand for the public good strictly increases. In other words, the offer curves for both
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agents are strictly decreasing functions of si. Essentially, s
m
i (y) is the inverse function
of the offer curve and hence it is also a decreasing function of y:
∂smi (y)
∂y
< 0.
First, notice that as y → 0, the left-hand side of equation (16) goes to 2, as both
individuals are willing to shoulder the full burden of taxation for low levels of the
public good. At the same time, the right-hand side of equation (16) is equal to 1
(∂smi (y)/∂y = 0 for very small values of y), which means that the difference of the
left-hand side minus the right-hand side is positive48. On the other hand, as y → ∞,
the left-hand side tends to 0, as individuals are willing to provide an infinitesimally
small part of their endowment for very high levels of the public good. At the same
time, because ∂smi (y)/∂y < 0⇒ −y
∑
i
∂smi (y)/∂y > 0 for large values of y, and hence
the right-hand side is greater than 1. This means that, as y →∞, the difference of the
left-hand side minus the right-hand side is negative. Since both sides are continuous
functions of y, there exists at least one level of the public good y∗ such that the two
sides are equal.
Second, because
∂smi (y)
∂y
< 0, −y∗∑
i
∂smi (y)
∂y
|y=y∗ > 0, so that at any solution of the
party’s problem it holds that:
∑
i
smi (y
∗) > 1. This means that the shares of expenditure
that agents are willing to provide for the public good exceed the required expenditure
and therefore political rents are strictly positive.
The intuition for this result is simple. When only one party is allowed to operate in
the economy it knows that it has full bargaining power over the population since its
offers will go unchallenged, so long as both agents are willing to forgo a part of their
endowment for the proposed level of the public good. It therefore becomes a social
48Recall the assumption made earlier that individuals have access to competitive firms, which can
produce the public good instead of the government. As a result, the maximum proposed share of
public expenditure (smi (y)) will not exceed one. If it did, the agent would be better off by producing
the good on her own, by ordering it by a firm. In other words the maximum value of smi (y) is 1 and
for very small values of y, ∂smi (y)/∂y = 0.
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dictator, using its power to provide allocations that maximize its rents. Because the
marginal utility of the public good is higher than the marginal rate of transformation for
both agents when its quantity is very low, proposals associated with positive political
rents are easy to find. Of course, all such proposals are socially inefficient, since they
imply excessive supply of resources into the production process and consequently waste
(because politicians are exogenous entities, political rents are deadweight loss for the
society.).
Case II
The main elements of the game are the same as in the first case. However, we assume
that there are two parties in the economy and the maximum-taxation constraint does
not hold49. This means that parties are free to choose any taxation level after being
elected in government, as long as the participation constraints are satisfied. In order
49It is straightforward to generalize for cases with more than two parties as the same reasoning
applies. Essentially, the only requirement for political competition is free entry of parties in the
political contest.
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to be more explicit, the structure of the game is presented below:
Stage 1: Each party makes an offer on the level of the public good and it is committed
to it.
Stage 2: Each agent decides which party to vote and the election takes place. The
party which receives the majority of votes wins the election. In case of draw,
party 1 is arbitrarily chosen to implement its proposal.
Stage 3: The elected party takes over power and implements its proposal.
The removal of the maximum-taxation constraint has an important implication for
the equilibrium outcome. Because the party in power is not constrained over the level of
taxation, political competition is rendered powerless. No matter what promises parties
make at the first stage for the level of the public good, the government will impose such
a high level of taxation on each agent, so that he is indifferent between the market and
the governmental allocation of resources. This happens because there is no effective
commitment to taxation levels after the election has taken place.
Agents, anticipating this, understand that all proposals imply the same utility level
for them, irrespectively of their promise over the quantity of the public good. Therefore,
they are indifferent between voting for one party or the other and vote arbitrarily for
one (we restrict our attention to pure-strategies). Political parties, of course, anticipate
this as they realize that their commitment to the level of the public good does not affect
agents’ voting behavior at the subsequent stage. Since the probability of winning the
election (which is either zero or one, depending on the pure-strategies of agents when
they are indifferent about party proposals) is independent of its proposal for any party,
the best choice for them is to commit to the level of the public good that maximizes
their rents after the election and simultaneously satisfies the participation constraints
98
of agents. In this case, parties are acting effectively as social dictators. Proposition 2
summarizes the result.
Proposition 2: The equilibrium outcome of the 2-agent, 2-party game, without the
maximum-taxation constraint enforced by the Constitution, implies strictly positive
political rents for the party that is elected in government.
Proof: At stage 3, whichever party is elected will impose the maximum taxation
possible. Given that there is no commitment to the level of taxation at stage one by a
party’s proposal and that there is no constitutional restriction, the maximum taxation
is the one that makes each individual indifferent between the allocation he would obtain
by competitive markets and the one implemented by the government.
At stage 2, agents are indifferent between party proposals, as all of them imply
the same utility level for each individual. Therefore, their vote can not affect the final
outcome of the game and they vote arbitrarily for one party. At stage 1, parties realize
that their political offer has no impact on the voting behavior of agents. Their best
response is to set the level of the public good so as to maximize their political rents.
Formally, each party solves the following problem:
max
y
rp(y) =
∑
i
ti(y)− y
m
subject to
ti(y) = {ti| ui(ei − ti, y) = vfmi )} , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
From the First Order Condition we get that:
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∑
i
∂ti(y)
∂y
=
1
m
(17)
This is a simple cost-benefit equation. It states that the party should offer a level
of the public good such that for the last unit of it, the marginal benefit of the extra
taxation is equal to the marginal cost of the extra resources required for its production.
Let ŷ denote this level of the public good. Notice that ŷ is unique. This is due to
the strict quasi-concavity of agents’ utility functions, which implies that ∂ti(y)
∂y
> 0 and
∂2ti(y)
(∂y)2
< 0. This means that the first partial derivative of ti(y) is a strictly decreasing
continuous function and hence the left-hand side of equation (17) is also a strictly
decreasing continuous function. Hence, the level of the public good that satisfies (17)
is unique. Also, from the total derivative of the participation constraint notice that:
dti
dy
=
∂ui
∂y
∂ui
∂xi
⇒
∑
i
(
∂ui
∂y
∂ui
∂xi
)
y=ŷ
=
1
m
This implies that the summation of the ratio of marginal utilities is greater than
the marginal rate of transformation for all y < ŷ:
∑
i
(
∂ui
∂y
∂ui
∂xi
)
y<ŷ
>
1
m
⇒
ŷ∫
0
∑
i
(
∂ui
∂y
∂ui
∂xi
)
dy >
ŷ∫
0
1
m
dy ⇒
∑
i
ŷ∫
0
(
dti
dy
)
dy >
ŷ
m
⇒
∑
i
ti − ŷ
m
> 0
The last inequality above states that political rents are strictly positive for the
party that proposes ŷ. Now, since agents vote arbitrarily at stage two (because they
are indifferent on which party to vote), it might be the case that they always vote for
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one of the two parties, say party one. The other party anticipates this and may propose
any level of the public good (since it expects to lose the election). But the winning
party is not indifferent, as it maximizes its rents by proposing ŷ. If, on the other
hand, both parties receive a strictly positive probability of winning the election (say
one agent votes for party one and the other for two), then both parties will propose ŷ in
equilibrium. In other words, the game has multiple sub-game perfect equilibria in terms
of strategies, but the equilibrium level of public good is unique and it implies strictly
positive political rents for the elected party. This completes the proof of proposition 2.
This shows that political competition on its own is not a sufficient condition for the
elimination of political rents. Institutional restrictions are also necessary, a point that
will be emphasized in the next case. In fact, without the maximum-taxation constraint,
political parties can implement perfect price discrimination at the third stage of the
game, so that the political rents for the ruling party will be at least as large as the ones
of the social dictator in case I, under any combination of individual preferences and
endowments. This is because political competition is powerless if there are no restric-
tions on the maximum level of taxation and as a result parties face one less constraint
than the sole party of the previous case. Once the maximum-taxation constraint is
reinstated, however, political competition leads to efficiency, as shown below.
Case III
The primitives of the economy and the political game remain the same as in the previous
case, with the difference that the two parties in the economy face the maximum-taxation
constraint. An immediate consequence of competition is that parties can not secure
election victory by simply satisfying agents’ willingness-to-pay, as was the case with a
single party. In fact political rents will be zero in equilibrium, irrespectively of the offer
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that will pass.
Proposition 3: The political game as described above, with 2 agents, 2 parties and the
Constitution as described in the previous section, has a unique sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium. Both parties propose the level of the public good that corresponds to the
Lindahl allocation of the economy. Both agents are indifferent and vote arbitrarily for
one. At the third stage, the party which receives most votes becomes the government,
otherwise party 1 is selected to implement the common proposal.
Proof: Note that, because both individuals have strictly increasing offer curves, they
intersect at most once. This means that there is a unique Lindahl allocation in the
economy. Let yL, sL1 , s
L
2 be the quantity of the public good and the respective expen-
diture shares associated with the Lindahl allocation of this economy. By definition,
sL1 + s
L
2 = 1.
At the last stage of the game, the party that wins the election maximizes its rents
given the commitment it has undertaken at stage 1 regarding the level of the public
good. The implication of this is that agents will be asked to contribute their maximum
willingness-to-pay at stage 3. If a party has offered yL, then it can not extract any
political rents after election, since the maximum willingness-to-pay of the agents is
exactly the same as the expenditure required for the public good. To see that, recall
from the previous section that smi (y) (the maximum willingness-to-pay of agent i) is
a decreasing function of y and that the Lindahl allocation is defined as a sharing of
the public good expenditure such that both agents agree on the demanded quantity.
This means that sm1 (y
L) + sm2 (y
L) = 1, while for y < yL : sm1 (y) + s
m
2 (y) > 1 and for
y > yL : sm1 (y) + s
m
2 (y) < 1.
If a party ever offered yp > yL, then agents would anticipate that such a level of the
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public good can not be implemented without violating their maximum willingness-to-
pay and hence they would not vote for the corresponding party. On the other hand,
if party p offers yp < yL, then agents, as noted in the previous paragraph, anticipate
strictly positive political rents for the party. Furthermore, both agents would be strictly
better-off by an offer with a greater level of the public good. This is because levels of
y closer to the Lindahl allocation correspond to points on the offer curves with higher
utility (See also Figure 8).
Therefore, if party p offers yp = yL, then the other party will lose the election with
certainty if it makes any other offer. If party p offers yp < yL, then the other party can
win the election with certainty by offering a quantity of the public good slightly greater.
Finally, any offer yp > yL is not credible, and party q can win with certainty by making
any offer with yq 6 yL50. As a result, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium involves
both parties proposing y = yL. The rest of the proposition follows immediately.
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Figure 9: Voting equilibrium under political monopoly and competition
50Given the enforcement of the maximum-taxation constraint, any level of the public good, that is
greater than the Lindahl, means that the summation of private taxation, that can be levied on the
citizens, is less than the resources required to produce it. Hence any party that makes such a proposal,
if it is voted on power, will have to either accept the infeasibility of the proposal and implement a lower
level of public good (in this sense the proposed allocation is not credible) or to pay out the difference
by its own wealth (negative rents, in which case the proposal is clearly not a best-response for the
party). Therefore, there can be no equilibrium of the game where the implemented level of the public
good exceeds yL.
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The main intuition of the proposition is that, when competition is allowed, then
parties can not maximize their political rents without taking into account the offers of
their contestants. Since agents anticipate that parties can commit to the level of the
public good, but not to the tax level, they will vote the proposal which minimizes rents.
Note that the Lindahl allocation is the only credible allocation on the Pareto frontier.
Political contesters understand this and make efficient offers. The resulting equilibrium
of the game is represented diagrammatically in Figure 9. The level of the public good
ym corresponds to the choice that a monopolistic party would do. Such a level implies
strictly positive political rents for the government, as the summation of the maximum
willingness-to-pay of the two individuals exceeds one. On the other hand, yL is the
level of the public good that is obtained under conditions of political competition and
it corresponds to the level of the public good under the Lindahl allocation L.
One can also see now why the assumption of sincere voting is not crucial for the
result. In the case where political proposals commit parties only to the level of the
public good, agents’ expected utility is an increasing function of the proposed public
good levels. Therefore, all agents would like to vote for the party which offers the
highest level of the public good. Even though coordination failures may arise (indeed,
without the sincere voting assumption, one can find equilibria where all agents vote
for a party with a dominated platform), one can easily dismiss them. For instance,
instead of simultaneous voting, consider the modified game where agents vote publicly
and sequentially. This eliminates any type of coordination failure and allows all agents
to vote only for the party that offers the highest utility to all of them51.
Proposition 3 seems to hold because of the way the maximum-taxation constraint
is constructed. In the following section we extend the political game and allow agents
51Of course one may point out that sequential, public voting almost never occurs in contemporary
democracies. However, explaining this fact would require an environment with multiple public goods
and would add additional complications to the model, which would derail us from our initial purpose.
We leave these and some other considerations for future work.
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to create the Constitution and to make proposals for the allocation of resources in the
economy. We thus allow the required conditions for the efficient provision of the public
good to arise endogenously.
3.4 Separation of Powers and Endogenous Political Institu-
tions
In the previous section we showed the importance of both political competition and
institutional restrictions for the efficient provision of the public good in the economy.
Most elements of the political game, however, were exogenously imposed and it would
seem as if the results are derived by assuming the partial commitment of parties to
their proposal and the maximum-taxation constraint.
In this section it is shown how these elements of the institutional environment
can arise endogenously. Most importantly, we show that separation of powers is an
important institution for imposing checks and balances on a government.
Consider an economy with n agents, where n > 3. As in the previous section, there
is one private and one public good. Each agent has an endowment ei of the private
good and a utility function ui(xi, y), which satisfies the same assumptions as before.
Let the production function of the public good be also the same as before: F (z) = mz.
Once again, let vfm be the vector of utilities that the agents of the economy receive, if
the public good is provided by a decentralized mechanism (competitive markets). Of
course, such an allocation is suboptimal. Finally, note that the assumptions made on
preferences mean that the economy has a unique Lindahl allocation.
Consider the following political game. At stage 1, agents decide what type of po-
litical power to hold. There are two types of power-holders: (i) legislators and (ii)
politicians. Legislators decide the institutional arrangements (the Constitution) of the
economy. Politicians, participate in the election by making proposals over the level
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of the public good to be produced. Once in government they implement their pol-
icy. Agents decide whether they want to become legislators or politicians or neither.
However, an agent can not become both. If no agent becomes a legislator, then no
Constitution is set and the politician elected in government has unlimited power (i.e.
non-commitment of political proposals and non-existence of the taxation constraint is
the status quo). On the other hand, if no agent becomes a politician, then no central-
ized decision is made and competitive markets decide the level of the public good to be
produced (i.e. the allocation afm is the status-quo).
At stage 2, legislators decide on the form of the Constitution. Specifically, they
decide on two different institutions of political competition: (i) which elements of a
political proposal are committing if the respective politician rises to power, and (ii)
whether the government will face the maximum-taxation constraint (as defined in the
previous section) or not. In other words, legislators choose the institutional constraints
for political parties and the government. Each legislator simultaneously makes a pro-
posal on these two issues and according to a given choice rule, one of the proposals is
chosen to be the Constitution of this economy.
The choice rule used for deciding the Constitution is inconsequential for the final
outcome of the political game, as is shown later. For reasons of expositional clarity, it
is assumed that the legislative proposal which is made by the majority of legislators
becomes the Constitution. It is also assumed that the Constitution is binding for
politicians. If any of its clauses is violated by the government or other agents, then the
centralized decision making process breaks down and agents allocate resources through
competitive markets (afm).
In terms of the decisions, which the legislators make on the Constitution, the fol-
lowing assumptions are made. First, legislators choose whether political offers are
committing to the level of the public good only, to the level of taxation only, to both
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or to neither. Second, legislators can choose whether to impose the maximum-taxation
constraint or not. But, the maximum-taxation constraint is anonymous. It holds for
either all agents in the economy or none. In other words, if an upper bound on taxation
is set, it can not be the case that some agents in the economy enjoy this privilege while
others are heavily taxed by the government. We call this condition the Anonymity of
the Taxation Constraint.
If there is no restriction on the maximum level of taxation and no commitment to
taxation during the election, then the government faces only one form of constraint: the
participation constraint of agents in the economy, which implies a lower bound to the
utility level agents can receive by the centralized allocation, equal to vfm. Effectively, we
allow any agent to block the formation of any centralized decision making mechanism,
which gives him lower utility than the one he receives under competitive markets.
The rest of the stages are similar to the ones in the previous section. At stage 3,
those, who have become politicians, make proposals over the quantity of the public
good and the level of taxation. At stage 4, each individual in the economy votes for one
proposal and the proposal that receives most votes wins52. At stage 5, the politician
who made the successful proposal, receives the power to levy taxation and implement
the allocation of resources, given the restrictions of the Constitution.
Notice that some sub-games of the game above may not have an equilibrium in pure
strategies. For example, if legislators choose that political proposals are committing
to both the public good and individual taxation, then, irrespectively of whether the
maximum-taxation constraint holds or not, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
For all these sub-games, we avoid issues of non-existence of equilibrium by adopting
a sequential bargaining approach. Specifically, it is assumed that there are T stages
of bargaining, T ∈ N . At every stage, each political receives an equal probability of
52One can show that the type of election rule does not affect the main results. We will discuss this
in more detail later.
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being chosen to make a proposal. If the proposal wins the majority of votes then the
politician wins the election. Otherwise, the procedure moves to the next stage. If the
final proposal is not passed then the agents return to the status-quo allocation (afm).
Finally, all agents have the same discount factor δ.
We solve the game and derive its results by backward induction. Since there are
four different types of commitment to political proposals and two different options on
the maximum-taxation constraint, it is convenient to conduct the analysis in terms of
the sub-games which result from the eight different Constitutions that legislators can
set. Below, we analyze each in turn, by focusing on the sub-game equilibrium payoff
of non-politicians, since this is crucial for the decisions of legislators at stage two. Also
note that in all the cases analyzed below it is assumed that at stage one at least two
agents have decided to become politicians and one agent is a legislator (the rest of
possible cases are examined subsequently).
Sub-game 1: No commitment to political proposals, no taxation constraint
Suppose that at stage two of the game legislators have chosen to impose no constraints
on politicians. This means that political proposals are not committing to any dimension
and that there is no maximum-taxation constraint. Recall that, given the assumptions
made about the structure of the game, this is equivalent to the sub-game where no
citizen decides to become a legislator. It is also equivalent to the structure of the games
in the citizen-candidate literature.
At stage five, the elected politician chooses the policy that maximizes his utility
given the participation constraints of agents. This generally implies positive political
rents, in the sense that the elected politician receives higher utility than the level
of utility he receives either under the Lindahl allocation or the competitive markets
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allocation. Formally, politician p solves the following problem:
max
y,t
up
(∑
i
ti − y
m
, y
)
subject to ui(ei − ti, y) > vfmi for i 6= p
Apart from the politician, all the other agents lie on their participation constraint.
Otherwise, the politician would tax away all their private endowment and they would
consume only the public good (recall that ui → 0, as xi → 0). Hence, ui = vfmi ,∀i 6= p.
Given this, at stage four, all non-politicians are indifferent on whom to vote, since
their utility levels are not affected by the politician in power, and they vote arbitrarily
for some agent (as in section 3.3, only pure strategies are considered). At stage three,
politicians also anticipate voters’ actions and they are also indifferent on which political
platform to propose, as they do not affect the election result. Hence, they arbitrarily
propose some policy. However, the main point is that all non-politicians expect to
receive ui = v
fm
i from this sub-game.
Sub-game 2: Commitment to the level of the public good, no commitment
to taxation, no taxation constraint
At stage five the elected politician is committed to the level of the public good he pro-
posed at stage three. However, we obtain the same result as in sub-game 1. This is due
to the non-commitment to taxation and the lack of the maximum-taxation constraint,
which allows the politician to tax each agent’s private endowment until his participa-
tion constraint becomes binding. Hence, non-politicians are indifferent at stage four on
whom to vote and politicians’ best-response at stage three is to propose the level of
the public good that maximizes their utility given the non-commitment to taxation at
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stage five.
Sub-game 3: Commitment to taxation, no commitment to the level of the
public good, no taxation constraint
Since political proposals are committing to individual taxation and not to the pub-
lic good, politicians’ preferences matter for voting behavior. This is because, given
the same taxation proposals from politicians, voters prefer the politician who has the
strongest preferences for the public good and hence will produce more of it. However,
this sub-game may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies and it is analyzed in
terms of the sequential voting procedure described earlier. For instance, if all politi-
cians have the same preferences, then any proposal by one politician can be countered
by a proposal which slightly decreases taxation on all voters and increases proposed
taxation slightly for the politician who made the original offer.
In terms of the sequential voting procedure, at the last stage of political offers, stage
T , the politician who makes the offer faces no competition and hence he will propose
the allocation that maximizes his utility given the participation constraint of all other
agents. Let Pmax = {tmaxP , ymaxP }, be this proposal. As before, it is easy to check that
all participation constraints are binding under Pmax. Also, let vmaxp be the utility level
that the elected politician p receives under Pmax. Let also E be the total number of
votes required for passing a proposal: n+1
2
6 E 6 n. As a result, the expected utility
of a politician p at the beginning of stage T is equal to: ET (up) =
1
K
vmaxp − K−1K vfmp ,
where K is the total number of politicians. Note also that the expected utility of a
non-politician i at the beginning of stage T is vfmi .
At the bargaining stage T − 1, the chosen politician q can win the approval of non-
politicians by offering Q = tQ, y such that ui(tQ,i, y
max
Q ) = δv
fm
i . If the number of non-
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politicians is greater than the election threshold, n−K > E, then politician q secures
election by proposal Q. Otherwise proposal Q must be such that ui(tQ,i, y
max
Q ) = δv
fm
i
for the n−K non-politicians and up(tQ,p, ymaxQ ) = δET (up) for E − (n−K) politicians.
If such a proposal Q is not feasible then politician q can not receive adequate support
for any of his offers and the game moves to stage T .
The same reasoning applies to any bargaining stage t 6 T . This means that in
any sub-game perfect equilibrium of the sub-game with commitment to taxation and
no maximum-taxation constraint, the maximum equilibrium payoff of non-politicians,
δtvfmi for ∀i ∈ N − P , is strictly less vLi . Again, the main result of the analysis is that
the expected utility of non-politicians is strictly less than the utility they receive under
the Lindahl allocation.
Sub-game 4: Commitment to taxation and to the level of the public good,
no taxation constraint
Due to the commitment of political proposals to both dimensions, the sub-game has
no equilibrium in pure strategies and it is analyzed in terms of the sequential voting.
The analysis is identical to the one in sub-game three. At each stage of the bargaining
procedure the randomly chosen politician tries to win the minimum amount of votes re-
quire in order to secure the election. This, however, implies that non-politicians receive
the discounted value of their participation constraints.
Sub-game 5: No commitment to political proposals, taxation constraint
Political proposals are not committing and hence they are not credible. At the last
stage of the game, the politician maximizes his utility subject to the participation and
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the maximum-taxation constraints. This means that if the politician chooses to pro-
duce the level of the public good y, he will impose the maximum taxation possible to
each agent for that level of the public good and place agents on their respective offer
curves (as long as their participation constraints are not violated). Also, recall that,
due to the assumptions on preferences, the utility level of an agent along his offer curve
is strictly increasing and that participation constraints are not binding if the Lindahl
allocation is provided.
Politician p can not produce any level of the public good above the Lindahl alloca-
tion, because this either violates the maximum-taxation constraint for some agent or it
is not feasible. If the politician chooses the Lindahl level of the public good it will also
impose taxation consistent with the Lindahl allocation, so that agent i receives the final
utility that corresponds to the Lindahl equilibrium vLi . This is because the summation
of the maximum willingness-to-pay of all agents is exactly equal to the inputs needed
to produce the the public good at the Lindahl allocation and, hence, any other taxation
scheme violates the maximum-taxation constraint for at least one agent.
If the politician in power reduces the level of the public good below the Lindahl, then
his utility may increase because the maximum willingness-to-pay of the agents relaxes
and he can extract political rents for private consumption, but it also may decrease
because the level of the public good is reduced. Adopting the same notation as before,
tmi (y) =
ysmi (y)
m
is the maximum taxation which can be imposed on agent i for the level
of the public good y, where smi (y) is the maximum willingness-to-pay of agent i. Given
that the budget constraint of the politician is given by xp + y/m 6 ep +
∑
i 6=p
tmi (y), the
overall effect in his utility by a small reduction of the public good below the Lindahl
level is given by:
−dup
dy
|y=yL = −∂up∂xp
[
− smp (yL)
m
+ yL
m
∑
i 6=p
∂smi (y)
∂y
|y=yL
]
− ∂up
∂y
In the sum above, the first term is positive (both terms inside the brackets are nega-
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tive) and reflects the marginal increase in utility due to the increase in the consumption
of the private good, while the second term is negative and reflects the marginal decrease
in utility due to the decrease of the public good. If the first term is greater than the
second in absolute values, then the politician prefers to decrease the level of the public
good below the Lindahl. In this case, agents final utility decreases as they move along
their offer curves to lower levels of the public good. If the second term is greater than
the first, then the politician imposes the Lindahl allocation of the economy.
At stage 4 agents anticipate this behavior by the elected politician. Therefore, they
vote for the politician who will choose the highest level of the public good at stage 5,
and this voting behavior is independent of any political proposal. As a consequence,
any combination of political proposals at stage 3 is an equilibrium of this sub-game
and agents, except for the preferred politician, receive at most the utility levels of the
Lindahl allocation (vL).
Sub-game 6: Commitment to the level of the public good, no commitment
to taxation, taxation constraint
This is effectively Case III of section 3.3. Since political proposals are committing
to the level of the public good only and the maximum-taxation constraint holds, politi-
cians compete on who will offer the highest level of the public good. As a consequence,
in the equilibrium of this sub-game, non-politicians will end up receiving vLi .
Sub-game 7: Commitment to taxation, no commitment to the level of the
public good, taxation constraint
Since this is one of the sub-games that may have no equilibrium in pure strategies, the
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analysis follows closely the one for sub-game 3. The only difference is that politicians
can not tax agents more than their maximum willingness-to-pay due to the maximum-
taxation constraint. Let Pmw = {tmwp , ymwp } be the policy that maximizes the utility
of politician p under the maximum taxation and individual participation constraints.
As was shown for the case where there is no commitment to any dimension of po-
litical proposals but the maximum-taxation constraint is imposed (see also sub-game
5), ymw 6 yL and therefore for any agent i other than the politician it holds that
ui(t
mw
i , y
mw) 6 ui(tLi , yL).
Therefore, at the last stage of proposals, stage T , if politician p is chosen, he makes
the offer Pmw = {tmwp , ymw} and agents vote for it. Then, by backward induction and
by using the same reasoning as in sub-game three, at every stage t 6 T the chosen
politician makes a proposal which gives to the rest of the agents the maximum between
their continuation value of the game and their participation constraint. In all possible
cases, the maximum utility level for non-politicians does not exceed viL.
Sub-game 8: Commitment to taxation and the level of the public good, tax-
ation constraint
The analysis of sub-game 7 also implies in this case.
Stage 2:
It is clear that the critical stage is stage 2, at which legislators decide the Consti-
tution, given that they know the identity of all politicians. Using the analysis that
preceded, we conclude that it is a weakly dominant strategy for legislators to set the
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constitutional rules of sub-game 6. This is because these rules ensure that the Lindahl
allocation will be implemented by political competition irrespectively of the identity of
the politicians53.
To see this, recall that in sub-games 1 to 4, legislator l expects to receive utility
equal to vfml , in other words, his participation constraint is binding. In sub-game 5, the
legislator’s expected utility is dependent on the preferences of the elected politician and
his utility is at most vLl , only if the politicians’ most preferred level of the public good
(given constitutional restrictions) is yL (which, in turn, requires specific restrictions
on the politicians’ preferences). In sub-games 7 and 8, the legislators expected utility
depends on the identity of all politicians, since they all have a chance of being elected
at stage one of bargaining, and his expected utility is at most vLl , only if all politicians’
most preferred allocation is the Lindahl.
In contrast, in the equilibrium of sub-game 6, l expects to receive vLl , irrespectively
of the preferences of politicians. Notice also that it is a weakly dominant strategy
for every legislator to set the constitutional rules of sub-game 6, irrespectively of his
preferences. Therefore, in any sub-game perfect equilibrium of sub-stage two in which
there is at least one legislator and two politicians, the Lindahl allocation will be the
equilibrium outcome. If, furthermore, none of the politicians’ preferences satisfy the
condition described at sub-stage 5 (i.e. the restrictions on preferences that make the
Lindhal allocation the most preferred one by a politician), then the unique optimal
action for all legislators is to make political proposals committing to the level of the
public good only and to impose the maximum-taxation constraint.
Notice also that these equilibria are independent of the election rule for either the
Constitution (the way legislators decide on the political constraints) or the politician
(the way voters decide on who will be the elected politician).
53It remains to be shown that political competition will indeed be part of the equilibrium path at
stage one.
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Stage 1: Political Entry
Finally, at stage one, the entry of citizens on political competition and the legislation
authority is analyzed. Clearly, it is a best-response for at least one agent to become
a politician. Since afm is generally below the Pareto frontier, if one agent becomes a
politician then, under any constitution, he can strictly improve his utility by proposing
his most preferred allocation given constitutional restrictions.
We consider different constitutional cases in order to examine whether a second agent
prefers to become a politician. Assume that there is at least one citizen who decides
to become a legislator at stage one. If agent p decides to become a politician and
his preferences satisfy the condition of sub-game 5, then legislators will be indifferent
between setting the rules of sub-game 5 or 6 at stage two. Given that, any citizen at
stage one will be indifferent between becoming a politician or a legislator and remaining
as a citizen, as the final outcome will be the Lindahl allocation, irrespectively of how
many other agents become politicians.
If, however, p does not satisfy the condition of sub-game 5 (which is generally
the case) then there are two cases to consider. If there is no legislator, then there is
no commitment to political proposals, any non-politician i expects to receive vLi and
therefore he is indifferent on whom to vote. If another agent p′ decides to become a
politician, then he may win the election if he is favored by the arbitrary strategies of
voters when they are indifferent on whom to vote or by the election rule in case of a
tie. If such p′ exists then it is a best-response for him to become a politician and hence
it can not be an equilibrium of the game p to be the only politician.
If there is no other agent p′ who is favored over p, then all other agents are indiffer-
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ent on whether to enter political competition or not. However, this may still not be an
equilibrium of the game. If p preferences are such that, under the maximum-taxation
constraint, his most preferred policy implies strictly greater utility than vLl for some
agent l, then this agent’s best-response is to become a legislator instead of remaining
a citizen in order to impose the maximum-taxation constraint at stage two. In other
words, there is an equilibrium of the game such that agent p becomes the only politi-
cian and all the other agents remain citizens, but it requires restrictions on the set of
preferences for p and specific pure-strategies for voting when voters are indifferent on
whom to vote (for example, always vote for agent 1 whenever his proposal is equivalent
to any other politicians’).
First, notice that the above equilibrium of the game is equivalent to the equilibria
generated by the citizen-candidate models. However, unlike these models, the positive-
political-rents equilibrium holds only for specific preference profiles and only if one
considers specific voting strategies for tie breaking. Hence it is not a general equilibrium
of the game. Notice also that, whenever the conditions for this equilibrium are fulfilled
there are also other equilibria of the game with zero political rents (which are derived
shortly). Finally, this equilibrium is not robust if there is an infinitesimally small but
positive probability that agents would vote for another candidate (since that agent’s
best-response would be to enter the political contest in order to reap the infinitesimally
small expected political-rents).
On the other hand, if there is at least one legislator, then, by becoming a politician,
another agent p′ ensures that it is the best response for the legislator to choose the
constitutional restrictions of sub-game 6 and hence ensures a minimum payoff of vLp′ .
In other words, apart from some special cases described above, it is not an equilibrium
of the game for only one agent to become a politician. Therefore, the set of politicians
is greater or equal to two.
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Stage 1: Entry of Legislators
We now come to examine if any citizen decides to become a legislator. First, suppose
that there are no legislators, a number of citizens greater or equal to one and at least
two politicians. Then this is clearly not an equilibrium outcome, since at least one of
the agents can improve his utility by becoming a legislator, imposing the constitutional
restrictions of sub-game 6 and receiving a final payoff of vLi > v
fm
i . This means that
the only potential equilibrium with no legislators, apart from a special case examined
above, is the one where all agents decide to become politicians.
We have also examined the case where there is no legislator and only one politician
and under which conditions it may turn out be an equilibrium of the game. The re-
maining alternatives to consider are the following cases: (i)all agents become politicians
and (ii) there is at least one politician and at least one legislator.
Suppose that all N agents decide to become politicians. If voting is sincere, then
each agent votes for his own proposal and agent 1 is elected (recall that in the case of
ties, the politician with the lowest index is elected). This can not be an equilibrium
of the game, as at least one other politician can increase his utility by becoming a
legislator instead and ensuring a payoff of vLi for himself. If voting is not sincere, then
under any pure strategy profile, a specific politician will be chosen (for example, all
politicians vote for p). This can not be an equilibrium either by the same argument
as above. Hence, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium of the game with all agents
deciding to become politicians54.
Consider the case where there is at least one legislator and only one politician. This
54Things get a little more complicated under mixed-strategy equilibria, but one can show that if
the number of agents is sufficiently large, then there is at least one agent who prefers to become a
legislator
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is an equilibrium of the game only if p’s preferences satisfy the condition of sub-game 5.
If this condition is satisfied then legislators set the maximum-taxation constraint and
this is sufficient for ensuring that the final policy implements the Lindahl allocation
(as was shown in sub-game 5). The rest of the agents of the economy are indifferent
whether they become politicians or not and hence there is no profitable deviation. Once
again, this is a special type of equilibrium that holds for specific preference profiles.
However, the following class of equilibria holds for all possible preference profiles55.
Suppose that at least two agents decide at stage one to become politicians and at least
one to become legislator. Then the best-response of legislators at stage two is to impose
the maximum-taxation constraint and make political proposals committing to the level
of the public good only (this is a best-response for legislators for all preference profiles,
unlike the previous case examined above). As a consequence and due to the analysis in
sub-game 6, all agents receive the level of utility corresponding to the Lindahl allocation.
This is a sub-game prefect equilibrium of the game, because no one can unilaterally
deviate and become better off. If the number of politicians is greater than two and the
number of legislators in greater than one, a unilateral deviation by any agent does not
affect equilibrium institutions or political proposals. If, on the other hand, there are
only two politicians, none of them wants to exit political competition as in the best of
cases his final utility will remain unchanged and in the worst it will strictly decrease.
Likewise, if there is only one legislator there is no other strategy for him that can strictly
increase his utility and therefore it is a best-response for him to remain a legislator.
However, apart from at most three agents, the rest of the citizens are indifferent on
what social role to choose and hence any distribution of agents between politicians,
legislators and citizens, which is consistent with the above results, is an equilibrium of
the game.
55Because the conditions for the other “special-case” equilibria are mutually exclusive, there are
preference profiles for which the general class of equilibria is the only class of equilibria of the game
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Proposition 4, below, summarizes the analysis so far for the class of equilibria which
are independent of the preference profile of the economy.
Proposition 4: The game of section 3.4 has multiple sub-game perfect pure-strategy
equilibria. However, the following class of equilibria is the only class of equilibria that
holds for all possible preference profiles of the game: At least two agents decide to be-
come politicians, at least one becomes a legislator, political proposals are committing
to the level of the public good only and the maximum-taxation constraint holds. The
equilibrium allocation is the Lindahl allocation.
First, the following assumptions are crucial for the results: (i) the Anonymity of the
Taxation Constraint, and (ii) the restriction that an agent can hold only one power.
Other assumptions can be relaxed without affecting the equilibria of the game. For in-
stance, the choice rule through which legislators decide the Constitution plays no role,
since in equilibrium, all legislators agree on the desirable set of restrictions. It was used
only for the facilitation of the analysis.
Second, in this game, almost all political institutions required for the implementation
of an efficient allocation of resources, arise endogenously. Legislators decide what type
of restrictions to set to voters and politicians. Proposals are also made endogenously
by politicians. The anonymity condition and the separation of powers are the only
institutions which are not created by agents. However, as far as separation of powers
is concerned, it should be noted that agents have the choice between utilizing this
institution or not. Since both types of power are used in equilibrium, it makes sense to
say that separation of powers emerges endogenously.
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3.5 Conclusion
Centralized decision making is very helpful for the solution of the free riding problem,
but, without any set of restrictions on the authority that implements it, inefficiencies,
in the form of political rents, arise. This chapter shows why political competition is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for political efficiency. Other forms of insti-
tutional restrictions, like restrictions to maximum taxation, are required for aligning
political incentives with societal interests, so that voting games achieve equilibria, which
otherwise they would not have. It is also worth noting that the focus the analysis is
on public goods, because private goods do not exhibit externalities and therefore, if
centralized decisions fail to provide efficient outcomes, this is not crucial for societal
welfare. Competitive markets could be used, instead, to allocate resources. In other
words, the reason why we examine the role of political institutions is exactly because
they impact the efficiency of social decisions when they are needed the most: to solve
problems which involve public goods.
This chapter takes the analysis one step further, by asking whether and how the
required political institutions can emerge endogenously. The answer given to this ques-
tion is to the affirmative. In the extended political game of section 3.4, it was shown
how separation of power can arise endogenously and how legislators select appropriate
institutions in order to limit the extractive powers of politicians. Thus, the point made
is that whenever collective decisions may increase societal welfare, agents have an in-
centive to devise and agree upon appropriate political institutions so that the decision
process does not break down. In fact, because the equilibrium outcomes of the game
presented coincide with the Lindahl allocations of the economy, one can say that agents
have the incentive to devise appropriate institutions so that they limit the rents of
politicians.
There is a variety of dimensions which the game can be extended to, while retaining
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its power, and most of these dimensions were discussed in the preceding sections. The
next step is to generalize the game for economies with multiple public goods and find if
additional political institutions are necessary for achieving the same set of equilibria. We
also intend to examine how these institutions can emerge by the actions of the agents.
Another question of interest is whether the results can be extended to economies with
asymmetric information. In this case, what are the political incentives for selecting a
specific mechanism and through which institutions do agents align political interests
with their own? These questions are left for future research.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter One
Lemma 1: Let PF(E) be the Pareto Frontier of economy E. Then, for every allo-
cation a on the Pareto Frontier, there exists at least one agent i ∈ I, who does not envy
the allocation of any other agent: Ui(ai) > Ui(aj),∀j ∈ I.
Proof: Suppose that the claim does not hold. Then, all agents envy at least one other
agent: ∀ ai ∃ j ∈ I, j 6= i : Ui(aj) > Ui(ai). But, since this holds for all agents, then
there exists at least one reassignment of individual allocations among the I agents such
that some of them are made strictly better-off and the rest remain as well-off as under
a.
In order to find one such reassignment, use the following algorithm. Pick an arbitrary
i ∈ I and let i = {j ∈ I : Ui(aj) > Ui(ai)}, be the set of agents whom i envies. Reassign
aj, for some j ∈ i to i. If i ∈ j, then reassign ai to j and stop the reassignment. If i /∈ j,
then reassign some ah, h ∈ j to j and then proceed to agent h. Continue until you
reach some agent k, such that either i ∈ k or there exists some l ∈ k, whose allocation
al has already being reassigned. In the first case, reassign to k allocation ai and stop
the reassignments. In the latter case, ignore all reassignments preceding agent l (these
agents retain their original allocations), reassign to l the allocation ak and stop the
reassignments.
Since the set of agents is finite and all agents envy at least one allocation, after at
most I reassignments, the algorithm above will end-up in some agent, whose allocation
has already been reassigned, or the first agent, where reassignment started. In this case,
a reassignment of allocations has been found, which makes some agents in I better-off
(from agent l until agent k) while the rest remain equally well-off. This constitutes a
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Pareto improvement and violates the initial assumption that a ∈ PF (E). 
Lemma 2: For every allocation a on the Pareto Frontier, there exists at least one
agent i ∈ I, whose allocation is not envied by any other agent: Uj(aj) > Uj(ai),∀j ∈ I.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that the claim does
not hold. Then, all agents are envied by at least one other agent: ∀ai ∃ j ∈ I, j 6=
i : Uj(ai) > Uj(aj). But, this implies that there exists at least one reassignment of
individual allocations among the I agents such that some of them are made strictly
better-off and the rest remain as well-off as under a.
In order to find one such reassignment, use the following algorithm. Pick an arbitrary
i ∈ I and reassign ai to one of the agents in the set i = {j ∈ I : Uj(ai) > Uj(aj)}. Then
reassign aj. If i ∈ j, then reassign aj to i and stop the reassignment. If i /∈ j, then
reassign aj to some arbitrary h ∈ j and repeat the reassignment. Continue until you
reach some agent k, such that there exists some l ∈ k, whose allocation al has already
being reassigned. Ignore all reassignments preceding agent l (these agents retain their
original allocations), reassign to l the allocation ak and stop the reassignments.
Since the set of agents is finite and all allocations are envied by at least one agent,
after at most I reassignments, the algorithm above will end-up in some agent whose
allocation has already been reassigned. In this case, we have found a reassignment of
allocations which makes some agents in I better-off while the rest remain equally well-
off. This constitutes a Pareto improvement and violates the initial assumption that
a ∈ PF (E). 
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Corollary 1: If a ∈ PF (E), then Lemma 1 and 2 hold for any subset of I. Namely, let
Iˇ ⊆ I and let Aˇ = {ai : i ∈ Iˇ}. Then, if a ∈ PF (E), Lemma 1 and 2 hold for Iˇ with
regards to Aˇ as well.
Proof: Take any subset of agents Iˇ of the set I. Suppose that Lemma 1 and 2 do
not hold over the set Aˇ, which is the set of individual allocations of the agents in Iˇ.
Then, it is possible to find a reassignment of allocations between the agents in Iˇ, such
that some of them will be made better-off while the rest remain as well-off. But that
is a Pareto-improvement for some agents in I, which contradicts the assumption that
a ∈ PF (E). 
Lemma 3: If the LNCIP holds, then around the neighborhood of any individual
allocation ai, there exists a set of allocations such that each agent of a certain type
prefers a particular allocation over the rest.
Proof: Recall that Ci(a) = {c ∈ A : Ui(c|ϑi,θ−i) = Ui(a|ϑi,θ−i), ‖c− a‖ < }.
Also, define Lj(ai) to be the lower-contour set of agent j associated with allocation ai:
Lj(ai) = {c ∈ A : Uj(c|ϑj,θ−j) < Uj(ai|ϑj,θ−j)} and Vj(ai) to be the upper-contour
set: Vj(ai) = {c ∈ A : Uj(c|ϑj,θ−j) > Uj(ai|ϑj,θ−j)}.
H is a L× S − 1 hyper-plane, which passes through ai, and is perpendicular to the
MRS of some type’s indifference curve, which also passes through ai. H splits the space
of allocations in two sub-spaces, A1 and A2. In each of these sub-spaces, and due to the
LNCIP, there exists some  > 0 such that for every  < , within the open ball B(ai),
the upper contour set of a type is a subset of the upper contour set of some other type
(see also the picture below).
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Figure 10: LNCIP and Local Incentive Compatibility
Say that agent k is the type with the smallest upper contour set within ball B(ai)
and subspace A1: Vk(ai)
⋂
B(ai)
⋂
A1 ⊂ Vl(ai)
⋂
B(ai)
⋂
A1,∀l ∈ Θ. Then, there
exists some allocation b ∈ B(ai) such that ai is strictly preferred to b by agents of type k,
but the agents of all other types strictly prefer b to ai: b ∈ Lk(ai) and b ∈ Vl(ai),∀l ∈ Θ.
Likewise, there exists allocation c, which does not belong in the two smallest upper
contour sets within B(ai) but it is within all the other upper contour sets, which means
that ai is strictly preferred by type k to b and c, b is strictly preferred by the type with
the second smallest contour set to ai and c and all the other types prefer c to ai and
b. By induction, one can construct Θ− 1 allocations in the -neighborhood of ai, such
that the agents of one type strictly prefer one allocation over all the other. 
Proposition 3: In the space of mechanisms, which permit sub-games with no equilib-
rium in pure strategies, Condition 1 is sufficient for full implementation.
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Proof: Suppose that GI(P,A) is a simultaneous move game G : P → A with I players,
and assume thatG has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (examples include Jackson
(1991) and Maskin (1999)). Also, arbitrarily restrict the payoffs of GI such that the
maximum possible payoff for any type is lower than if he were to receive the first-best
allocation of any other type56. Let Ri(p−i, G) be the best-response correspondence of
agent i if game GI is played. Finally, suppose that Condition 1 is satisfied and that
the interim distribution of types, β, is common knowledge. The mechanism below fully
implements any Pareto efficient allocation which satisfies Anonymity.
Each agent reports his type mi and a final allocation is received according to the
following mechanism M(g, a):
(i) If m ∈ Θ(β), then ai(mi,m−i) = a∗(mi, β), ∀i ∈ I.
(ii) If m is such that for two types, (ϑ, ϑ′), the number of reported agents is different
from number of agents in the interim-distribution by one, specifically λm(ϑ) =
λβ(ϑ) + 1, λm(ϑ
′) = λβ(ϑ′)− 1, then:
• If Rank(ϑ) = Rank(ϑ′), agents who reported types ϑ, ϑ′ choose an allocation
from the set {a∗ϑ − , a∗ϑ′ − }.  is strictly positive for all state-contingent
commodities and it is sufficiently small so that a∗ϑ− ϑ a∗ϑ′ and a∗ϑ′− ϑ′ a∗ϑ.
• If Rank(ϑ) > Rank(ϑ′), agents who reported types ϑ, ϑ′ choose an allocation
from the set {aϑ(ϑ, ϑ′), aϑ′(ϑ, ϑ′)}. a(ϑ, ϑ′) satisfies Condition 1.
• If Rank(ϑ) < Rank(ϑ′), agents who report type ϑ′ receive allocation a∗ϑ′ and
agents who report type ϑ receive allocation
λβ(ϑ)
λm(ϑ)
a∗ϑ.
• For all mk 6= {ϑ, ϑ′}, ak(mk,m−i) = a∗(mk, β).
56An easy way to do this is to multiple all payoffs of GI with an arbitrarily small but positive
number.
127
(iii) For any other case, the mechanism induces the game GI .
If more than one misreport is detected, M induces GI , which has no equilibrium
57.
Therefore, there can be no equilibrium of the mechanism where agents believe that more
than two misreports will be detected. Conditional on that, it is a strictly dominant
strategy for the agents of the highest rank to report truthfully their type. To see
this, take agent i of type ϑ and suppose that his rank is K. Agent i’s only possible
equilibrium beliefs are that: either (i) all other agents will report truthfully or (ii) one
other agent will misreport or (iii) there will be multiple misreports but they will cover
each other (e.g. type ϑk reporting as type ϑl and vice versa) apart from one. Case (ii)
and (iii) are strategically equivalent for i as his response induces the same allocation.
If i believes that all other agents will report their type truthfully then his best
response is to report truthfully as well. Otherwise, he receives either the allocation
a∗ϑ − , if he misreports his type as of another type with equal rank, or the allocation
λβ(ϑ
′)
λm(ϑ)
a∗ϑ′ , where ϑ
′ is of lower rank than i. Clearly, i strictly prefers a∗ϑ to the above
allocations and his best response is to report his type truthfully.
If, on the other hand, i believes that an agent (say j of type ϑ′) of rank(K) will
misreport his type to ϑ, then by reporting truthfully he receives a∗ϑ−, while by reporting
type ϑ′ he receives a∗ϑ′ . By construction, a
∗
ϑ−  ϑ a∗ϑ′ . If i reports any other type then
his payoff will be even less due to the restrictions on the payoffs of GI . Hence, i’s best
response is to report truthfully.
If i believes that an agent (say m of type ϑ′′) of a lower rank will misreport his type
to ϑ, then a similar argument goes through. Reporting truthfully is strictly preferred
to reporting any other type, since aϑ(ϑ, ϑ
′′) ϑ a∗ϑ′′ . Finally, if i believes that some
agent m of type ϑm will misreport his type to ϑn, then i prefers reporting truthfully
57More than one misreport detected means that either λβ(ϑ) 6= λm(ϑ) for more than two types or
that λm(ϑ)− λβ(ϑ) > 2 and λm(ϑ′)− λβ(ϑ′) 6 2 for some types ϑ, ϑ′.
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and receiving a∗ϑ to reporting untruthfully and receiving some payoff induced by GI .
Hence, for all beliefs that can be consistent with equilibrium, all agents of rank
K strictly prefer to report their type truthfully. Given this and by following the same
reasoning, agents of rank(K−1) strictly prefer to report truthfully as well. By induction
and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, we conclude that all ranks will
report truthfully and hence the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the mechanism is for
all agents to report their type truthfully. 
Proposition 4: Condition 1 and 2 are jointly sufficient for full implementation.
Proof: Suppose that Condition 1 and 2 are satisfied and that the interim distribution
of types, β, is common knowledge. The mechanism below fully implements any Pareto
efficient allocation which satisfies Anonymity. Each agent reports his type mi and a
final allocation is received according to the following mechanism M(g, a):
(i) If m ∈ Θ(β), then ai(mi,m−i) = a∗(mi, β), ∀i ∈ I.
(ii) If m is such that for two types, (ϑ, ϑ′), the number of reported agents is different
from number of agents in the interim-distribution by one, specifically λm(ϑ) =
λβ(ϑ) + 1, λm(ϑ
′) = λβ(ϑ′)− 1, then:
• If Rank(ϑ) = Rank(ϑ′), agents who reported types ϑ, ϑ′ choose an allocation
from the set {a∗ϑ − , a∗ϑ′ − }.  is strictly positive for all state-contingent
commodities and it is sufficiently small so that a∗ϑ− ϑ a∗ϑ′ and a∗ϑ′− ϑ′ a∗ϑ.
• If Rank(ϑ) > Rank(ϑ′), agents who reported types ϑ, ϑ′ choose an allocation
from the set {aϑ(ϑ, ϑ′), aϑ′(ϑ, ϑ′)}. a(ϑ, ϑ′) satisfies Condition 1.
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• If Rank(ϑ) < Rank(ϑ′), agents who report type ϑ′ receive allocation a∗ϑ′ and
agents who report type ϑ receive allocation
λβ(ϑ)
λm(ϑ)
a∗ϑ.
• For all mk 6= {ϑ, ϑ′}, ak(mk,m−i) = a∗(mk, β).
(iii) For any other case, an allocation a˜, which satisfies Condition 2, is implemented.
The mechanism above is identical to the mechanism of Proposition 3, with the only
exception that, if more than one misreport is detected, then instead of inducing a game
without an equilibrium, the mechanism provides an allocation which is constructed
according to Condition 2. By construction of a˜, all types prefer to report truthfully if
they believe that many misreports will be detected.
Therefore, even if a rank(K)-agent believes that there will be several detections
of misreports, he still prefers to report truthfully. He also prefers to report truth-
fully than reporting any other type, if he believes that there is only one misreport
(aϑ(ϑ, ϑ
′′) ϑ a∗ϑ′′ ϑ a˜ϑ′). Since his best-response remains the same for all other be-
liefs, this means that any agent of rank(K) has a strictly dominant strategy to report
truthfully. Therefore, by following the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition
3 and by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, we conclude that the
mechanism has a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium, at which all agents report their type
truthfully. 
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Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter Two
Proposition 1: Let p = kH + βj(v − kL) − c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) . Consider the social con-
tract S∗, which defines:
(i) if trade of good g takes place, agent ξ receives subsidy (negative taxation)
τξ1 = (1− f(e, e))
(
βξ(v − kL)− c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
< 0.
(ii) if trade of good g does not takes place, agent ξ pays out taxation
τξ0 = f(e, e)
(
−βξ(v − kL) + c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
> 0.
(iii) any private contract pi(0, pˆ, Ig) or pi(qˆ, p, Ig), with pˆ > p or qˆ > p − p is non-
enforceable.
Then S∗ implements the first best effort levels and it is renegotiation-proof.
Proof of Proposition 1: Without any subsidization of effort, the farmer and the
producer will trade the good only in the low-cost state at the expected price p =
(1− βi)v − βikL. The expected utility from trade is v − p = βi(v − kL) for the farmer
and p− kL = (1− βi)(v − kL) for the plough-maker.
Agent ξ exerts high effort in the production of good g if the expected utility of high
effort is higher than the expected utility of low effort. Assuming that trade takes place
at the expected price and given the beliefs of ξ for the effort level of ζ:
eξ = e⇔ f(e, eζ) (βξ(v − kL)− τξ1)+(1−f(e, eζ))(−τξ0)−c > f(e, eζ) (βξ(v − kL)− τξ1)+
(1− f(e, eζ))(−τξ0)− c⇔
τξ0 − τξ1 > −βξ(v − kL) + c−cf(e,eζ)−f(e,eζ)
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Since we require both agents to exert high effort58: τξ0 − τξ1 > −βξ(v − kL) + c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) .
This expression gives the minimum required wedge between taxation in the two states
in order to induce high effort for ξ. Notice that the right hand side of the inequality
is positive due to the condition imposed by inequality (1) in section 2.2. On the other
hand, incentive compatibility requires that the producer of the good, who suffers from
the high production costs in state H, does not want to trade in that state. The farmer
may be willing to offer him an increased price in order to cover the high production
cost, in which case incentive compatibility is impossible to satisfy without restrictions
on the transfers that the two agents can do. Indeed, if the farmer pays an expected
price pˆ, incentive compatibility for the producer requires(notice that in this case, since
we are referring to the producer, ξ = j):
pˆ− kH − τj1 6 −τj0 ⇔ τj0 − τj1 6 kH − pˆ
Combining the two inequalities above, the combination of incentive compatibility and
effort exertion conditions, gives:
−βj(v − kL) + c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) 6 kH − pˆ⇔
pˆ 6 kH + βj(v − kL)− c− c
f(e, e)− f(e, e) (18)
Any net transfer of resources higher than the right hand side of (18) will lead to
violation of incentive compatibility and trade in the high cost state, which then leads
to low-effort exertion. This is because agents know that they will trade and receive the
58One may worry that coordination failures are possible if both agents believe that the other agent
will exert low effort level and if f(e, e) − f(e, e) > f(e, e) − f(e, e). In this case one can define the
difference between taxation levels in terms of the min{f(e, e)−f(e, e) , f(e, e)−f(e, e)}. This ensures
that it is a strictly dominant strategy for each agent to exert high effort.
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subsidies in any state of the world. Let p = kH + βj(v − kL) − c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) . First, note
that p is greater than the fair price p:
p > p⇔ kH + βj(v − kL)− c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) > (1− βi)v + βikL ⇔ kH − kL > c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
The inequality above holds, due to the assumptions of the model and inequality (1):
kH − kL > v − kL > c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
Since p > p, the producer will not accept to trade in the high cost state without
receiving an additional payment above the “fair” price. So violation of incentive com-
patibility from one side requires a higher exchange price or a side contract, actions
which themselves are verifiable. Second, the farmer is willing to pay a price as high,
because the utility of trading under this price is greater than the utility of not-trading:
v − p− τi1 > τi0 ⇔ v − kH − βj(v − kL) + c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) − (τi0 − τi1) > 0⇔
kL − kH + 2 c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e) > 0 , which holds due to inequality (3) in chapter 2.
Therefore, inducing high-effort exertion and incentive compatibility, require that
any transfer pˆ > p or any side-payment qˆ > p−p is non-enforceable. Required taxation
conditional on trade is given by:
τξ0 − τξ1 > −βξ(v − kL) + c− c
f(e, e)− f(e, e) (19)
f(e, e)τξ1 + (1− f(e, e))τξ0 = 0 (20)
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This system provides the required taxation levels as given by the proposition. We
turn now to the issue of renegotiation-proofness. Consider first the ex-post renegotia-
tion. If the low-cost state arises then the farmer and the producer can enforce the trade
and receive the subsidies by making the same trade agreement as the one they would
have made in the absence of the social contract. This provides them the maximum ex-
post payoff. Therefore, any renegotiation of the social contract can not increase their
payoffs and agents have no incentive to renegotiate it with the institutional agent. If
the high-cost state arises, then the two agents can increase their pay-offs if they modify
the social contract so that private contracts are enforceable. In such a case, net trans-
fers of resources between the two agents are allowed and they can extract the subsidies
by trading at the pre-specified price p, even though this is suboptimal. Since it is the
institutional agent who bears the true cost of this sub-optimal transaction, both i and j
would agree on it. However, the institutional agent anticipates the renegotiation of the
social contract in the bad state. Furthermore, any credible reward the agents are willing
to provide to him in order to agree to renegotiate does not cover for the losses by paying
out the subsidies. Therefore, the institutional agent does not agree to renegotiate the
social contract in period 4.
A similar type of argument shows that the institutional agent does not agree to
renegotiate the social contract in the interim stage. 
Proposition 2 below provides the necessary conditions for the implementation of first-
best effort levels. It is proven for a more general environment, where effort levels are
continuous and hence inequalities (1)-(2) are not necessary. Condition (3) is substituted
for v− kL > kH − v, but the interpretation and role is the same. Due to the Revelation
Principle, we restrict attention to direct mechanisms S, where agents send messages
about the state of the world and the mechanism determines if the good is traded or
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not, at what price and if subsidies are given.
Proposition 2: The existence of the institutional agent and the non-enforcement of
private contracts contingent on trade are necessary conditions for the implementation
of first-best effort levels.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we prove that any renegotiation-proof mechanism S
that does not include an institutional agent (Σ = Ø) can not implement the first-best
effort levels. Consider any direct mechanism S( . ,Σ = Ø), and assume that the mech-
anism infers that the cost is low if the agents send the messages mˆ. Implementation of
the first-best effort levels requires that trade takes place and appropriate subsidies are
provided only in the low-cost state. Therefore, in terms of ex-post utility, the combi-
nation of incentive compatibility and efficiency requires:
ui(mˆi, mˆj|kL) = v − kL > ui(m′i, mˆj|kL),∀m′i (21)
uj(mˆj, mˆi|kL) = v − kL > uj(m′j, mˆi|kL), ∀m′j (22)
uξ(m˜ξ, mˆζ |kH) = 0 > uξ(mˆξ, mˆζ |kH), for some m˜ξ 6= mˆξ and for some ξ ∈ {i, j} (23)
uζ(mζ , m˜ξ|kH) = 0 ,∀mζ and ζ 6= ξ (24)
Inequalities (21) and (22) imply that the aggregate subsidy given in the low-cost state
is equal to the surplus:
∑
ξ
sξ = v − kL. Inequalities (23) and (24) require that at least
one of the agents has the incentive not to trade if the high-cost state arises, while the
other does not benefit from the non occurrence of trade.
If the mechanism S( . ,Σ = Ø) allows for private contracts, contingent on messages
(the equivalent of private contracts conditional on trade), (23) can not be satisfied.
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This is because
∑
ξ
sξ = v − kL > kH − v and therefore there is always a private
contract pi(mˆi, q, ∅) such that uξ(mˆξ, mˆζ |kH) + q > 0 for both agents. Without loss
of generality, assume that S( . ,Σ = Ø) specifies a price p (not necessarily equal to
(1 − βi)v + βikL), if g is traded, and subsidies {si, sj}, which satisfy (21) and (22).
Then ui(mˆi, mˆj|kH) = v − p + si, uj(mˆj, mˆi|kH) = p − kH + sj and ui(mˆi, mˆj|kH) +
uj(mˆj, mˆi|kH) = v − kH +
∑
ξ
sξ = (v − kL) − (kH − v) > 0. Therefore, there exists
a net-transfer q and a private contract pi(mˆξ, p, ∅) such that ui(mˆi, mˆj|kH) + q > 0
and uj(mˆj, mˆi|kH) − q > 0, which violates the incentive compatibility-cum-efficiency
condition.
If, on the other-hand, S( . ,Σ = Ø) does not allow for the enforcement of private
contracts, then there are two possibilities. Either inequality (23) can not be satisfied,
in which case the result of the proposition holds, or (23) is satisfied. In this case,
however, M is not ex-post renegotiation proof, because there exists another mechanism
S ′( . ,Σ = Ø), which allows for private contract enforcement and makes both agents
better off, as shown above. This completes the first part of the proposition, namely that
the existence of the institutional agent is a necessary condition for the implementation
of the first-best effort levels.
The necessity of the non-enforcement of the private contracts follows from the first
part of the proof. Even if the mechanism specifies an institutional agent, inequalities
(21)-(24) must still be satisfied, and with enforceable agreements of the form pi(m, q, ∅),
we already showed how (23) is violated. 
Lemma 1: The optimal social contract S∗ determines that the set Σ is of measure
zero. That is, the total number of institutional agents is infinitesimal compared to the
aggregate population.
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Proof: Formally, S∗ = arg max
S
{mi(S)Ui +mj(S)Uj +mΣSr+σ }, where mi(S) is the mass
of agents of type i who engage in productive activities according to S, mj(S) is the
mass of type j agents, who engage in productive activities, and mΣ(S) is the mass of
institutional agents set by S.
We show that any contract S, which assigns strictly positive mass to the set of
institutional agents can not be socially optimal and will be not chosen. To see this,
consider the social contract S(Σ,Φ(Q), τ, za, zg), with mΣ > 0. Let S
′ be another
social contract which specifies exactly the same taxation and investment schemes as
S (τ ′ = τ , z′a = za , z
′
g = zg), has the same set of enforceable contracts Φ(Q), but
specifies a smaller set of institutional agents Σ′, subset of Σ (Σ′ ⊂ Σ⇒ mΣ′ < mΣ). S ′
also provides the same rewards r as S to all agent in the set Σ, even though some of the
agents in this set are not institutional agents according to S ′. In other words, S ′ keeps
exactly the same vector of transfers of S but shrinks the set of institutional agents.
Then S ′ provides a Pareto improvement over S. This is because all agents who are
occupied in productive activities under S continue to pay the same taxation and receive
the same benefits from productivity investments in S ′, so their utility is unchanged.
Also the institutional agents in the set Σ′ are equally well-off as in S. But the agents
in the set Σ − Σ′ are made better off because they receive the same reward as before,
plus they are occupied in productive activities under S ′ and receive all the marginal
benefits of their own production: S ′ is a Pareto improvement over S. Hence, any social
contract with positive measure of institutional agents can not be part of the equilibrium
strategies of the game. 
Lemma 2: The optimal social contract specifies the following rewards and punishments
for the institutional agent: {r+σt, r−σt} = {(A(Zat)e∗σa − cia0(e∗σa)), 12A(Zat)(e∗iat + e∗jat)},
with e∗ξat being the optimal effort level for type ξ in period t.
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Proof: Suppose that some social contract S is proposed in period t. The reward
r+σt for the proposed institutional agent σ in period t must be at least as large as the
discounted value of production of the good a that σ can produce in period t. Otherwise,
she can vote against the proposal and receive her autarchic production. Therefore, in
order to achieve the agreement of the institutional agent, the optimal social contract
must set r+σt equal to (A(Zat)e
∗
σa − cia0(e∗σa)), where e∗σa is such that ∂cσa0∂eσa = A(Zat).
On the other hand, the optimal social contract minimizes the resources allocated to
non-productive activities, hence r+σ can not be greater. These two conditions imply
that r+σt = δ
t(A(Zat)e
∗
σa − cia0(e∗σa)), where e∗σa : ∂cσa0∂eσa = A(Zat).
r−σ must be set sufficiently high, so as to prevent the institutional agent from not
complying with the contract. Since the greatest amount of resources that the governor
can extract from the economy is the aggregate production of the autarchic good, setting
r−σt equal to
1
2
A(Zat)(e
∗
iat+e
∗
jat) is sufficient for making the governor to comply with her
role in period t. The above mean that the rewards and punishments must increase with
the increase in the productivity of the economy for the non-specialized good and the
aggregate exerted effort level in its production. This generates the optimal punishment
plan {r+σ , r−σ }, which is a vector with elements r+σt(A(Zat)) and r−σt(A(Zat)) for t ∈
[0, T ].
Proposition 3: Let p = Γ(Zgt−1)
(
kH + βj(v − kL)− c−cf(e,e)−f(e,e)
)
. Incentive compati-
bility requires that any private contract pi(pˆ, Ig) or pi(qˆ, p, Ig), with pˆ > p or qˆ > p− p
is non-enforceable.
Proof: The proof follows from the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B. Incentive
compatibility for type j requires that she prefers not to trade in the high cost state
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than to trade, which implies that p + q − ΓtkH − τj1t 6 −τj0t. At the same time, the
difference in taxation conditional on trade must be sufficiently high so that agent j
prefers to exert high effort. The condition is given by equation (6) in subsection 2.4.1.
Combining the two conditions gives the condition that p+ q 6 p. 
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The figures in the following three pages present diagrammatically all the possible
cases of investment plans. We do not derive the conditions under which these paths
arise, but the required analysis is similar to subsection 2.4.4. The cases depend on the
size of the three critical values Z˜a, Za and Za. In each case, the optimal investment
path is described in terms of: (i) its duration (as provided by the endogenous thresholds
t˜, t, t and t∗), (ii) for which goods is the productivity increased through investments in
the respective capital stocks, and (iii) for how many types of agents is effort exertion
subsidized. Recall that if only one type of agent receives a taxation-break, then this is
the type with the lowest bargaining power.
aaa ZZZ
~
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Figure 11: Case I
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Case III:
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